Advisory board

Rosi Braidoti, University of Utrecht
Judith Butler, University of California, Berkeley
Ghislaine Glasson Deschaumes, Editor of "Transeuropéennes", Paris
Elisabeth Grosz, Buffalo University - State University of New York

Marina Grzinic, Slovenian Academy of Science and Art
Judith Halberstam, University of California, San Diego
Petar Krasztev, Central European University, Budapest
Hanne Lorek, Humboldt University, Berlin
Vladimir Milcin, University of Skopje

Miglena Nikolcina, University of Sofia
Zarana Papic, University of Belgrade
Svetlana Slapsak, Institutum Studiorum Humanitatis - Ljubljana

Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture (ISSN 1409-9268) is published biannually.
Publisher: Research Center in Gender Studies, Euro-Balkan Institute, "Partizanski odredi" 63, Skopje, Macedonia

Subscription:
Macedonia, 1 year: 10$ individuals (plus postage expenses), 15$ institutions (plus postage expenses).
Eastern Europe, 1 year: 10$ individuals (plus postage expenses), 15$ institutions (plus postage expenses).
Other countries: 1 year: 20$ individuals (plus postage expenses), institutions: 40$ (plus postage expenses).
Contact: Dusica Dimitrovska-Gajdoska, Identities, "Partizanski odredi" 63, e-mail: identities@sonet.com.mk
www.euba.org.mk/identities.htm

Notice to Contributors
1. Please type all copy – including reference list and notes – double-spaced and allow generous margins on both sides, on the top and the bottom.
2. Place the notes at the end of the paper, just before the reference list.
3. Use font size 12, both for the notes and the reference list.
4. For the citations and references, it is recommended to apply the standard outlined in the Chicago Manual of Style.
### СОДРЖИНА

#### 7 I. ПОЛИТИКА/ИДЕНТИТЕТИ
- 9 Катерина Колозова: Замислувајќи го лицето на „Реалното”: Некои размисли за војната и насилиството
- 24 Имануел Вапершайн: Култури во конфликт? Кои сме Није? Кои се Другите?
- 50 АлаШивчишева: Фуко за смењето

#### 65 II. СЕКСУАЛИТЕТИ/ИДЕНТИТЕТИ
- 67 Јасна Котеска: Сексуалноста на синот кај Кафка: тероризам и прогон
- 82 Џудит Халберстам: Силеџии, чудаци и кралеви: постимперијални мажествености
- 113 Елизабет Грос: Лезбејски фетишизам?

#### 135 III. КУЛТУРИ/ИДЕНТИТЕТИ
- 137 Мируше Хоџи: Патот, цикличноста и театарот (или: Врз кој темел го дефинираме поимот на универсалноста во контекст на театарот?)
- 146 Рада Ивековиќ: Полот на нацијата
- 164 Марина Гржиниќ: Монструозни тела и субверзови грешки

#### 185 КЛАСИЧЕН ТЕКСТ
- 187 Ричард Рорти: Феминизмот и прагматизмот

#### 227 Прикази/осврти


"Идентитети" истакнува дека сите текстови се објавени со согласност на авторите.
CONTENTS

7 I. POLITICS/IDENTITIES
9 Katerina Kolozova: Imagining the Face of the "Real": Some Considerations about War and Violence
24 Immanuel Wallerstein: "Cultures in Conflict? Who are We? Who are the Others?"
50 Alla Ivanchikova: Foucault on Laughter

65 II. SEXUALITIES/IDENTITIES
67 Jasna Koteska: The Sexual Strategy of the Son in Kafka: Terrorism and Exile
82 Judith Halberstam: Thugs, Geezers and Kings: Post-imperial Masculinities
113 Elizabeth Grosz: Lesbian Fetishism?

135 III. CULTURES/IDENTITIES
137 Miruse Hodza: The Path, Cyclicity and the Theatre (Or: On What Ground Do We Define the Term Universality, In the Context Of the Theatre
146 Rada Ivekovic: Le sexe de la nation
164 Marina Grzinic: Monstrous bodies and subversive errors

185 CLASSICAL TEXT
187 Richard Rorty: Feminism and Pragmatism

227 Reviews

"Identities" wishes to underscore that all articles are published with the permission of the authors.
identities
Katerina Kolozova

IMAGINING THE FACE OF THE “REAL”: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT WAR AND VIOLENCE

1. The War and her powers of consolidation
(with respect to identity)

To a mind - and body - born and grown up in the “postmodern condition”, and brought up according to the best traditions of the postmodern thought, the experience of war - and the violence pertaining (specifically) to it - calls for (or simply generates) some disturbing restructurings of the ways of thought. In my personal experience, what has been - in this sense - the most striking effect of the war that has been ailing Macedonia for almost half a year already, can be reduced to the shock by the necessitating powers of the Real (of violence) over the “realms of the Imaginary”. (Under the designation of “the realms of the Imaginary” I subscribe also the notions of the “symbolic”, “sign”, “semantic”, “fiction” - in psychoanalytic terms, all pertaining to the “signifying chain”.)

Before our eyes we see, with our bodies and in our minds we experience the “imaginary” categories, such as “Nation” and some other collective identities, fold painfully into “real” ones, transforming themselves into concrete situatedness infused by the - still ungraspable yet not quite unthinkable - presence of the Real/real.
The unconceivable self-nurturing of violence, the mysteriously auto-generated deployment of force, the grave continuous trauma in the shape of pain, anxiety and anger - still in a state of suspense, rather than certainty, of war - is something that can be experienced but as an omnipresent thrust of the Real into life. This is how it feels like now in Macedonia, at least for some of us...

We all - to a certain extent, inescapably - become a part of - to some of us abjectly - the concrete "we". And, moreover, as opposed to "them". And one is cornered to embrace this restrictive choice as a necessity, since it is the sovereign rule of the violence of War which decides so (for us). Most of the attempts for transcendence of this and such an imposition of choice turn out to be futile, although one cannot, must not abandon attempting. Nevertheless, frustration is created.

One realizes that behind that imaginary (presumably pertaining exclusively to the territory of Sign...) construction of identity resides a residual unsusceptible to transcendence, acting as necessity breathing upon the insurmountable Real of the (defining) opposition of the Other. The identity narrative within which one (we, you, I, they...) is situated becomes a self-enclosure (a turn upon and against "oneself", upon and against one's desire)\(^1\), imposed by the confining imperative of the Real (of War) to embrace the opposition of the Other as his/her only possible position. (Meaning his/her only possible positioning with respect to "me" and "us".) And it is a confinement not only by, but also within the domain of the Real, namely the "material"\(^2\) -
говото/нејзино единствено можно позиционирање во однос на „мене“ и „нас“.) И ова е ограничување не само од страна на, туку и внатре во областа на Реалното, имено „материјалното“ - ограничување на, и од страна на, територија, географија или топографија. „Тие“ се во ова или она село, а „ние“ не сме. Ке се приближат ли „тие“ до местото на кое што сме „није“, „оние идат“ ќе ни се доближат ли „нам тука“?

Ова чиј сведок сум - во јавниот дискурс на воена Македонија - во поглед на конкретизацијата и консолидацијата (со посредство на Реалното на Војната) на „ние“ и „тие“ зад имињата, е дека етничките „ние“ и „тие“ не се единствените вклучени во овој процес. Тука се, исто така, и „ние“ и „тие“ што ја претставуваат Нацијата-Држава, од една страна, и групите на ОНА, од друга; потоа, „ние“ што ги претставува сите идентички од Македонија (и Балканот), без оглед на етничката припадност, и „тие“ од т.н. „Меѓународна заедница“. Потоа, и други форми на „ние“ и „тие“ се во жив процес на консолидација!... Сепак, наша задача овде не е да составиме каталог на оваа разнообразност на идентитети што ќе го проучиме, туку да го истражиме она што им е заедничко на овие процеси, имено учинокот што Реалното на Војната го предизвикува врз нив.

Впечатливото во овие процеси е постоенето на определена моќ на присилба насочена кон тоа „доброволно“ - колку и да звучи парадоксално ова - да се прифати еден од двата спротиставени идентитети во рамки на една бинарна структура (на пример, Македонец/Албанец или Албанец/Неалбанец; Прозападен/Антизападен, итн.) Оваа моќ ги наметнува овие и важните рестриктивни избори на таков начин што ги произведува како ненадминлива нужност обвитана во густата аура на неумолкашна реалност. Ова е моќта на заканата на насилството.

Оваа „мистериозна“ сила на принуда е изворот на впечатокот за опипливата присутност на реалното (Реалното) во она што до вчера претставуваше само сениште, идеја, концепт - политичко-културниот и национален идентитет. Ке се заложам за тоа дека токму присутството,

confinement within and by territory, geography or topography. “They” are in this and that village, and “we” are not. Are “they” going to come closer to where “we” are, “those there” will “they” approach “us”, who are here?

What I am witnessing – in the public discourse of Macedonia at war – with respect to the concretization and consolidation (by means of the Real of War) of the “we” and “they” behind the names, is that the ethnic “we” and “they” are not the only ones involved in this process. There are also the “we” and “they” representing the Nation-State on the one hand and the groups of NLA on the other; then, the “us” representing all those from Macedonia (and the Balkans) regardless of the ethnic belonging and the “they” of the so-called “International Community”. Also other forms of “we” and “they” are in fermenting processes of consolidation… However, our task here is not to set up and study a catalogue of this diversity of identities, but to explore the commonality they undergo in these processes, namely the impact of the Real of War upon them.

What is fascinating as a part of these processes, is a certain compelling power to “voluntarily” – however paradoxical this may sound - embrace one of the two opposing identities within a binary structure (for instance, Macedonian/Albanian or Albanian/Non-Albanian; Pro-Western/Anti-Western, and so on). This power imposes these and such restrictive choices in a way that it renders them as some insurmountable necessity wrapped into a thick aura of an implacable reality. And it is the power of the threat of violence.

This “mysterious” compelling force is the source of the impression of the tangible presence of the real (Real) within what only until yesterday was but a specter, an idea, a concept – the politico-cultural and national identity. I shall argue that it is precisely the presence, the thrust and the insertion of the Real
IMAGINING THE FACE OF THE "REAL"

The becoming of flesh and blood of these "abstractions", and vice versa, incited by the imposed (to everyone in the country) exposition to the Trauma of war and violence, is what I would like to engage in considering here. I shall also attempt to expose the castrating powers of the Real (of War and violence) and the suffocating effects of the Abject - as merely the obverse of the Real - over the political Subject, inspired by the latest political and military events in my country.

2. The ways in which the Real (of Violence) operates within the construction of identity

[2. 1. The principal politico-ontological frustration provoked by the Real of War]

In its greatest part this essay shall be an account of the political - and ontological, as immanently pertaining to the construction of the Subject - frustrations caused by the reality of the binary, exclusive and oppositionary choices of identification imposed by the cornering powers of violence.

The key political oppositions at play in this war - which always inherently pertain to a certain claim of identity - enforced by the powers of violent force, establish the firm limits of discourse and annihilate virtually any possibility of their transcendence, let alone proposing completely different and new discourses. The discourse that has been inaugurated within these firm limits is, of course, that of war. The first political (and ontological) frustration occurs when one attempts to realize his/her
The firmness and implacability of this imposition originates from the actual sovereign rule of the Real (of violence and of war) and its "performative" position in language and discourse.

"The performative of the Real"... This may sound as *contradictio in adjecto*, but only if one claims the absolute and undisturbed absence of the Real from the signifying chain, which I am not (claiming). What I will argue here is precisely the contrary - that the Real "presentifies" itself into the pleasure principle and on the territory of the sign, and thus can assume its "performative" positions. In different words, the inescapability of the imposed choices, the unavoidability of the enforced discourses, with their strong aspects of violence and force, all of this renders these impositions (of identity situating, discourses, etc.) as the performances of the Real itself, together with its own specific impact - that of Trauma.

Thus, what I am discussing here are not the mediations of the Real through and by the signifying chain, but the immediacy of the Ungraspable and Implacable itself and its unmediated encounter with the fantasmatic, the imaginary, or quite simply - with the identity constructs. Violence in itself, and its interactions with and within the political, is the subject of our discussion here, as well as its active, shaping role within the processes of identification.

Let us now consider a brief account of the elements of how (and why) I am proposing to think the "unthinkable" (psychoanalytic and, concurrently, postmodern) Real in the context of this debate:
[2.2 Ex-course: methodological points of departure]

By accepting François Laruelle's radical critique of the dualistic, binaristic and oppositional ways of thinking, I am also rejecting the dichotomy and the exclusive opposition between the real and the fiction. In fact, at the very core of Laruelle's radical critique lies the deconstruction of the real:fiction dichotomy and it is precisely the notion of the "real" liberated from its relation (not only of opposition but of the "logic of relating" as such) to the fiction which enables him to conceive of a Thought which would be beyond duality. In his Philosophie et non-philosophie he claims that the "Thought-in-Two", and the relational thought itself, deriving from the latter, represent the perennial essence of the Western thought and philosophy as dichotomic and oppositional. The alternative proposed by Laruelle is the Vision-in-One (la Vision-en-un) conceived as a thought precisely in terms of the real and singularity, as the sole way of evading "relationism" and establishment of a "philosophical cosmos" (or in his own words, "decision philosophique"), which, being generalizing, is also universalizing.

"The problem of philosophy in general originates from the fact that it never thinks of the terms in their specificity, but as contrary to each other, within their relations, and, in the best case, at their borders and in their proximity. As a result of this, the concept of the fiction, like any other [concept], designates an amphibologic [amphibologique] reality, a limitrophy of the real, regardless of the fact whether it is placed beyond [au-delà] the latter, or before it [en deça], or at the border between the two.

From classical rationalism to contemporary deconstructions, fiction has remained captivated within that relation of the mixed [le rapport de mixte], i.e., of the unitary [unitaire]. Excluded by the real, internalized by it, while internalizing it herself and pretending to co-determine it, [la fiction] has never escaped the games of inter-inhibition [entre-inhibition], which are those that philosophy plays with herself, where it is but one of
inhibition], оние што философската ги игра со самата себе, и во кои ова е само една од играчките на историјата која претендира да ја надмине." (Laruelle, 1989: 232)

Така, јас предлагам овде да го мислим Реалното (или реалното) во термини на Ларуеловата сингуларис-тичка мисла на реалното, ослободена од сопствената опозиција, од „односноста“, кон фикциското, фантазматското, имагинарното, знаковното...

Што се однесува, пак, до Реалното на психоаналитичката и постструктуралистичка традиција, тоа, ре-чиси без никаков потрес, успева да ја одржи својата по-зиција au-delà, на Непристапното и Немисливото. На тој начин, тоа се однесува како (веројатно, последното и единствено) недопрено Трансцендентално. Несомнено, аксиом е дека Реалното, и неговите дејства, е нешто што не може да се сфати низ јазик и воведе во (политичкиот) дискурс, бидејќи е немисливо и невообличиво во прашање. За мене, ова е нешто во својата основа проблематично; не можехќи да му одолеам на впечатокот дека токму оваа широко прифатена „Вистина“ е само невидлив остаток на метафизичката верба во Трансценденталното.

Похатаму, самата лакановска психоанализа - или, поточно, фројдовската, низ читањето на Лакан (во Les quatre concepts fondamentaux...) - овозможно мислење на "Немисливото", односно Реалното. Се работи за Реалното во неговит аспект на Траума, или, поточно, за Реалното како Траума, како она (за) кое може да мисли, расправа или, едноставно, да се оприсутни во јазикот. Според Лакан, Реалното/Траумата како tuché - односно случајност и случај што го прекинува, му се наметнува со своето присуство и го трауматизира означителскиот синџир - е во интеракција со синџирот на означители (automaton).4 Според ова, лесно може да се извлече заклучокот дека tuché - преку своите ефекти - произведува пресврти и нови знаци во знаковиот поредок (automaton).

Исто така, оваа расправа во значителна мера и должи на постојаната заложба на Славој Жижек, која, the toys of a history which pretends to surpass it." (Laruelle, 1989: 232)

So, what I am proposing here is to think the Real (or the real) in terms of Laruelle’s singularistic thought of the real, thus liberated from its opposition, or "relationism", to the fictional, phantasmatic, imaginary, signifying...

As for the Real in both the psychoanalytical and the post-structuralist tradition, it has maintained - almost unshakably - its position au-delà, as the Unpenetrable and the Unthinkable. Thus, it acts as (perhaps the last and only) unsullied Transcendental. It is a virtual axiom that the Real, and its workings, is something that cannot be conceived in language and introduced into (political) discourse, being unthinkable and thus unquestionable. I find this fundamentally problematic; not being able to resist the impression that this particular widely accepted "Truth" is but an invisible remainder of the metaphysical belief in the Transcendental.

On the other hand, Lacanian psychoanalysis itself – or rather Freudian, through Lacan's reading (in Les quatre concepts fondamentaux...) – renders the thinking of the "Unthinkable", namely the Real, possible. It is the Real in its aspect of Trauma, or rather the Real as Trauma, that can be thought (about), discussed (about) or, simply, made present into language. According to Lacan, the Real/Trauma interacts with the signifying chain (the automaton) in as much as the tuché, i.e., the hazard and incident that is interrupting, intruding into and traumatizing the signifying chain.3 Thus, one can easily infer that tuché produces (through its effects) reversals, and thus new signs, in the order of signs (the automaton).

This discussion is also deeply indebted to Slavoj Žižek's consistent engagement in, what can be arguably called, the "theo-
I find a very close affinity with Alenka Župančič and her remarkable work *The Ethics of the Real*, representative of the "Žizekian school" (if one can put it so...). Departing from Kant and Lacan, Župančič engages into thematizations of the "impossible", nameless Real as such, thus establishing the paradoxical possibility for a theory of the impossible. Just as a measure, but encapsulating, illustration of what *The Ethics of the Real* is about I am offering the following quotation from this inspiring book:

"The heart of all ethics is something which is not in itself 'ethical' (nor is it 'non-ethical') – that is to say, it has nothing to do with the register of ethics. This 'something' goes by several different names – although we will limit ourselves to two: for Lacan, it is 'the Real'; for Badiou, 'the event'.

These terms concern something which appears only in the guise of the encounter, as something that 'happens to us', surprises us, throws us 'out of joint', because it always inscribes itself in a given continuity as a rupture, a break or an interruption.

According to Lacan, the Real is impossible, and the fact 'it happens (to us)' does not refute its basic 'impossibility': the Real happens to us (we encounter it) as impossible, as 'the impossible thing' that turns our symbolic universe upside down and leads to the reconfiguration of this universe." (235)

Similarly, what I am attempting here is also to discuss the immediate encounters of the symbolic or imaginary – or...
[2.3 Insertion and intertwining of the "material" or "territorial" inasmuch as "the Real" into the processes of identification]

The account of the politico-ontological frustrations caused by the war continues... The fact of occupying a concrete circumscribed and circumscribing physical ("material") space, such as specific villages and towns, areas and regions, plays a key role in the current processes of re-shaping and condensation of identities. The limited physical space (of a certain size measured in square meters) is limiting and determining in terms of the possible situation of identity - only such and such specific "Albanian" or "Macedonian" identity in this and that village and town can emerge and be claimed.

Nowadays, territory is prescribing - very strictly - the possibility of identity and its situation. The more limited the territory, the more limited and constraining in detail the prescription of identity is. For example, in a village or a smaller town it does not suffice to be a "Macedonian" or "Albanian" at the right place, one also has to be a patriot, nationalist, hate the other... In the bigger towns, or in the capital Skopje, the exigencies for claiming a certain ethnico-political identity are lesser, but the imposition of identification choice with this or that group - which is ever more often the one between "Non-Albanian" and "Albanian", rather than that between "Macedonian" and "Albanian" - is inescapable.

Space in terms of its size, and of its organization (urban or rural), has thus had determining and defining powers over the processes of shaping of the political. And the nature of these powers is such that they are essentially restrictive - and
the difference between urban and rural is in the degree of restriction, not in substantia – and reductive, not expansive nor proliferating. Or in different words, they are “exclusive” and quite certainly not “inclusive”.

Space, and geography, also conditions the political discourse and prescribes its boundaries. In the more “restrictive” places, one can - in the best case - expect a peace campaign proclaiming tolerance and understanding for the other to be accepted in the sense of hosted, but without it fundamentally affecting – let alone undermining - the strong prohibition of any “indigenous cosmopolitanism”.

The abject presence of the Real - that brute, traumatizing physical restriction of movement in space - is being infused, or infuses itself, into the “ethereal”, delicate nature of identity and its sensitivities. Here again we encounter the (conditioning) thrust of that which cannot be thought, of the “conceptless”, merely territorial, into the ways of identities, into the narratives within which we live (the identities), into our universes.

The obverse of this situation is that identity restricts one’s movement in space – where one can enter or pass through and where one cannot. More generally, the discourse of war and the symbolic universe it has created - the rules and ways according which one lives now, the Law of this universe of war – conditions highly restrictively the freedom of body and its movement in space. You cannot take the route through Tetovo if you want to get-from Skopje to Ohrid – you can get killed, be shot at. You can take the safer one – but far from being actually safe – through Bitola. Thus one is deprived from the landscapes - mountains and villages, colors and fragrances – that has shaped one’s sentimentalities, one’s intimate, affectionate “I”... Here violence and territorial restrictions, both but the Trauma of the Real in itself, have joined their “creative” forces to influence upon the feelings and – consequently - processes of re-structuring of identities.
The ungraspable Thing, by the nameless Name of War, has created vulnerable and fearful subjectivities reduced (doomed) to the clinging to exclusive — often resented — identities, the ethnic and national ones. Overcoming of this and such a reduction implies but the overcoming of the reality of war — namely the Real of the physical restriction, that is to say the rule of the physical threat immanent to the reign of the bare, out-of-joint violence and territorial confinement. At the moment, this should be an unimaginably difficult task to accomplish.

By means of physical threat, accompanied by territorial, and thus bodily restrictions, violence and/or war imposes discursive limits which reflect and are product of its own "logic", namely that of opposition. Therefore, the Real of War or the Sovereign Rule of Violence can produce but opposing and (mu-
With its all-flooding nature of opposition it opposes and bans every non-oppositionary discourse and positioning of identity. Its principle is the unrestrained expansion and thus leaves no space for critical thinking which, in order to come forth and flourish, has need of the empty space of rupture between the signs in the symbolic and/or imaginary universe, an abyss of crisis within the signifying chain. Or in Foucauldian language, it can be said that these topoi of critique can be identified with the critical - also in the sense of loci of crisis - knots of resistance in the Web of Power. Crisis - since Hoelderlin and Nietzsche until Jaspers and Deleuze - has been but the moment and locus of hiatus and rupture.

What is distinctive about situations like this - in Macedonia “the situation” has become the most popular euphemism for “war”... - is that the authority of the Real over the construction of the Subject and identity is becoming poignantly recognizable, brutally present, and so easily detectable. That amorphous, purely experiential fact of trauma, fear and pain - impossible to identify with a concept, fix it to a meaning - conditions the creation of a certain meaning of the "I", of what "I" mean and represent - of my identity. And this conditioning power is virtually above my individual authority of choice. This alien factor is that which makes the decision for me of who "I" am or of who "I" ought to become. Briefly, this outlandishness has to become an inalienable part of my innerness.

The Real is thus inextricably intertwined with the realm of the sign - the imaginary, symbolic - by way of its inescapable absorption into subjectivity and identity. The Abject is part of the Subject. And the war and violence make it even more so.
The terrorism and territorialism of war infuses the Subject with an unbearably heavy presence of the Abject and, consequently – as we have already implicitly inferred above – through the presence of the Real, solidifies the exclusive, stable and opposing identity.

3. The closing paragraph

Such are the suffocating and castrating powers of the “unbridled” Real. But it can also be “bridled”, “domesticated” and “pacified”. Nevertheless, it is always already at the base of - and in a constant play with - the narrative of the “I”. I hope that, through this saddening example of the Real in the face of War, I have managed to make some small positive theoretical contribution. Namely, to have shown that the formative powers of the Real are inherent to the construction of both subjectivity and identity, and are an inalienable part of the realm of the Sign.

NOTES

1 An allusion to the Nietzschean conceptualization of the Subject’s formation, and to the developments of the latter by Judith Butler in *The Psychic Life of Power* from 1997.

2 For an explanation of the use of the quotation marks here – and how the notion of “materiality” can be related to that of the “Real”/ "real" - see note 4 below.

3 “N’est il remarquable que, à l’origine de l’expérience analytique, le réel se soit présenté sous la forme de ce qu’il y a en lui d’*inassimilable* - sous la forme du trauma, déterminant toute sa suite, et lui imposant une origine en apparence accidentelle? Nous nous trouvons là au coeur de ce qui peut nous permettre de comprendre le caractère radical de la notion conflictuelle introduite par l’opposition du principe de plaisir au principe de réalité - ce pourquoi on ne saurait concevoir le
trouvons là au cœur de ce qui peut nous permettre de comprendre le caractère radical de la notion conflictuelle introduite par l'opposition du principe de plaisir au principe de réalité - ce pourquoi on ne saurait concevoir le principe de réalité comme ayant, par son ascendant, le dernier mot." (Lacan, 1973: 65)

4 See, for example, The Ticklish Subject, pp. 369-377 or 359-364, and elsewhere; also in Hegemony, Contingency, Universality (written together with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), passim.

5 "Материјалното", односно "телесното" и "физичкото", се, исто така, секогаш веќе концепти или loci/toposи населени од имагинарното и никогаш девствено такви. Па и самата идеја за "девствено такви" е само - идеја. Поимот на телото како материјално, или на неговата материјалност, беше деконструиран од страна на Џудит Батлер во нејзиното значајно дело Bodies That Matter (1993). Сепак, се чини дека секогаш кога одредена психичка операција/дејствие е насочена кон Реалното, или кон тога да дејствува врз Реалното на определено нешто или определен некој, таа има за цел да дејствува врз телото, физичкото. На пример, желбата за целосно, потполно, "реално" поништување на некого се остварува низ деструкцијата на неговото/нејзиното тело - реализирајќи се или како убиство или како нанесување крајна физичка болка. Во современата мисла (и тоа не само философската), претопувањето на Реалното со физичкото/материјалното е епистемолошки факт, овозможен од самото факто што овие се единствените ("консензуално") "признаени претставници" на опипливо постоечкото (како стварни) - единствено "несомнено реалното".

6 Пошироко ги истражувам метафорите и концептите на процес, криза, бездна и кајсура кај овие автори во студијата "Les troubles et matamorphoses de Mnemosyne: Sur les concepts tragiques du temps", pp. 35-39

REFERENCES


Recognizing the power of raciology, which is used here as a shorthand term for a variety of essentializing and reductionist ways of thinking that are both biological and cultural in character, is an essential part of confronting the continuing power of "race" to orchestrate our social, economic, cultural, and historical experiences.

Paul Gilroy, Against Race

Not so long ago, there was a Cold War. Everyone talked of it as an ideological battle. For some this was the battle between the free world and the evil empire of Communism; for others it was the battle between the exploiting capitalist class and the workers of the world. But everyone purported to believe that this was a life and death struggle over fundamental political values.

One day, the cold war ended. It was in fact rather sudden, and most unexpected. The European regimes that purported to be Marxist-Leninist almost all ceased to exist. The Asian countries with Communist parties in power and Cuba continued...
to wear the same ideological clothing, it is true, but in general, the world seemed to accept that there was no more "cold war," and by and large this was regarded with some relief.

This new situation was greeted spectacularly by some as "the end of history," although most people seemed to think that history was continuing its ceaseless path. A new word, globalization, did become common currency to describe the marvelous new world about to begin or that had presumably already begun, and to which (in Mrs. Thatcher's unforgettable prose) TINA - there is no alternative. The very same moment of history saw the maturing of a strong new academic emphasis, one that had begun in the 1970s but seemed to reach an acme in the 1990s. It came to be known generally as cultural studies. Indeed, I am here today under this very aegis.

Culture was once a benign word. High culture was something of which to boast. No one cared to be described as uncultured. Culture meant restraint, cultivation, taste. But the new field of cultural studies harbored a more feisty mood. It was an academic upstart and announced in no uncertain terms that it was remedying a deep neglect in the structures of knowledge. Cultural studies was often associated with, allied with, the pursuit of something called multiculturalism. And multiculturalism was a political demand, a demand of groups that felt they were downtrodden, or ignored, or repressed. Meanwhile, in a different camp and from within the world Establishment, there were voices using the concept of culture in quite a different way. They were telling us that the twenty-first century was going to be the century of a "clash of civilizations," and that we had to gird ourselves, politically (and implicitly militarily), to meet the challenge. What the proponents of multiculturalism took as a liberating prospect, the successful reassertion of non-Western cultures, the proponents of the clash of civilizations considered to be the prime menace.
What is going on here? And first of all, in what capacity do I speak of it? Am I speaking as an American in China - a citizen of the currently strongest state in the world-system speaking to an audience of the most ancient civilization in the world? Or am I a pan-European addressing an audience of the non-Western world - a White among non-Whites? Or am I a modern worlder addressing an audience at a university whose very name bespeaks modernity - a university of science and technology? Or am I simply an academic scholar among his peers - peers who happen to be working or studying in Hong Kong? Or am I a social scientist trying to cope with a concept whose primary locus is in the humanities - the concept of culture?

To be honest, I’m not sure which of these roles describes me, or describes me best, if any of them do. Nor am I sure which of these roles I wish to affect. We are far less in control of our biographies than we like to think, and we can find it extraordinarily difficult to be “objective” in our analyses, if that means that we are required to shed our biographies in our scholarly work. Nor are any of us so easy to classify. Biographies are complex mixtures, and the weights of different locations in which we find ourselves are not necessarily easy to discern, by others or by ourselves. Nor do these weights remain constant over time. What I am today is not necessarily identical to what I was yesterday.

I think I am coming to you now as a social scientist who is attempting to understand the world in which we live, one who is deeply concerned about the trajectory of this world and who believes he has a moral duty to act within it and upon it. I think I am coming as a modern worlder who has nonetheless deep reservations about what the modern world has been and who is no longer sure at all that it has represented progress over earlier world-systems. I probably cannot escape being an American and a pan-European, and I see no good reason to try to do so.
toa што сум Американец и пан-европеец, и не гледам никаков добар разлог да се обидам да го направам тоа. А во мое доба, јас сеако ги носам ем гревовите ем доблес­тите од животот како академски човек.

Ке ви зборувам за времето, за универзализмот и за партикуларизмот, а потоа ке ја искористам оваа рас­права да ви зборувам за тоа кои сме "ни" а кои се "дру­гите" во нашите мисли и во нашата политика. Но би тре­бало веднаш да дополнам дека ке зборувам за времето, универзализмот и партикуларизмот само во множина бидејки, во спротивно не верувам дека овие зборови имаат некое значење. Има повеќекратни темпоралности, пове­ќекратни универзализми и повеќекратни партикуларизми. И добар дел од нашата збрка во расправите за културата произлегува од потиснувањето на оваа повеќекратност во анализата.

Да започнеме со темпоралностите. Ги започнав мо­ите забележки посочувајќи на Студената војна. Студената војна обично се датира дека се одвива од 1945 до 1989. Всушност Андре Фонтејн уште одамна инсистираше дека таа започна во 1917.2 А нејзиното започнување од 1917 година значително ја менува анализата. Но, тоа не е важ­но. Се претполага дека е завршена. Сепак, кога ќе наслуш­неме извесни гласови во Соединените Држави, и извесни во Кина или Русија, се чини дека таа не е за секого зав­ршена. Таквите гласови се чини дека ја сметаат идеолошката реторика на студената војна како постојан показател за тоа како тие ја дефинираат тековната светска реалност. Можеби не би требало да ги земаме нив премногу сериозно. Заставниците на Realpolitik постојано образлагаа дека идеологијата е само реторика наменета да го прикрие raison d'état на државите, а дека владејачките слови ниго­гаш не обраќаат премногу внимание на идеолошката за која официјално се залагаат. Шарл де Гол се чини дека имаше малку сонеж за тоа дека Советскиот Сојуз беше пред сè Руска империја а Соединетите Држави Американска империја, и тој врз оваа основа ги правеше своите анализи и пресметки. Дали тој не беше во право? Кога Ричард Никсон замина во Кина за да се сретне со Мао Це Тунг дали и

And, at my age, I certainly bear the sins as well as the virtues of a life as a scholar.

I am going to talk to you about time, about universalism, and about particularism, and I am then going to use this discussion to talk to you about who are the "we" and who are the "others" in our thoughts and in our politics. But I should immedi­ately amend that because I shall be talking of time, universalism, and particularism only in the plural number since I do not believe those words have any meaning otherwise. There are multiple temporalities, multiple universalisms, and multiple particularisms. And a good deal of our confusion in discussing culture comes from suppressing this multiplicity in the analysis.

Let us start with temporalities. I opened my remarks by referring to the Cold War. The Cold War is usually dated as going from 1945 to 1989. Actually André Fontaine insisted a long time ago that it began in 1917. And starting it in 1917 changes the analysis considerably. But no matter. It is supposed to be over. Yet, when one listens to some voices in the United States, and some in China or Russia, it does not seem to be over for everyone. Such voices seem to take the ideological rhetoric of the Cold War as a continuing marker of how they define the current world reality. Perhaps we should not take them too seriously. Proponents of Realpolitik have always argued that ideology was merely rhetoric that was meant to mask the raison d'état of the states, and that the ruling strata never paid too much attention to the ideology they officially espoused. Charles DeGaulle seemed to have little doubt that the Soviet Union was first and foremost the Russian empire and the U.S. the American empire, and he made his analyses and calculations on this basis. Was he wrong? When Richard Nixon went to China to meet Mao Zedong, was each subordinating ideology to raison d'état, or was each simply pursuing more long-range ideological objectives? Historians will no doubt continue to argue over this for centuries to come.
Today, the United States and China seem to share a common commitment to encouraging production for the world market. Yet each defines the roots of this commitment differently. American politicians and pundits persist in describing the U.S. as a country committed to free enterprise capitalism, while Chinese politicians and pundits persist in describing China as a country committed to socialism, now sometimes called market socialism. Are we as social scientists to take such self-descriptions at face value? And if not, how should we really describe the structures of each country?

Of course, one factor in these self-descriptions is the chronosophy3 common to each country, or at least to its leaders and to most of its citizens. Each country is committed to a long-range optimism based on the assumption of linear progress. Each seems to be sure it is on the path to the more perfect society. These self-descriptions are, however, in some sense as much statements of the teleological objective towards which they are heading as analyses of the present. But there are other chronosophies which would give us different temporalities. And even within any chronosophy, there are other periodizations, which again give us different temporalities.

What is most important to remember is that we live in many of these social temporalities simultaneously. We can, for example, analyze the world in terms of the modern world-system as an historical system, which would lead us to take as temporal boundaries the long sixteenth century to the present. And one of the many ways in which we could describe this system is the periodic shift of centricity, seeing it as having a succession of hegemonic powers, whose hegemony is always temporary. If
trichnost, согледувајќи го како да минува низ последователност на хегемонски сили, чија хегеномија е секогаш привремена. Ако го направиме ова, није можеме да зборуваме за амексиканската хегемонија која расцнува во 1870-ите, го достигнува врвот во периодот 1945-1970, и сега е во раните етапи од нејзиниот зазов. Се разбира, није можеме и да го поставиме прашањето, кои што всушност беше честопати поставувано, за тоа која би можела да биде последователната хегемонска сила. Некои не убедуваат дека е тоа Јапонија, помалку дека е Кина, а и други кои сметаат дека хегемонијата на САД е понастояние премногу при нас за да можеме јасно да ја промислуваме оваа тема.

Или пак, останувајќи во временските граници на модерниот светски систем, није можеме да го согледуваме како пан европски проект на светска доминација ("експанзијата на Европа") и да расправаме колку оваа експанзија го достигна својој врв - во 1900, во 1945, во 1989? - и кога повратниот удар започна - со Јапонскиот пораз од Русија во 1905, со навлегувањето на кинеските комунисти во Шангај во 1949, со Бандунгската конференција во 1955, со поразот на САД во Крим во 1973? И тогаш није можеме да расправаме за прашањето дали овој повратен удар е знак за структурна криза во модерниот светски систем или (како што би рекле некои) дали ја промени историски процес во кој азииската планетарна централност беше привремено истисната од краткотрајниот западен или европски момент.

Повеќекратните темпоралности во кои што живееме можат во нас да предизвикат известна аналитичка збрка, но далеку полесно можеме да ги промислуваме и со нив да се справуваме отколку со повеќекратните универсализми. Се разбира, "повеќекратни универсализми" е оксиморон. Се предполага дека универсализмот го означува гледиштето дека постојат начела или вистини што се применуваат на сите личности, сите групи, сите историски општествени системи во сите точки во простор и време. Оттаму, тој е единствен, единечен и

we did this, we could talk of the rise of American hegemony burgeoning in the 1870's, reaching a peak in the period 1945-1970, and now in the early stages of its decline. And we could of course ask the question, one indeed frequently asked, as to who might the successor hegemonic power be. Some argue the case for Japan, and a few for China, and there are others who think that U.S. hegemony is still too much with us to think clearly about such an issue.

Or, still within the time boundaries of the modern world-system, we could see it as a pan-European project of world domination (the "expansion of Europe") and debate when this expansion peaked - in 1900, in 1945, in 1989? - and when the pushback began - with the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905, with the entry of the Chinese Communists into Shanghai in 1949, with the Bandung conference in 1955, with the U.S. defeat in Vietnam in 1973? And then we could discuss the question whether this pushback is the signal of a structural crisis in the modern world-system, or (as some would have it) nothing but the end of a phase in a far longer historical process in which Asian global centrality had been temporarily displaced by a brief Western or European moment.

The multiple temporalities in which we live may cause us some analytic confusion, but they are far easier to think about and to handle than multiple universalisms. "Multiple universalisms" is of course an oxymoron. Universalism is supposed to mean the view that there exist laws or truths that apply to all persons, all groups, all historical social systems at all points in time and space. Hence it is unitary, unique, and unified. How can there be multiple versions of that which is one? Well, I could refer to some versions of Christian theology, which have long argued that there is a trinity in which God is both one and three,
or to the Hindu idea that the gods have many avatars. These are theological, not scientific, ideas, but they do indicate a wisdom, the kind of wisdom science has often, to its peril, ignored, and often found validated at a later point in its own evolution.

But I do not wish to appeal to theological insights. It is quite clear that there are multiple universalisms both at the level of popular, community-based claims and also at the level of scholarly assertions. We can of course, speaking from within the framework of one of these claims, reject the others as patently false or at least badly worded, and this is regularly done. All nomothetic social science is based on precisely this procedure. There are many who would insist that the term "science" is reserved for those who, in any domain of knowledge, are working to build a unique universalism. I want to argue that not only does no unique universalism exist, nor could ever exist, but that science is the search for how multiple universalisms can best be navigated in a universe that is intrinsically uncertain, and therefore hopefully creative.4

The modern world has been for most of its history a prisoner of Aristotle's doctrine of the excluded middle. Something is either A or not-A. There is no third possibility. But of course, quantum mechanics has gotten us used to the idea that things can be two different things at the same time, or at least can be measured in two quite different ways or can satisfy two different equations. Light is a swarm of particles and a continuous wave as well. We do not have to choose, or rather we cannot.
We face the same problem in social science. In the arena of public policy, groups regularly contend on the basis of different so-called basic values, or different priorities in values. We are in fact constantly faced with such issues in our personal lives. I read in the newspapers of the tragic situation of two European infants who are Siamese twins. The doctors say that, since the twins have only one heart and one lung, they can only be separated in such a way that one twin lives and the other dies. The doctors also say that, if they do not separate the twins, both will die within months. The parents say that they cannot allow one child to be killed in order that the other live. And the British courts are being asked to resolve juridically this moral dilemma, this difference in moral priorities.

Not all such choices are tragic. Not all of them require that we choose between competing rights to life. But the underlying issues are omnipresent, and we are all collectively being constantly asked to make historical choices. All the debates about outside intervention in the "internal affairs" of any country invoke on the one side claims about universal human rights and on the other side the right of countries not to be subordinate to the imperial and imperious imposition of the values of others on them. And it is this last debate which has been central to the modern world-system since its outset and which has come to the fore again in the last decade.

The reality of the modern world-system, the capitalist world-economy, is that it is a hierarchical, unequal, polarizing system, whose political structure is that of an interstate system in which some states are manifestly stronger than others. In furtherance of the process of the endless accumulation of capital, stronger states are constantly imposing on weaker states their will, to the degree that they can. This is called imperialism, and is inherent in the structure of the world-system. Imperialism has always had, however, its moral defense. It has been justi-
CULTURES IN CONFLICT

Who are we? Who are the others?

Immanuel Wallerstein

Yet, on the other hand, local despotisms have always thrived on their ability to maintain closed frontiers and to reject any and all "outside interference" with their nefarious doings. And we have become increasingly sensitive to the evils of non-intervention, given the enormity of the crimes that are sometimes committed under the cover of sovereignty. In this current era when so many governments and churches are apologizing for past misdeeds, we are constantly adjured to remember those, especially those who are seemingly powerful, who failed to protest (and perhaps thereby to prevent) the misdeeds of still others. From the Holocaust to Rwanda, the albatross of guilt is laid around our necks. But of course the guilt of non-intervention didn't start with the Holocaust. Before the Holocaust there was the Middle Passage of the Atlantic slave trade, and the countless slaughters of indigenous peoples, not to speak of the child labor which to this day pervades this globe.

So, we cannot fail to confront these evaluations of the past and the present by pretending that this is an exercise of the political and not of the scientific world. It is after all a discussion of multiple universalisms, which we have all been sedulously avoiding. Since, however, there are many, many universalisms, should we give them all equal weight and place? This is another way of asking whether we should be totally relativistic. And the answer is surely not. Because if there are formulas of accommodation between many universalisms, it is also true that there are some universalisms which are truly incompatible with others. And we are thereby forced into a meta-debate: Is there a
singular hierarchy of universalisms, some of which are reasonable and acceptable and others of which are deeply repugnant? And if the answer is yes, and I suspect it is, is this not simply another way of returning to the unique universalism we are trying to escape? In any case, to say there is a hierarchy of universalisms solves nothing since we still must decide on what basis we can judge which are the claims that we should firmly exclude.

There is no easy or immediate answer to such a question. The attempt to draw fuzzy lines instead is the only real alternative. It is our continuing quest for unifying the true and the good. The journey, rather than reaching some utopian arrival point, is the positive action. It is a moral action, but it is an intellectual one as well, one furthermore that can only be conducted plausibly by a truly worldwide collectivity of participants in the quest. Each will bring to the quest a different biography, a different experience with priorities, a different insight into the possible consequences of alternative paths. Each may restrain the worst impulses or the weakest judgment of the other.

In practice, there are three major varieties of universalisms that have a hold on the modern mind. There are those which derive from the world religions (and of course there are many religions). There are those that derive from the secular Enlightenment ideals that have been central to modernity. And there are those which express the sense of the powerful that the basis of their power has been their righteous actions and that therefore imperial stretch is a virtue, not a vice.

We have learned once again in the last two decades not to underestimate the hold of religions on the minds of people and therefore on the politics of the world-system. Religions are universalist almost by definition. Even when they originate in very local situations, they almost always lay claim to being uni-
universal truth, applicable to all persons. Often, however, religious universalisms are thought to be more than merely applicable to all; they are seen as mandated for all. And even when the rhetoric is less compulsory in tone, almost all religions teach the uniqueness of their path to truth or to salvation. Some religions are more exclusionary than others, but all insist on the virtue of their particular path of doctrines and practices. The three most widespread religions in the world - Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism - are all proselytizing, the first two aggressively so. This is no doubt why they are the most widespread, or at least that might be the view of an non-committed observer.

So what do the religions of the world tell us? To love each other, to love everyone, and to love particularly those who share the faith or the practice. One cannot say that this is an unambiguous message. And the results of course have been highly ambiguous. For while it is clear that religious authorities have regularly been a force for peace and tolerance, it is equally clear that they have regularly been a force for violence and intolerance. No doubt God moves in mysterious ways, but we simple humans may feel impelled to try to make sense of these ways and, dare I suggest it, to draw more coherent conclusions from our faiths and our sciences than mere fatalism.

It was of course in revolt against the dominance of religions that Enlightenment humanism-scientism staked its claim to a truly universal universalism, one to which all persons had equal access via their rational insight and understanding of eternal verities, via their verification of these truths in ways that all could replicate. The problem here, as we know, is that when all persons exercised their insight and understanding they came up with different lists of truths. Of course one could (and did) argue that this situation was temporary, to be resolved by rational debate. But in practice, this solution did not seem to eliminate the problem. And Enlightenment humanism-scientism was thereby forced to create a hierarchy of human beings, accord-
those who based their universalisms on the imperative of might makes right were at least more straightforward. Essentially, they told us that whatever is had to be and that polarizing hierarchies are and must be the result of unequal skills, wisdom, and moral virtue. This was theorized in the nineteenth century as somehow biological in origin. Biologically-based explanations have come into disfavor, ever since the Nazis took these theories to their logical conclusion. But never fear! It has been easy to replace these biological explanations with cultural ones. Those who have power and privilege are said to have it because they are heirs to a culture which provided them with skills, wisdom, and virtue. Do note the coming to the fore in this context too of the concept of culture.

What none of the three varieties of universalisms - the religious, the humanist-scientific, or the imperialist - have offered us however is a theory of multiple universalisms, or even a theory of a hierarchy of universalisms. For each it has seemed
to be a competitive race to the top. This may explain why the twentieth century, the most universalizing century in the history of humanity, was also the most brutal and the most destructive of human beings. When universalisms destroy or oppress, people take refuge in particularisms. It is an obvious defense, and most of the time a very necessary one. And it works, up to a point. Particularisms by definition deny universalisms. They say in effect, we are different and difference is a virtue. Your rules do not apply to us, or have negative effects on us, or are designed specifically to do us harm. We therefore amend them, or reject them outright, and our rejection has a status of at least moral equality with your assertion of the universalistic rules. It turns out however that there are multiple stances from which one can assert particularisms, and the cultural claims made in the name of the multiple particularisms can have quite different political meanings.

There are first of all the particularisms asserted by the current losers in the universalism races. The current losers are generically those to whom we refer as "minorities." A minority is not primarily a quantitative concept but one of social rank; it is those who are defined as different (in some specified way) from the group that is dominant - dominant in the world-system, dominant in any institutional structure within the world-system such as the state-system, or the class structure, or the meritocracy scales, or the constructed race-ethnic hierarchies we find everywhere. Minorities do not necessarily begin by proclaiming particularisms. They often try first to appeal to the universalistic criteria of the winners, demanding equal rights. But they quite frequently find that these criteria are then applied in such a way that they lose anyway. And so they turn to particularisms with which to confront the so-called majority.
The mechanism of these confrontational particularisms is quite familiar. It is to assert that the losers had in fact been ahead of the winners on the universalistic criteria over the long term, but that they had been pushed temporarily behind by some act of illegitimate force, and that the rank order is destined to be reversed once again. Or it is to assert that the universalistic criteria are in reality particularistic criteria, no better (indeed worse) than the particularistic criteria of the minority, and therefore the rank order is destined to be reversed. Or it is to deny that any truly universalistic criteria can possibly exist, that the rank order is always a matter of force, and that since the minorities are a quantitative majority, the rank order is destined to be reversed. Or it is to proclaim all these theses simultaneously. The emphasis in this variety of particularism is always on "catching-up" to, and quite often on "exceeding," the presently dominant group. It is seldom the search for a new universalism, except one that may be achieved by the total elimination of the currently dominant group.

There are then the particularisms of the declining middles. Social science has written much about this. These groups may define themselves in any way - class, race, ethnicity, language, religion. In the ceaselessly polarizing pressures of the capitalist world-economy, there are always clusters of people whose status in the prestige hierarchy and whose standard of living is declining with reference to a recent past. And such people are naturally anxious, resentful, and combative. Sometimes they may focus their angers on those responsible for this decline, who will defend themselves on the basis of the inevitability of the changes in terms of maximizing overall economic efficiency of production. But quite often, it is not easy to perceive what actions of the powerful have led to the decline. And thus it is that those who are suffering such declines come to scapegoat groups that seem even weaker than they (but who are perceived, often incorrectly, to be improving their status and income levels).
This is such a familiar story around the world over the past centuries that it is scarcely worth spending time elaborating it. But it should be noted that in such situations we see fierce particularisms, often of a particularly nasty nature. And it follows that the groups who are then the target of these angers, these hatreds, respond by forging their own strong particularisms. Thus we enter into a cycle of senseless violence, which can last a very long time, until the groups are exhausted, and the rest of the world too, and some kind of truce is imposed on the contending groups. In the process, scapegoating becomes the game of the third parties as well. They define the conflict as the result of eternal enmities. Frequently such claims are patently false assertions, but they do have the consequence of blaming both sets of victims - the original group that is declining because of the imperatives of capital accumulation and the still weaker group they are blaming for it - and minimize our ability to analyze the relevant causes of the fierce internecine combats. The cultural particularisms invoked in such situations are in no way a positive action, even if we can understand how they arose. In the end, we can only emerge from this vicious cycle by an appeal to relevant universalisms.

There is a third variety of particularism, that of the persistently bottom groups, again however defined. That they are thought of and think of themselves as particular is of course basic to social definitions of identity. They are the pariahs of our system - Blacks, Roma, Harijan, Burakumin, Indios, Aborigines, Pygmies. The assertion of their particular identities has been in the twentieth century, particularly the late twentieth century, an essential element in their political mobilization to achieve minimal political, economic, and social rights. That they have overstated their arguments in some cases, that they have from time to time indulged in a counter-racism seems less relevant than the fact that, despite all their efforts, they have at best been only very moderately successful in emerging from the pariah category. The fact is that the social dice are still loaded
against all these groups. And one of the major weapons used to keep them down is to assert the primacy of universalistic norms every time they demand compensatory intervention or assistance in overcoming the cumulative negative effect of centuries (if not more) of discriminatory treatment, what in the United States is called affirmative action. Over all, however much the particularisms of the declining middles may have devastating social consequences, the particularisms of the persistently bottom groups tends to have positive consequences for all social strata, and not only for them. The greatest beneficiaries of affirmative action over the long run will be the so-called majorities.

There is a fourth variety of particularism with which we are all familiar. It is the particularism of the effete snobs, those who pride themselves on their high culture (that word again) and denounce the vulgarity of the masses. Not that the masses are not vulgar. The word vulgar after all comes from the Latin term for the "common people." In days of yore, the aristocracy defined their own behavior as high culture, and forbade the common people to engage in practices of high culture. For example, there were dress codes. But the modern world-system has created a superficial democratization of culture. We are all permitted to engage in these practices. And more and more people everywhere do.

The effete snobs are really that segment of the upper strata, sometimes especially found among those declining in wealth, who are determined to hold on to their cultural separation from the masses. This creates a curious game. As each cultural practice and artifact that is defined as "high" is copied and/or indulged in by the common people, it becomes redefined as vulgar. And the effete snobs rush to find new artifacts and practices. One of the places they find such practices is pre-
immanuel wallerstein  cultures in conflict? who are we? who are the others?

bovi brazaat da pronajadat novi artefakti i praktiki. Edno od mestata kade sho tije gi naqoajat takvite praktiki e toku vo protestnite antissemitski praktiki na trajno dolnite grpui. Ova sadzava postojana napnatoz, zaqto sekoj postojano gi prevrednuva takvite artefakti i praktiki, dovueduaqi do mnogu zbrka, chesto preetiketirane, i golema borra za prisvooanje na pravata na niv.

Петтиот вид партикуларизам е партикуларизмот на доминантните елити. Тоj не е сочema ист како onoj на исцрпените снобови. Имено, тоj не se nosi sebesi kako visoka kultura, tuku kako osnovni kulturni prettopstawki, oha sho jas go narakov geokultura, „dolnata strana na geopolitikata.”5 Ovoj oblik na partikularizmam se kreje sebesi pod pravuzot na universalizmot - vo deneshniv svet, kako universalizam na racionenlosita. Ovoj oblik na partikularizam go koristi razoblichevaneto na partikularizmot kako najdelotvorno sredstvo za potvrduvane na sopstvenoto prvenstvo. Raspravite da se ishodova v Soedinitite Drahavi pochnavame da gi narukuvame „kulturni vojni“ - pak toj zbor!

Се razbirajte, ovim povcekreatni varieteti na partikularizmot ne se povjek rakovodeni so zakonot za iskluchiveno средen odoshoto se rakovodenije povcekreatnit varieteti na universalizmot. Siste nie postoijano se devjime napred-nazad niz ovje varieteti, zaljubivajci se za nekolko od niv vo некое дадено време и простор. Ниту пак политичките импликации на секоj od niv se zaartani zanavek. Нивната uloga e funkcija na sevkupnata socijalna situacija vo koja tije se jaavuvajte i vo koja tije se sogledani. Но, se razbira, nie mozemo da gi vrednuvame ovie ulogi i mozemo da gi podrzhe, zanemaremo, ili da im se protistavime so ogled na nase sospstveni vrednosni prioriteti.

Ako poglednem kon dolgotrajnata istoriska evoluacija na moderenot svetski sistem, nie gledame deka izborite pomu temporalnostite, universalizmitite i partikularizmitite bea соседi na nase politichki bori. Edno od oružjata sto gososeduva moqnite, bese ovie raspravi da se definiraat pogreanno, i na toj nacin

cisely in the protesting, antisytemic practices of the persistently bottom groups. This creates a constant strain, as everyone constantly reevaluates such artifacts and practices, amidst much confusion, frequent relabeling, and much struggle to appropriate the rights to them.

A fifth kind of particularism is that of dominant elites. This is not quite the same as that of the effete snobs. For it does not garb itself as high culture but as basic cultural presuppositions, what I have called the geoculture, "the underside of geopolitics."5 This form of particularism hides itself behind the screen of universalism - in today's world, as the universalism of rationality. This form of particularism uses the denunciation of particularism as the most effective means of asserting its own primacy. The debates that result we have come to call in the United States the "culture wars" - again that word!

These multiple varieties of particularisms of course are no more governed by the law of the excluded middle than are the multiple varieties of universalisms. We all move back and forth through all these varieties constantly, and espouse several of them at any given time and space. Nor are the political implications of each etched in stone. Their role is a function of the total social situation in which they occur and in which they are perceived. But we can of course evaluate these roles and we can support, ignore, or oppose them in terms of our own priorities in values.

If we look at the long historical evolution of the modern world-system we see that the choices among temporalities, universalisms, and particularisms has been a central locus of our political struggles. One of the weapons the powerful have had has been to misdefine these debates, and thus to obscure them, in an imagery that argues that time and space are simply
contexts within which we live rather than constructs that shape our lives. And universalism and particularism are defined as a critical antinomy which we can use to analyze all social action and between whose priority we all have to choose, and once and for all. This has been helpful to the winners and not at all to the losers, which is the most urgent reason why we must unthink this antinomy and make far more complex our appreciation of the options that are available to all of us.

Culture, too, is not just there. Its very definition is a battlefield, as I have previously argued. The uses of the concept of culture are furthermore manifold, as I have tried to show in this discussion. One of the most urgent tasks of cultural studies today is to take more emotional distance from culture, to regard the concept of culture itself, as well as the students of the concept, as an object of study. Equally, we need to deepen our understanding of the politics and the economics of culture. The sacred trinity of liberal ideology - the political, the economic, and the socio-cultural - is one of the most oppressive weapons of the particularism of the dominant strata. It is probably the one that is most difficult and most necessary to unthink. I would, if I could, abolish all three adjectives from our vocabulary. But I do not think I can, yet, for one thing because I am not sure with what to replace them.

So, are cultures in conflict? Undoubtedly, but saying that does not tell us very much. We need to be aware that the historical system within which we live thrives by the effort to commodify everything. High culture has been commodified for at least two centuries, and the last half-century has seen a spectacular rise in the degree to which high culture is a profitable enterprise for all concerned - the manufacturers of cultural products and the artists whose products are packaged.
In the last twenty years, we have seen how the culture of protest can be commodified as well. One doesn't assert one's identity, one pays to assert it, and one pays to observe others asserting it, and some people even sell us our identity. One copyrights culture. These days, there is a struggle going on between the producers of music in the form of CDs who seek to sell these CDs and those who operate web sites on the internet that enable consumers to download these CDs at no cost. But of course, the internet web site expects to make its money from the advertisements that will be placed on its web site. Virtually no one in this dispute speaks in favor of the true de-commodification of cultural products.

Is the culture we pay to display the expression of our heritage or our souls or even our political demands or is it the internalization of values imposed on us for the profit of those who gain rent from the transmission of these displays? Or can we even distinguish the two? Not even folklore, traditionally defined as a non-commodity, escapes this deep involvement in the endless accumulation of capital.

Who then are we? Who are the others? It depends of course on which battle we are fighting. And is it local, national, or global? It also depends on our assessment of what is happening within our historical system. I have been arguing for some time now that our historical system, the capitalist world-economy, is in structural crisis. I have said that we are in the middle of a chaotic period, that a bifurcation is occurring, and that over the next fifty years, not only will our current system cease to exist but a new one will come into existence. Finally, I have argued that the nature of this new system is intrinsically unknowable in advance, but that nonetheless its nature will be fundamentally shaped by our actions in this era of transition in which "free will" seems to be at its optimal point. Finally, I have argued that the uncertain outcome may result in a historical system that is better, worse, or about the same morally as the
I will not rehearse here the case I have made for the existence of such a structural crisis, nor for the chronosophy I am employing. Rather I want to outline the possible "we's" and the corresponding "others" in this crucial period of a struggle that is simultaneously political, economic, and cultural.

Let me start by rejecting some possible "we's". I do not believe we are really living through, or should be living through a clash of civilizations, in which the Western world, the Islamic world, and an East Asian world find themselves arrayed against each other. Some people would like us to believe this, in order to weaken our hands in the real battles. But I see little real evidence of such a clash, outside the rhetoric of politicians and commentators. The multiple universalisms and particularisms that I have outlined exist within each of these presumed civilizational arenas, and in not significantly different proportions.

Of course, the clash of civilizations is one formula for defining North-South conflicts. While I believe that North-South conflicts are a fundamental political reality of the contemporary world - how could they not be in a constantly polarizing world-system? - I do not draw the conclusion that virtue derives from geography, or that the spokespersons for each side at any moment reflect necessarily the interests of the larger group they purport to represent. There are too many cross-cutting interests at play, and too many tactical follies, for anyone to commit himself or herself unreservedly to one side or the other in the endless skirmishes. However, on the basic issue that there must be an end to the polarization and a drastic move towards equalizing the uses of the world's resources, I feel there cannot be any equivocation. It is for me a moral and political priority.
Is then the "we" those delineated in the class struggle? Well, of course, but what exactly does that mean? We can draw a line between those who are living off the surplus value produced by others and those who are not retaining all of the surplus value they are producing, and we can call this line that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, or some similar language. But in fact, of course, within each of these categories, there exists a complex, overlapping internal hierarchy. The existing system has not created two homogenized classes (much less one homogenized humanity), but a subtle skein of privilege and exploitation. That is why we have so many varieties of particularisms. Reducing this picture to two camps is no simple task, as none other than Karl Marx demonstrated in his classic political analysis, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*. If even Mao Zedong insisted that the class struggle continued within a socialist society, we are made aware of how prudently we have to be in assigning "we-ness" on the basis of class.

Then there is the "we-ness" of nationhood. Nationalism has proved to be an extremely powerful appeal to solidarity in the last two centuries, and there is little sign that this appeal has disappeared from the horizon. We are all aware of the conflicts that nationalism has bred between states. But I wish to remind us of the conflicts that nationalism has bred within states. For nationalism is not a cost-free good.

Look at Japan. In the post-Meiji period, nationalism became a strong weapon of constructing a modern state, one that was powerful, one that achieved its objectives in terms of advancing the relative status of Japan in the world-system. It led ultimately to the seizure of Korea, the invasion of China, the conquest of Southeast Asia, and the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Japan lost the Second World War, and suffered the atrocious price of Hiroshima. After the war, nationalism became itself an element of internal conflict within Japan. There are those who fear that any resuscitation of nationalist symbols might trigger a restoration of a militarist, aggressive, internally repressive regime. And there are those who feel that Japan alone is being denied its national(ist) identity, to the detriment of so-called traditional values.

Japan is not alone in this conflict about the utility of national(ist) identity. Both China and the United States are afflicted by the same latent (and not so latent) conflict. But so are a long list of states around the world. I draw from this the conclusion that invoking national identity is akin to risky surgical intervention. It may be essential for survival (or merely for improved health) in some situations, but beware the surgeon (political leader) whose hand slips or the side effects that no surgeon (political leader) could have prevented.

If I thus reject civilization, class, and nation as easy, straightforward criteria of "we-ness" (not to speak of race, a totally malicious and invented criterion), with what are we left to navigate the difficult waters of a chaotic transition over the next fifty years from the historical system in which we live to some alternative system in which our descendants shall live? Nothing easy to define.

Let us begin by asserting moral/political objectives. When a historical system is in crisis, one can move, it seems to me, in one of two basic directions. One can try to preserve the hierarchical structure of the existing world-system, albeit in new forms and perhaps on new bases. Or one can try to reduce, if
not altogether eliminate, the inequalities to the extent possible. And it will follow that most of us (but not all of us) will opt for one of the two alternatives in consequence of the degree of privilege we enjoy in the present system. It will follow that there could emerge two broad camps of persons, and that such camps could not be identified either by civilization, by nation, or even by current definitions of class status.

The politics of the two camps is not hard to predict. The camp favoring hierarchies will enjoy the benefits of its current wealth, its power therefore to command intelligence and sophistication, not to speak of weaponry. Nonetheless, its strength, though manifest, is subject to one constraint, that of visibility. Since, by definition, this camp represents the numerical minority of the world's populations, it must attract others to support it by appealing to themes other than hierarchy. It must make its priorities less visible. This is not always easy, and to the extent it is achieved it can cause confusion and reduce solidarity among its core members. So it is not guaranteed victory.

Arrayed against it would be the camp of the numerical majority. But this is a highly divided camp, divided by the multiple particularisms and even by the multiple universalisms. The formula that can overcome this disunity has already been proclaimed. It is the formula of the rainbow coalition. But this is far easier said than done. Advantage of each participant in such a formula is middle-run, and short-run considerations force themselves upon all of us with great regularity. We seldom have the discipline, or even the resources, with which to ignore short-run advantage. We live after all in the short run as individuals. It is only collectively that we live in the middle run, and can place such an alternate temporality into our schema of priorities. And when one thinks of creating not a national rainbow coalition but
How then does one go about trying to do this? In part, this is a political task that has to be pursued simultaneously at the local, the national, the regional, and the global levels. It is one in which one has to concentrate, if one is to succeed in pulling together a meaningful coalition, on the middle-run question of the kind of replacement system we wish to construct while not ignoring the short-run problem of alleviating the miseries under the existing system. I feel it is not my function to go further in outlining a political strategy. Rather I wish to concentrate on the intellectual contributions that social science can make in this era of transition.

I think the first thing we can do is to unthink the social science categories bequeathed to us by the existing world-system and that have so hobbled us in our analyses not only of current reality but of the possible alternatives to it we might construct. Recognizing the existence of multiple temporalities, multiple universalisms, multiple particularisms is a first step. But of course we need to do far more than simply acknowledging their existence. We have to begin to figure out how they fit together, and what is the optimal mix, and in what situations. This is an agenda for major reconstruction of our knowledge systems.

I have not spoken up to now of the "two cultures" - that presumed fundamental epistemological split between the humanities and the sciences. This split, reproduced within social science as the *Methodenstreit* between idiographic and nomoth-
denstreit помеѓу идеографските и номотетичките методологии, е вттушост неодамнешен изум. Тој не е постар од 200-250 години, и самоот е првенствено создание на модерниот светски систем. Тој е исто така длабоко ирационален, затоа што науката е културен феномен, затвореник на соопствениот културен контекст, додека хуманистичките дисциплини немаат ненаучен јазик, инаку тие не би можеле никому да му ја приопштат нивната порака кохерентно.9

Едно од нештата што сите треба да ги правиме е да читаме далеку поопсежно. Читањето е дел од процесот на теоретско откривање, од пронаоѓањето на нишките и врските што лежат закопани во масата наталожени производи од знаење. Ни треба да ги насочиме нашите студенти кон сопствување на фундаментални епистемолошки теми. Ни мора да престанеме да се плашиме и од философијата и од науката, билејки на крајот тие се исто нешто, и можеме да практикуваме една од нив само до колку ги практикуваме обете, или до колку признаеме дека тие се единствен потфат. Притоа, није ќе станеме наполно свесни за повеќекратните универзализми кои што владеат со нашито универсум, и за првпат ќе бидеме црсто рационални, на дофат на консенсус, макар и привремен, за вредносните приоритети и за вистините во еден универсум во кој није постојано мора да правиме избор, и следствено, да бидеме креативни.

Ако социјалните научници, ако не и сите образовани од кое и да е поле, можат да успеат во таквото реконструирање на нивниот потфат, а тоа е многу големо ако, ние масово ќе придонесеме кон историските избори што сите нии нажно ги правиме во ова транзиционо доба. Како и да е, тоа нема да биде крајот на историјата. Но, тоа ќе ни овозможи да продолжиме со посигурен чекор.

Велат дека има една изрека од династијата Кинг: Луѓето се плашат од владетелите; владетелите се плашат од тугите ѓаволи; тугите ѓаволи се плашат од луѓето. Се разбира, Кинг веќе имале искуство со модерниот светски систем. Но ние, луѓето, ние сме исто така туѓи ѓаволи. Нај-

etic methodologies, is in fact a recent invention. It is no more than 200-250 years old, and is itself a prime creation of the modern world-system. It is also deeply irrational, since science is a cultural phenomenon, a prisoner of its cultural context, while the humanities have no language that is not scientific, or they could not communicate coherently their message to anyone.9

One thing we all need to do is to read far more widely. Reading is a part of the process of theoretical discovery, of uncovering the clues and the links that lay buried in the mass of deposited knowledge products. We need to point our students towards reflection on fundamental epistemological issues. We must cease fearing either philosophy or science, since in the end they are the same thing, and we can only do either by doing both, or by recognizing that they are a single enterprise. In the process, we shall become fully aware of the multiple universalisms that govern our universe, and begin for the first time to be substantively rational, that is to reach a consensus, however interim, on the priorities of values and of truths in a universe where we must constantly make choices, and therefore be creative.

If social scientists, no if all scholars of whatever field, can succeed in thus reconstructing their enterprise, and that is a very big if, we shall have contributed massively to the historical choices that all of us are necessarily making in this era of transition. This will not be the end of history, either. But it will allow us to proceed on a better foot.

There is said to be a Qing dynasty saying: People fear the rulers; the rulers fear the foreign devils; the foreign devils fear the people. Of course, the Qing already had experience with the modern world-system. But we, the people, we are also the foreign devils. In the end there are no others, or at least no
други, барем не други што не можеме да ги контролираме доколку колективно не го наумиме тоа, доколку не расправаме, не ги измериме алтернативите, и креативно не избереме. Во социјално-конструиранот свет, ние сме тие кои го конструираат светот.

Превод: Жарко Трајаноски

БЕЛЕШКИ

7 Видете ја извонредната расправа за овој феномен во Paul Gilroy, Against Racism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), ch. 7 и passim.
9 Моите аргументи за елаборирање на оваа теза можат да се најдат во вториот дел, “The World of Knowledge,” од The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-first Century (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1999).

NOTES

3 On the concept of chronosophy, see Krzysztof Pomian, “The Secular Evolution of the Concept of Cycles,” Review, II, 4, Spr. 1979, 563-646. Pomian uses the term in contrast to chronometry and chronology, saying “it speaks of time; it makes time the object of a discourse or rather of discourse in general” (pp. 568-569).
4 See Ilya Prigogine, The End of Certainty (New York: Free Press, 1997). It should be noted that the original title in French, La fin des certitudes, uses the plural for certainty.
5 This is the title of Part II of Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-system (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991).
7 See an excellent discussion of this phenomenon in Paul Gilroy, Against Racism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), ch. 7 and passim.
9 My arguments to elaborate this thesis are to be found in Part II, “The World of Knowledge,” of The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-first Century (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1999)
Laughter is generally the privilege of the insane...
(Baudelaire, *On the Essence of Laughter*)

Introduction

In my essay I am not going to construct a general theory of laughter in Foucault's works. That would have been a radical and challenging task though, and I slightly regret to have to leave it to some other, more systematic mind. All I have to suggest here is an analytic of several episodes in the body of Foucault's books, essays, interviews, where laughter comes into play. I will try to show the function laughter plays in these episodes without suggesting that this function is necessarily the same. Laughter is not a smile, where at least one could detect its location, - it's a disembodied faceless voice which doesn't stay within its own belongings and tends to traverse them every time we think it's in our hands.

It is probably useful to say that this paper is not about humor and it won't teach one how to be funny. If the reader was expecting to find something like this, she'd better go directly to the bibliography page - other authors will take care of you. Check for Lewis Carrol or Doug Adams references, that would be my suggestion.

Here I was simply trying to deal with the issue of how the mind comes to freeze some memories, precisely memories...
which are traumatic. I use the word 'freeze' in a manner in which a psychoanalytic author would use it - meaning fixation or/and forgetting - most common ways of dealing with trauma. My first encounter with Foucault was certainly traumatic - a shock disclosed by laughter which I wasn't able to articulate effectively. I couldn't cope with the text's denial to keep identity, with its rejection to have a meaning. I had a simple hermeneutic problem of how I was supposed to read the text when Foucault says 'I am here laughing at you' and 'don't ask me to remain the same'. Due to my incapability to digest such statements (probably caused by my old platonic belief that our mind operates through establishing identity and difference among things) I developed a fixation on these statements and turned to the body of commentaries in search for help. It didn't take much time to realize that in the body of commentaries on Foucault forgetfulness (as the second common way of dealing with trauma) prevailed.

My basic intuition that led me through the way was that the 'laughing encounter' in what we call 'archeological period' of Foucault works is somewhat close to the 'clash with power' in his 'genealogical' writings. In the essay *The Life of Infamous Men* he describes this clash by using metaphors of 'flash' and 'lighting'. I found these metaphors extremely helpful, for they hint at the revealing quality of this encounter, position this encounter as a certain disclosure, clearing which brings to sight something which would otherwise remain hidden. I dare to suggest that laughter refers to order (archeology) the same way as clash refers to power (genealogy).

\[
\text{Laughter} \quad \text{Clash} \\
\text{ORDER} \quad \text{POWER}
\]

The other intuition - somewhat melancholic - was that one could see laughter which is 'generally the privilege of the insane' as a certain promise hinting at the utopic possibility of
the place or moment where power machine collapses. In this kind of fantasy laughter is not a simple resistance to power but a complete - though maybe only momentary - escape from the power-resistance grid itself. This fantasy, no matter how utopic, is necessary and comforting. Whether this moment of infinite improbability can be turned into a constant and conscious strategy is an entirely different question.

My third intuition was that Foucault’s laughter turns out to be a form of terrorism – a strategy which was later adopted by Deleuze and Guattari; so the laughter has at least three faces: revelation (knowledge), utopia (promise) and terrorism (strategy). I will try to unfold all three ideas during the course of the article.

Otherwise, this paper is about hermeneutic and experimentation - it deals with the issues such as 1) how excavation of meaningful response was interrupted by a little earthquake, 2) how to proceed under these geological circumstances, 3) how to throw yourself on the ground and miss, 4) all mentioned above and many others. If you were careful enough you could see that some of those issues belong to the category of experimentation, some of hermeneutic, some don’t belong to any of them, but don’t worry - that is precisely the point.
coastline where one formation ends giving space to another, returning suddenly and then giving space again. This hiccup of history is paradigmatically described in the introduction to the book, with most brilliance Foucault is capable of. This introductory chapter stands aside from the rest of the book, doesn't unfold in the following chapters. In the very next chapter Foucault starts his discussion of Las Meninas, and after that jumps directly into historical matter of the 'classic period'. Introduction stands aside as a book-in-itself, keeping certain integrity. Trying to locate this chapter geometrically in relation to the following chapters one could say that it exists in a metaspace, revealing the very form, strategy and methodology of the book, scheme of the experience one is going to go through. I always had the feeling that all Foucault wanted to say in the book (from the point of methodology, form, experience) he already said in the introduction. Let us look at it closely.

The very first passage of the Introduction says: 'This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I read the page, all the familiar landmarks of my thought - our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography - breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things...'. The shattering laughter described through the abundance of tectonic metaphors is Foucault's response to the 'Chinese Encyclopaedia', a fantasmatic classification of animals invented by Borges. Though entirely fictional, this classification is capable of producing monstrous effects on Foucault who is strucken by the 'stark impossibility of thinking that'. This passage from Borges presents a certain order totally different from 'all landmarks of our thought' revealing the order we are accustomed to as itself fictional, or better to say revealing the separation between fiction and reality as a theoretical fiction, or optical illusion. The impossibility to think through the classification results from the absence of the common ground, that is, unity of classification, which grants the passage, as Foucault says with 'monstrous quality' or 'absurdity'. We can see here that laughter Foucault experienced is not related to something humorous or funny, but is rather a fright as
a response to an aporia, infinite improbability of a mind which would operate by producing such classifications. This monstrous quality is far from being just non-sense. One can easily deal with non-sense operating through the usual categories of identity and difference (Same and Other in Foucault's terms), identifying non-sense as separate (different) from sense. The term 'monstrosity' here suggests the collapse of these categories themselves, contamination of sense by non-sense, revealing the possibility that the truth of the sense itself is non-sense or at least that the limits of sense are not that easy to determine. The reader finds herself in the position of Alice willing to keep her sanity but also facing the impossibility of it: "Oh, you cannot help that," said the Cat: "We're all mad here. I'm mad. You're mad."

This encounter has a parodic quality, and as every parody it plays with resemblance. Chinese Encyclopaedia resembles order, in fact is a sort of order, which however we cannot operate with. We cannot divide things and group them according to this table, they slip back into indifference and - the other way round - produce differentiations where we would not expect. This inverted image of order shows that the order we are used to in its essence is also a non-order. The rupture in with laughter shatters is not a rupture within the order, but the groundlessness of the order itself. It opens a void in which our familiar order 'hovers' as ungrounded, infinitely contingent, and can be seen in a certain estrangement, 'unfamiliarity'. A void between 'orders' is also a void of greater importance - a void between the 'order of things' and the subject capable of seeing it in its contingency. Not that one can voluntarily leave one order of things for the sake of the other changing them as a disguise. At the opposite, Foucault's puts emphasis precisely on the horror one feels while encountering otherness, complete failure to imagine its possibility. But the positive outcome of this horror is that one is also capable of distancing oneself from one's own familiar order, revealing its axiomatic charac-
I think that this Preface is a well staged experiment on the reader, as well as most of other texts of Foucault. I believe that descriptions play the same role in Discipline and Punish - they open the same void, produce the same distance. Take for example the slaughter of Damian in the very beginning of D & P - this scene of torture is not offered to us for voyeuristic purpose only, as a spectacle for our contempt. Think of both repulsion and recognition it produces in the reader, both surprise and fright. The description of Damian's death is not capable of initiating laughter the way that a passage from Borges does because of its proximity to us - we still take this kind of order/power operating through public executions too seriously, we recognize ourselves in it, and the fear one feels is the sign of this recognition. Only the detailed description produces a degree of uneasiness which is a possible sign of distance. I would use the metaphor of 'little earthquakes' in relation to the use of detail in this description as compared to a large tectonic rupture in the Order of Things.

Foucault describes his experience of laughter in terms of uneasiness and anxiety. "The passage from Borges kept me laughing a long time, though not without a certain uneasiness that I found hard to shake off." (p. xvii) Three following conditions are said to contribute to this uneasiness - impossibility to think, to speak and to visualize (perceive). All those signify a certain ruination - ruination of the subject of thought, speech, perception. Ruination isn't just a destruction. It can be defined as experience caused by encounter with something which dis-
Ruination of thought in the Order of Things is caused by paradoxes imbedded in the classification, which give the passage already mentioned 'monstrous quality'. "The central category of animals 'included in the present classification', with its explicit reference to paradoxes we are familiar with, is an indication that we shall never succeed in defining a stable relation of contained to container between each of these categories and that which includes them all..." (xvii)

Ruination of thought is linked to the failure of imagination, collapse of geometry, impossibility to visualize, distribute given entities in space: "...there is a worse kind of disorder than that of the incongruous, the linking together of things that are inappropriate; I mean the disorder in which fragments of a large number of possible orders glitter separately in the dimension, without law or geometry, of the heteroclite... it is impossible to find a place of residence for them, to define a locus beneath them all." Foucault calls these impossible places 'heterotopias' in opposition to 'utopias'. "Utopias afford consolation...", he says, "Heterotopias are disturbing." (xviii)
"The uneasiness that makes us laugh when we read Borges is certainly related to the profound distress of those whose language has been destroyed: loss of what is common to place and name' (xix) This distress is also the anxiety of the aphasic who creates a multiplicity of grouping only to find out that they 'dissolve again, for the field of identity that sustains them, however limited it may be, is still wide not to be unstable; and so the sick mind continues to infinity... teetering finally on the brink of anxiety." (xviii)

In fact, if we admit that in the first pages of the Order of Things Foucault tries to invent some kind of language which allows to speak about anxiety, it will let us put Foucault in a context much wider than the context of his own works only. There is a long tradition of thinking about anxiety, which probably starts with Kierkegaard and goes through Sartre, Heidegger and Lacan into late XX century. It is possible to interpret Foucault's 'aphasia' in terms of the encounter with the real in the works of Lacan. The question also arises about the possible relation between

"Непријатноста која не тера да се смееме кога го читаме Борхес несомнено е поврзана со длабокото страдање на оние чиј јазик е уништен: загуба на она што е вообичаено за просторот и името" (xix). Ова страдање е и вознемиреноста на афазичниот кој создава мноштво групација, само за да откриве дека тие "повторно се растварат, бидејќи полето на идентитет кое ги одржува, колку и да е ограничено, е се уште доволно широко за да не биде нестабилно; и така болниот ум продолжува до бесконечноста... конечно тетеравејќи се на работ на вознемиреност" (xviii)

Непријатноста што ја носи смеенето доаѓа од несопособноста на субјектот да го одржи својот идентитет, кој е можен само преку воспоставување на идентитет на дискурсот, идентитет на значењето, на просторот, геометријата на видливото. Одреден елемент на ексцес се појавува на патетиката на Фукоовото дело и предизвикува руинирање пред книгата воопшто и да започне - овој чуден однос меѓу поредокот и неговото прекинување, символичен тоталитет соочен со темелен неред, момент на хаос кој е ставен надвор од репрезентираното. Чарлс Шепардсон го смета ова за 'еден вид дух, трауматичен елемент, кој ги прогонува делата на Фуко како постојана можност за лудило' (стр. 21). Тој исто така предлага дека овој елемент, за кој нема место воведено поредокот, воведено место во симболичниот поредок - имено, поради тоа што предизвикува пукнатина во истот - се манифестира како траума која не може да се интегрира и се открива себеси преку смеене и вознемиреност, а и чудно наликува на нешто што Лакан би го наредил реалното.

Всушност, ако призname дека на првите страни од Поредокот на нештата Фуко се обидува да измисли еден вид јазик, кој овозможува да се зборува за вознемиреноста, тоа ќе ни дозволи да го ставиме Фуко во многу поширок контекст од неговите сопствени дела. Постои долгата традиција на размислување околу вознемиреноста, традиција која најверојатно започнува со Кjerкег (Kierkegaard) и преку Сартр, Хайдегер и Лакан (Sartre, Heidegger, Lacan) оди во доцниот 20-ти век. Можно
Foucault and Heidegger. The question to be articulated is whether what Foucault calls 'disorder', 'heterotopia' is the same as what Heidegger calls Being or Lacan calls the Real.

I think that such equation is a very tempting enterprise because it allows to position Foucault in the tradition of philosophy, which he himself denied by saying he was not a philosopher but simply a historian. It also allows to introduce an ontological dimension in his thought. Saying for example, that the Preface to The Order of Things introduces a possibility of something like the Real or the Being would elevate Foucault's thought above the level of historical 'relativism' and disturbing contingency of the discursive formations. It allows the dimension of depth to (re-)appear behind the interplay of surfaces. However, I think this attempt is misleading. What I suggest here is to turn to these thinkers themselves and to see what they have to say on the topic on anxiety.

Heidegger: What is Metaphysics?

"What is metaphysics?" is a question Heidegger developed in his Inaugural Lecture, after he had been appointed to the Chair of Philosophy as a successor of his teacher Edmund Husserl, the author of the 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science'. In this lecture Heidegger posits the question of Nothingness as a key to metaphysics. He seeks to uncover the possibility of the mode of 'awareness' which is non-scientific and which hopefully would disclose the nature of metaphysics.

Being different both from mere 'absence' of a being and from mere negation of a being, nothing is neither the effect of the negation as a logical function, nor it lies within the field of logical awareness. Logic, Heidegger claims, itself presupposes nothing as its condition. The form of 'negation' remains 'foreign'
The form in which nothing reveals itself is, therefore, 'mood', a type of awareness which is not dependent on an intellectual grasping of something. The mood in which 'man is brought before nothing itself' is 'Angst' (dread, anxiety). What distinguishes Angst from fear is its objectlessness. This non-intentional character of Angst is of particular importance for Heidegger for it indicates that the one who is anxious is actually driven beyond the totality of beings, exposed to a lack of being in a way. However, nothing is encountered in the state of anxiety not as something isolated, apart from the things in the world, but as one with them. The essential point emphasized is that in the state of anxiety things tend to slide away, sink, that the control over things strangely weakens. The emergence of nothing make things change. Or I would say, the directionality of things changes. The world seems to flee from the subject. The things lose their character of being-ready-at-hand for Dasein. Heidegger claims that anxiety reveals 'things as they are', but certainly not as they are experienced in our average everydayness. The Anxious is driven beyond the familiar disclosedness in which the beings are meaningfully manifest (which means they can be used and spoken of) into the field of estrangement. As in Foucault's case, the subject is confronted with something he cannot operate with, 'unfamiliar'.

Heidegger explicitly refers to this experience as 'Unheimlichkeit', that is, the experience of not being at home in one's own experience. 'In Angst, we say, there is being-not-at-home' (in other translation, 'being ill-at-ease'). This being-not-at-home, doesn't imply that there is a 'home' somewhere, a 'natural place' where Dasein belongs to, and where it would be free from the scary encounter with nothing, but rather that this Unhomeliness is a necessary characteristic of Dasein and is its essential belonging.
Исто така, искуството на општа непознатост му е некако „секогаш премногу позната“ на Dasein, бидејќи, како што вели Хајдегер, вознемириеноста – имплицитно – е секогаш присутна. Некој секогаш „се тетерави на работ на ужасот“. Овој философски гест импицира дека непознатоста на Познатото (нештата го губат своето значење) и познатоста на Непознатото (прастарата природа на вознемириеноста) онтолошки ј ј претходат на познатоста на познатото (разоткривноста на нештата како да се при рака, како да се референцијални, наредени).

Вознемириеноста или Unheimlichkeit за прв пат го носи Dasein пред суштествата, како такви, оттаму носејќи ја и можноста за метафизика. Донесувајќи го Dasein лицев-лице со светот во сета негова неоснованост, „расположението“ покажува дека иако Dasein задолжително постои во светот, светот не е ниту место на неговата автентичност, ниту негов дом.

The Language of the Real

And also, this experience of general unfamiliarity is somehow always-too-familiar for Dasein, for, as Heidegger says, anxiety - implicitly - is always there. One is always ‘teetering on the brink of horror’. This philosophical gesture implies that unfamiliarity of the Familiar (things loose their meaning) and familiarity of the Unfamiliar (the primordial character of anxiety) are ontologically prior than familiarity of the familiar (disclosedness of things as being-at-hand, as being referential, orderly).

Anxiety or Unheimlichkeit brings Dasein for the first time before beings as such, therefore brings forth the possibility of metaphysics. Bringing Dasein face-to-face with the world in its groundlessness, the 'mood' shows that though Dasein necessarily exists in the world, the world is not the place of its authenticity, not its home.

Borrowed partially from Freud essay on uncanny, partially from Heidegger's lectures on Metaphysics, uncanny or Unheimlich becomes a technical term in Lacan's writings. Uncanny cannot be described better as simply an anxiety provoking event, let's say, a certain excitement, which has no reason, comes without being due, as a surprise. Anxiety should be distinguished from fear: one can be afraid of a concrete person or object; fear should be provoked by an object, it has a cause, while anxiety doesn't have a cause. It is provoked by uncanny.

The paradigmatic example of the uncanny to which both Freud and Lacan refer is the double. The importance of un-
voobichajenite fenomeni e deka tie se portata kon real-
noto. Voznemiirenosta, rezultat na sredbata so novoob-
ichaenoto, e signal/simptom deka chovek se priблиjuva do
realnoto.

Во контраст со претходните психоаналитичарски
автори кои ja сфаќаа вознemiirenosta, едноставно, како
една loшa работа, нешто што треба да se отстри, Lакан,
во хајдегеријански стил, признава дека вознemiirenosta
има позитивен квалитет, tokму зашто го приближува суб-
jектot vo допир со реалното. Реалното e она нешто што
nедостига во simboličniot poredok, neшto што не може
da bitе регистрирано во него, нешто до што може да se
приближиме, но никогаш не можемe da go сфатиме.
Reалното создава takанаречени „дупки“ vo рамките на
simboličкото кои ja покажуваат нецелосностa на
simboličkata struktura. Реалното припаѓa надвор od
operaцiiite на знаењетo и логиката на претставувањe.

На некој начин, знејќи дека сите tri spomenati
автори пробуvaат да направат јазик со коj ke можат da
зборуваат за вознemiirenosta, tie doаѓaат, помалку ili
pwеке, do isti rezultati. Сите троjoцa
1) описуваат средбата koja предиз-
викува вознemiirenуањe како ekcesivна, без причина,
изненадувањe, шок;
2) зборуваат за колапсот на јазикот/не-
успехот на значењетo;
3) зборуваат за средбата со извесен пре-
kin, или низа прекини, и
4) сугерираат руинирање на репрезен-
ционалната логика; субjектot не може da se оддели
od расположението, загаден e ili вовлечeн во него.

Меѓутоа, и покраj сите сличности megu triите фи-
guri, mislam deka Haјdегer и Лакан имаат повеќe заед-
nички точки megu себе, отколку со Фукo. Најголемата раз-
lika koja ja гледам лежи во интерпретациjата на зна-
чењетo на вознemiirenостa. Kaj Haјdегer и Лакан функциj-
jата е „откривачка“. Angstot gi открива сушестваата kako
canny phenomena is that they are the gate to the real. Anxiety,
caused by one’s encounter with uncanny, is a signal/symptom
of one’s getting close to the real.

In contrast with earlier psychoanalytical authors that per-
ceived anxiety as being simply a bad thing, something to get rid
of, Lacan, more in a Heideggerian manner, admits that anxiety
has positive quality, precisely because it brings the subject in
touch with the real. Real is something lacking in the symbolic
order, something that cannot be registered in it, can be ap-
proached, but never grasped. Real creates so called 'holes' within
the symbolic which show incompleteness of the symbolic struc-
ture. Real falls outside the operations of knowledge and the logic
of representation.

In a way, given that all three mentioned authors try to
develop a language in order to speak of anxiety, they approach
more or less the same results. All three of them
1) describe the anxiety provoking encounter as
excessive, not having a cause, a surprise, shock;
2) speak about the collapse of language/failure
of the signifier;
3) speak of the encounter as a certain rupture,
or a chain of ruptures;
4) suggest the ruination of representational logic;
the subject is unable to separate himself from the 'mood',
is contaminated or absorbed by it.

However, in spite of all similarities among three figures,
I think that Heidegger and Lacan have more in common with
each other than with Foucault. The major difference that I see
lies in the interpretation of the meaning of anxiety. In Heidegger
and Lacan the function of anxiety is 'revealing'. Angst reveals
beings as beings in the black light of nothing, bringing forth the
possibility of metaphysics. For Lacan anxiety discloses the real as the impossible limit of the symbolic order, reveals the latter as always disrupted and incomplete. Laughter in Foucault reveals the existence of the order, but at the same time it opens a possibility for experimentation. Laughter brings subject to ruination which in fact leads to a possibility of renovation. The function of laughter indicates the possibility of the movement of experimentation.

Episode III: How to throw yourself on the ground and miss.

The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy has this to say on the subject of flying.

There is an art, or, rather, a knack to flying. The knack lies in learning how to through yourself on the ground and miss.

Pick a nice day, it suggests, and try it. The first part is easy. All it requires is simply the ability to throw yourself forward with all your weight, and the willingness not to mind that its going to hurt. That is, it's going to hurt if you fail to miss the ground.

(Hitchhiker's Trilogy)

Paradoxically enough, I am willing to claim that Foucault's point is somewhat similar to the suggestions from Hitchhiker's Trilogy: he suggests the possibility of throwing oneself on the ground and miss. Only the ground means something different - it means the order. Showing the groundlessness of the order means in a way hovering above it, for the order is a ground. But for the sake of this hovering the subject has to give up his will, to be able to operate, has to loose a certain degree of 'sanity' and has to be able to sustain the shock of non-identity.

"No, no, I'm not where you are lying in wait for me, but over there, laughing at you... Don't ask me who I am and don't
In this passage laughter comes into play again, but the function of it is different. It no longer bares resemblance with the figures of ontological thought, such as Real or Being, doesn't suggest a rupture in discourse, failure to signify, collapse, but rather reveals itself as a conscious strategy. This strategy is connected with something Foucault calls fiction, which is an important concept in *The Order of Things* as well as in the *Archeology of Knowledge*. Since the episode with Chinese Encyclopaedia implied that every order is fictional, and that the very distinction between fiction and reality is a kind of illusion or fiction itself, the notion of 'fiction' opens infinite space for experimentation. Fiction or 'writing' is perceived by Foucault as a space free from the law of compulsory identity, a heterotopia where subject can experiment with the change or metamorphosis - become a fly, become a snail, become a monster. What Foucault seems to suggest here is a form of terrorism through writing - where the enemy of the order changes places and masks and becomes invisible and flees at the moment one tries to catch him. A lizard. This terrorism can take different forms: apart from the metamorphosis - the strategy later adopted by Deleuze and Guattari (see "How One Make Oneself a Body Without Organs"), Foucault also uses another strategy: making the reader and the text itself come face to face with its own contingency, where he puts into question its own capacity to bare a meaning, where meaning collapses in laughter. This type of subjectivity, that is not linked to identity and is experimentally produced in the non-space of writing, is capable of 'missing the ground' and hovering in-between. Though Foucault elaborated the concept of subjectivity and subjectivation (as self-production along with subjection) much later, one can see the trace of the concept already in the archeological period, or at least there is an intuition that "the struggle for subjectivity presents itself as the right to difference, variation and metamorphosis" (*Deleuze*, p. 106).
како право на разлика, варијација и метаморфоза." (Deleuze, p. 106)

БИБЛИОГРАФИЈА
Deleuze, *Foucault*, University of Minnesot, 1998
Foucault, *The Order of Things*, NY, 1990
Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, NY, 1974
Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, NY, 1995
*Trauma, Explorations in Memory*, ed. by Cathy Caruth, John Hopkins University Press, 1995

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Deleuze, *Foucault*, University of Minnesot, 1998
Foucault, *The Order of Things*, NY, 1990
Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, NY, 1974
Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, NY, 1995
*Trauma, Explorations in Memory*, ed. by Cathy Caruth, John Hopkins University Press, 1995
identities
сексуалностим
sexualities
сексуалностим
In this essay, I will not delve broadly and exclusively into the issue of the sexuality of the Son in Kafka, but particularly into one of its aspects - sexual strategy. I would like to present and elaborate on two complementary structures, because I consider two of Kafka's posthumously published short stories commonly entitled Sons, The Metamorphosis and The Judgment, to be a joint representation of the two archaic resolutions of the Son's sexual drives.

The first structure is that of the Son becoming a terrorist of the Symbolic Order/Father, since terrorism - begotten by the sadism of the Symbolic Order - can be seen as a quasi-form of sadism. The opposite structure obtained by the Son's need to marry the Symbolic Order, i.e. the Father, arrives from the masochistic pleasure to devastate the Symbolic Order by swallowing it. The last structure includes the secondary production of the Other, which unfolds in the Son, since the exile, as we will try to explain later, can be analyzed as a utopian version of terrorism. The resolutions involved - murder in the first story, and suicide in the latest - are dependent, both on the utopian/
As Shakespeare points out, with the greatest insight, in the relation to the Other, hatred is more archaic and primordial than love. *My only love sprung from my only hate!* - says Juliet immediately after meeting Romeo. Therefore, the Son's love towards the Father, just like hatred, in Kafka, is also directed towards the devastation of the Symbolic Order. The issue most attractive to me is the significance of the two strategic solutions chosen: terrorism and exile. But, before I venture into any analysis, I would like to distance myself from the issue whether the Symbolic Order can be so easily equalized to the Father. This is not only because of the limited scope of this essay, but primarily due to the position of the Son in Kafka. The Son is not always in a love-hate relationship with the Father, but with the Symbolic Order that he sees represented in the Father. Therefore, I shall divert the main attention to the more essential question: what is the relation between the Subject (here, the Son as a Subject) and the Symbolic Order? How does the Son, bearer of sexuality, position himself in relation to the Order? I would like to quote a sentence from the book *Tales of Love* by Julia Kristeva, where she says:
"We are all perverts, we are neotenic, incapable of subsisting solely within the symbolic order, constantly driven to seek the animal sources of a passion that defies the Name to the advantage of loss of self in the flood of pleasure."

Kristeva positions the subject as the one who always seeks crisis. Precisely, every subject is defined as being close to madness, always perverted and criminal regarding the Symbolic Order. This is because the Symbolic Order in which we sojourn is ambivalent, and its contradiction affects us so that we never fully abide by its rules and we always seek for a word that will oblige us to nothing. However, there is no such word and the Language becomes a place where everyone begins a battle. Kristeva says, the Subject confronts the Language. With all my passion, I want to defeat the Name, lose the Language, so I can fully enjoy the pleasure. For, the Language, as well as the Symbolic Order, is made of ambiguity. Therefore, the criminal, perverse subject can be defined as an eternally infantile subject.

The key word in Kristeva’s quote is neotenic. Neoteny is a quality or ability of the adult to retain the memory of its immature, juvenile characteristics. Therefore, the adult has a built-in capacity of being a non-adult, and can use this potential as needs arise - and there are always needs. The most significant post-Freudian psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, describes this extensively in his text “The Symbolic Order.” I shall present here one of his examples of neoteny.

It is a famous case of a charming patient of Dr. Balian, who was a talk-talk-talk-say-nothing type of person. On one of the séances, after an entire hour of “sick babble,” Balian gently touched the spot that didn’t want to be disclosed. She received a recommendation letter, which stated that she is “a trustworthy person.” The breaking point was that she did not want to be seen as trustworthy. For the word is bond, and she will be obliged to stop talking and start working. And work has its laws,
Neoteny necessarily reminds us of the capital investment Freud made in the realm of sexual theory. By investing in the awakening of the neglected infantilism and infantile amnesia, Freud's theory re-evaluates the infantile subject and its capacity for sexuality, and one of his key works is titled exactly "Infantile Sexuality." This amnesia is created where the sexual drives have been cast away. This means that culture itself seeks neoteny, due to the subject's need to be included in the Symbolic Order. Though conservative in its descriptive capacity, Freud's cultural theory has proven to be prescriptive, as well. I think that exactly the renewal of the amnesic sexual drive brought forth the restructuring of the Modernity.

Here I would like to introduce my definition of the Modernity as a project led by the Son. As several mystical and unorthodox traditions stated, the Modern period, or new era, is dominated by the Son. I claim that the cultural sympathy, energy and concentration on the Son in the 20th century, is due to his released, amnestied neoteny.

While I was writing this essay, I read a column in a Macedonian daily, where the author stated that "a juvenile is an entire nation" (there: the Macedonian nation) and that "our adolescence has its advantages."
Terrorism

The solutions of the spirit are nothing but requests, different precisely because of the different composition of the bodies.

Spinoza, Ethics

The advantage here is, in fact, the advantage of the terrorist. Regarding the aforementioned column, it is appealing how in the diplomatic rhetoric, a terrorist from a foreign place is often referred to as a rebel. This shift, for example, is often present in journalist reports on the terrorist crisis in Macedonia and Southeast Europe. It is my opinion that the cultural sympathy towards the Son has somehow influenced the shift of these two phenomena. Infancy calls out for a need to defeat the Name, or at least, restructure it. In this process of Naming, we are witnessing the diplomatisation of the cultural sympathy towards the Son, organized on the basis of imaginary enchantment in the idealized gaze (albeit, an effect of the essentially, naive gaze) of oneself as the Son in the foreign Symbolic Order. The subject here is the Western European or the American, who gazes at oneself as the Son of the Southeastern European Symbolic Order.

The same mechanism, however, is at work, when the reader identifies with Kafka's hero, Gregor Samsa, in The Metamorphosis (1912, first published in 1915). The story of a Son, who becomes a terrorist, opens our first theoretical category, which I will refer to as animalism. The main character in this story, Gregor Samsa, works hard as a traveling salesman, in order to financially support his parents and his younger sister. One morning, he wakes up in his bed, transformed into a giant vermin. At first, practical issues worry him: how to get up from the bed and walk with his many legs. Soon enough, his abilities, tastes and interests change - he climbs the walls and eats from the floor. Nobody can understand his new language, the language of a bug. Terrified by this metamorphosis, his family locks him up in his room and refuses communication with him. When
Gregor, on one occasion, tries to leave the room, his father starts to throw apples at him, trying to scare him off. One of the apples is stuck in his back and causes an infection. Gregor grows weaker and weaker and soon he dies. The cleaning maid collects his remnants and throws them in the garbage.

There are many texts in literary criticism, which, although not showing ill will towards the body, have little understanding for its secrets. They see the metamorphosis of Gregor Samsa from human to bug through the economy and logic of the gaze. These texts say that a gaze at Samsa recognizes a bug in the, heretofore, traveling salesman, son and brother. The gaze of the never innocent beholder (the family gaze: the father, the mother and the sister; and the non-family: the tenants, a procurer and the maid) wants to see a bug in Samsa. Gregor has not become a bug, but, rather, like a bug to them.

This reasoning is fundamentally wrong, not only because its logic stems from the moralism of the Modern (which refuses to bereave itself from the luxury of the human non-reducibility to the animal), but, above all, because Kafka elegantly evades the problem of the spectator and the laws of spectatorship. The first eyes to recognize the bug in the, until then, traveling salesman Gregor Samsa are the very eyes of Samsa. Here is how Gregor faces his new nature at the beginning of the story:

"He was lying on his hard, as it were armor-plated, back and when he lifted his head a little he could see his domelike brown belly divided into stiff arched segments on top of which the bed quilt could hardly stay in place and was about to slide off completely. His numerous legs, which were pitifully thin compared to the rest of his bulk, waved helplessly before his eyes."

This is different from the economy of gaze, a key factor to understanding Mary Shelley's "Frankenstein" monster, which faces his identity not in the laboratory but after his first encounter.
torijska, tuku po prvata sredba so lugeto. Prezemaajki go pogledot na drugiот, toa go sозnava svojot monstrozen identitet, monstrozen biodikey различных во однос na nivniot. Spored taа logika, sekoe gleđaњe e proizvod na opštestvoto, a vidlivosta e kategorija na mislečkoto, go gleđame она што go mislimе. Kaj Samsa очигледно проблемот не se naoѓa во pogledot na Drugiот, tuku e vistinsko odreduvanje na teloto, koe ja prezelo linijata na animallnoto. Cелиот расказ, сведочи za negovoto човечко согласување со animallnoto. Додека слабата волja на dугот сакa да заборави, negovoto telo se izvestua za postojeњeto, поднесувањето и управувањето со друготo telo - животното, koe zаживеjва во него. Drugотo telo se впишува во negovoto. Неговотo telo поброj od negoviot дух сe ослободuва од наивната вера дека e едно, само, и човечko telo.

Here we need to recall and think of the capital investment that Deleuze and Guattari made in the realm of the mechanisms of the body's animalization. They showed that the bodies, just like the ideas, do not die, but turn into archaisms. In the book "A Thousand Plateaus," Deleuze and Guattari analyze animalism and the new philosophical formula born out of it - becoming an animal.

One can immediately perceive the exclusion of the word "like". It is an act of elimination of the mediator, or, an act of the evasion of the metaphor. The cultural duress pursues mankind into seeing relations in the correspondence of the elements in nature: A is to B like C is to D. The effect from the operation of metaphor leads to an essential misunderstanding of the laws of nature and the secrets of the body, say Deleuze and Guattari. This release from the mimesis is, in fact, an act of confrontation with the Language. The symbolic epithet is lost so that the body might surrender itself to the joy of being, of becoming one with nature. Today's thought makes culture which is permeated with rationalization and non-affection privileged. A man cannot say: "I am a bull, I am a wolf," because then he greets the animalistic within. The Modern forces man to say: "I am to the woman what the bull is to the cow, or I am to another man what the wolf is to
become a neighbor, of being adjacent to the animalistic, as a real production. Deleuze and Guattari's suspicion—say we know very little of the inseparability of the human and the animalistic—is justified. I would like to remind of a recent discovery of two twin girls, aged 10, in a forest in Africa. At the time when they were found, living with a flock of sheep, although two, they had not developed any language, any system of signs and symbols. This shows that the body feels neighborliness with other bodies and has the ability of self-production. The cognizance of the body depends on this production and it will oftentimes work on directives given out by the body itself. The body, by the very laws of its nature, is capable of many feats—and even the spirit finds it magnificent. Samsa makes such a rehabilitation of the animalistic, which is, in fact, an archaic memory of the body. It is an inhuman agreement to the animalistic. It is a principle of approaching, without any analogy, to the neighborliness of animalism. The principle question is: why does Samsa's body decide to coexist with the animal?

To answer this question, we have to glance at yet another, hidden metamorphosis in the story—the one of the Father. Since Gregor takes on the financial care for the family, the Father declines and retreats; after Gregor turns into a bug, the Father activates again, working and "holding himself very erect."

It is the Father-Son rotation around the capitalist idea: never be idle. More precisely, in this pair, one is always prostituting the idea of work in the Symbolic Order, and the other is gaining erected energy to fight its prostitution. This libidinal charge and discharge is helping to establish the identities in the body of the Patriarchy.
In terrorism, as well as in sadism, the themes of the Father and the patriarch dominate. However, the subjects of terrorism and sadism are different. Deleuze writes that the sadistic theme resides, after all, on the theme of the Father who destroys his family. In sadism, the picture of the woman is created in such a way that she explodes, since the sadistic Father is the one who disbands the family and prostitutes its members: in an indicative scene in the story, Samsa's sister plays the piano for the tenants, who are, figuratively, a deaf audience, since they are blind to any aestheticism. Playing the piano is an order of the Father for the prostitution of his daughter, while the tenants are the symptom of the disbanding of the family.

This is where terrorism positions itself close to sadism. I think that terrorism, which resides on the theme of the Son and his restlessness regarding the system, has very similar effects on the body of the Patriarchy. The Son's terrorist strategy, which can be referred to as bodily terrorism, the terrorism of the body, effects what is crucial for the Patriarchy - and, doubtless, that is the Body itself. In the explosion, which comes after the metamorphosis, by living close to the animalistic, the Son renders any further procreation - impossible! And verily, this is terrorism's final goal: making procreation impossible and, in effect, actively nullifying the Mother. The main paradox leading into terrorism can be brought down to what Lacan called *lady's refusal*, in fact, an infantile denial to be tied up to a contract. Or, as Kristeva says, the neotenic capacity of the Subject to be confronted with the Name. In the hazy mixture of joy and humiliation - he who gives the orders to the body simultaneously, together with the witnesses, shows deep solidarity - Samsa, in fact, renders the idea of existence outside the Symbolic Order possible. The punishment for this im/possible existence is a murder, and the Father is the prosecutor, so that he can then rehabilitate the family structure and restore the Order.

This is a vengeful murder but also an identity murder - only by killing the Father, one becomes a Father (again). On the
Exile

Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our identity...
Julia Kristeva,
Strangers to Ourselves

An identical outcome - to become one where there were many - takes place when the Son wants to marry instead of terrorize the Order. In The Judgment Kafka presents an ultimate pattern of a homosexual and/or incestuous love. The Son desires to overcome the ambivalence of the Symbolic Order/Father by swallowing it, and his intention is to restore the lost, initial harmony. He hallucinates of merging with the Whole. The object of love in this story is supposed to disappear as well, but not by destruction (with murder, as a punishment that follows), but by swallowing (with suicide, as a punishment that follows). The main character in The Judgment is the Son, Georg Bendemann. He is at his professional and private peak. After his mother's death, his father physically deteriorates. The son takes over his father's business, incorporates some innovations and after becoming rich, he affiances himself to a rich heiress. He is still hesitant about the future marriage, since he feels uneasy how to notify his most intimate friend from the youth about his future plan. Bendemann's father, already on the deathbed, resists both, the fiancé - declaring her the reason for desecrating the memory of the mother, and the friend - declaring him a liar! He sentences the son to death and Bendemann leaves the house and commits suicide. The most dramatic and most mystic figure in the story, the friend from the youth, is a total opposite from Bendemann. After making nothing of his work, he immigrated to St. Petersburg and started a business there, failing again. He did not succeed in contacting the colony of his kinsmen there, and lost all connections to his country. Embittered by the world and the people, he rejects all objects and gifts, falls ill, and becomes a refugee, a foreigner, to be more accurate.

At this point, a rapid reminder of the production of the Other in me takes place. The Father declares the friend from St. Petersburg a Lie: "You have no friend in St. Petersburg. You've always been one for pulling people's legs and you haven't hesitated even when it comes to me." If the friend is false, then he does not live in St. Petersburg, but in the Son. That means the Son, who lives successfully in the Symbolic Order, has a need to create a qualitatively opposed Alter Ego, which exists completely unsuccessfully in the same Symbolic Order, in the same time. A question arises: Why does Bendemann feel the need to create a False I? Here we will recall the extraordinary discernment of the nature of self-cognizance in Slavoj Zizek's Metastases of Enjoyment (1994).

In the prologue of the book, Zizek tells the episode of Freud's visit to Shkofyan Caves in Slovenia. In his writings, Freud notes that while sight-seeing the fascinating world of underground caves, to his surprise, he suddenly met another visitor. This scene later helped him create the well-known metaphor of descending into the nether world of the subconscious. Freud met Vienna's mayor at that time, Dr Karl Lugger, a right wing, radical anti-Semite. The word-play with Mr. Logger's surname, the German for lie (die Lüge - a lie), brought him to the essential truth of his learning: when going deep into our personality, the thing we will discover there is - the Lie. This basic and primordial lie is a creation of the Subject, which creates phantasmagoric constructions with the aid of which it tries to cover up the ambivalence of the Symbolic Order in which we dwell. The embodied and visible Bendemann is successful by all norms of the Order, but he simultaneously fosters a hidden, fake Bendemann, who will testify of the essential failure of every Subject in the Order. There is a consciousness that resides inside Bendemann, one that says there is no such thing as the inherent ownership of the subject. His double says there is no territory that belongs to me.

Every success is the mythology of the stolen; what the subject owns is the lie. What really exists in the Symbolic Order

Bo уводот кон оваа книга, Жижек ја раскажува епизодата од Фројдовата посета на Шкофјанските јами во Словенија. Во своите списи Фројд пишува дека додека го разгледувал фасцинантниот свет на подземните јами, на своје изненадување, наеднаш се соочил со еден друг посетител. Таа сцена подоцна му помогнал да ја создаде познатата метафора за симнување во долниот свет на несвесното. Фројд налетал на тогашниот Виенски градоначелник др Карл Лигер, претставник на десното крило, радикален антисемит. Играта на зборовите со презимето на Лигер, коe на германски значи лага (luger - лага) го повела кон темелната вистина на неговото учение дека при продорот во длабочините на нашата личност, тоа што ќе го откриеме таму е - Лагата. Таа темелна и исконска лага, е креациjа на Субјектот коj гради фантазмагорична конструкциjа со помош на коjа настоjува да јa прикрее амбивалентностa на Simboliten Poredok во коj buoramime. Otelotvoreniot i vidliv Benedem e uspešen po sите normi na Poredokot, no toj istovremeno neguva eden skriennifer, lajhen Benedem, koj treba da svedochi za temelbita neuspesnost na sekoj Subjekt vo Poredokot. Vo Benedemn живее свестa deka ne postoi takvo nešto kako inхернетна сопственост na subjektot. Negojot dojnik кажува deka ne postoi teritorija koja mene mi priraga.

Сekoj uspeš e mitologija na otkrađenoto; toa шto subjektot gо poseduva e lagata. Toa шto vistinski susi-
I shall allow myself a game and turn this thesis around. If the Father is lying, then the Friend from Russia is a real one. This twisted thesis, as we shall see, not only brings us to the same results, but also helps answer the question: why does Bendemann commit a suicide? After Bendemann admits that: “I can't cut myself to another pattern that might make a more suitable friend for him”, his fiancée, Frieda, shows a fundamental resistance towards the friend from Russia. She feels that the absent foreigner is the most fundamental love of Bendemann, and that forces her to say: “If you have friends like that, Georg, you shouldn’t ever have gotten engaged at all.” In the Fatherly and patriarchal theme of The Judgment, the female figure of the
Mеланхолична забелешка: стратегија или тактика?

Седум години по Метаморфоза и Пресуда, Кафка напишал долго и болно писмо до татко му (Letter to Fa-

absent fiancée, explodes more strongly. Both fathers in The Metamorphosis and in The Judgment prostitute the daughter, or the future daughter-in-Law. As the conveyor of sadism, the Father in The Judgment sentences the family to disbandment, when he exhibits primordial impatience towards the fiancée: Because she lifted up her skirts, because she lifted up her skirts like this, the revolting creature...you went after her, and in order to have your way with her undisturbed, you have disgraced our mother's memory, betrayed your friend, and stuck your father into bed so that he can't move. Whether or not the Friend is a lie, his position as mediator of love is unquestionable. Bendemann is tied to his father, in a sense that no female figure is welcomed. That way, a threesome, male love relation is structured among the Sadistic Father (Judge), the Son, and the Friend. Bendemann's primordial wish, in fact, is directed towards the ideal Father/Symbolic Order. Apart from its neotenity, this is a lawless love, more specifically, love for the Law, love greater than the Law. It presents not just the end of procreation, but the end of the Order, as well. Due to the collapse of values in the Patriarchal body, the one who stays - Samsa - is killed, and the one who leaves - Bendemann - commits suicide. In a way, Bendemann suicide is a female one, if we take into consideration Kristeva's distinction of female and male suicides. The male one is an expression of the antagonism towards the Father, and respectively, God, in terms of determination of the being. In a way, Samsa deliberately exposes himself to being murdered by his Father - that is how he expresses his antagonism towards the Symbolic Order. When it comes to Bendemann, it is about suicide as freeing from will or from identity - it is not so much an expression of antagonism, as it is an exit, similar to the exile. An exile from the Symbolic Order.

A Melancholic Remark: Strategy or Tactics?

Seven years after The Metamorphosis and The Judgment, Kafka wrote a long and painful Letter to Father. With
deep melancholy, he confessed the broken will of the Son when faced with the prohibitive nature of the Father. As opposed to the Sons in his short stories, Kafka made tactical, not strategic solutions. The difference is in the time and the planning: a Subject strategist plans operations, while the Subject tactician acts only when feeling directly threatened. Kafka, whose letter can be read as an effort of the tactician, never actually sent this Letter to Father. Although he saw his father as a pragmatic patriarch and tyrant, Kafka chose to live near him even in his adult years. His entire work is an evidence of the ambiguity of the Symbolic Order and the lethality of not having a strategic position of defense against it - or for the fundamental impossibility of actually having one.

Regardless. Kafka lead his life consciously subverting it - he spent his daytime doing routine office work, and his night writing. Is this not one of the facets of the Son's terrorism against the Symbolic Order? A passive-aggressive solution, like that of Samsa, a pessimistic response, similar to the pessimism of his Sons. Kafka tried Bendemann’s recipe - exile, only once. He left for Berlin, to distance himself from the family ties and to dedicate himself to writing. This was in 1923, and he past away only one refugee year later.

NOTES

3 Here, I am thinking of the global movements for liberation and individualization.


In my book *Female Masculinity* (Duke UP, 1998), I found that I had little if nothing to say about the various dominant and subversive forms taken by male masculinity. My resistance to engaging the topic of male masculinities certainly left my project open to questions about the vagueness of the term masculinity itself and possibly created historical problems by failing to develop a model of the production of manliness. However, I argued in *Female Masculinity* that if what we call “dominant masculinity” appears to be a naturalized relation between maleness and power, then it makes little sense to examine men for the contours of its social construction. Male masculinity figured in my project as a hermeneutic, and as a counter example to the kinds of masculinity which seem most informative about gender relations and most generative of social change.

In this essay on “post-imperial” masculinities, I would like to use some of the paradigms generated by my earlier work to examine the impact of other minority models of masculinity upon dominant conceptions of manhood and manliness.¹ I also want to situate the discussion of female masculinity alongside a whole array of alternative masculinities within postmodernity which, when taken together, launch a powerful critique of mod-
ernist or what can be called imperialist masculinity. I raise the question here of whether new and recent representations of British masculinity in contemporary film and literature are capable of generating different models of masculinity, models which address the specificities of working class, black and queer masculinities rather than just absorbing minority masculinity into the ignominy of otherness. I will be ranging back and forth between very different sites of cultural production in a British context all of which seem to point to a contemporary crisis in masculine identity. I start with an example of an imperialist ethnographic narrative about the phenomenon of the football hooligan in Bill Buford's social narrative Among the Thugs and then I turn to a post-imperialist counter-narrative about the same phenomenon in Irvine Welsh's notorious Scottish novel Trainspotting; the last part of my paper considers a recent British comic film about masculinity and class identities - The Full Monty and, finally, I turn to drag king performances in London's Club Geezer. All of these representations of working class masculinities are situated in 1990's Britain but all also reflect upon a fascinating history of British manhood, a history that links colonialism and empire to gender ideologies.

In her ground-breaking book Manliness and Civilization, Gail Bederman has described the rise of middle-class white masculinity in America as the careful deployment of discourses of racial dominance and civilization. A turn of the century boxing match between black fighter Jack Johnson and white fighter Jim Jeffries, she points out, became a racialized contest of virility which, she states, was an example of the "multitude of ways middle-class Americans found to explain male supremacy in terms of white racial dominance and conversely to explain white supremacy in terms of male power." White middle class men aspired to a morally sanctioned model of manhood in the Progressive Era in America while keeping at bay competing
ците од средната класа се стремат кон етички санкциониран модели на колективитет, додека ги држат на отстојание другите форми на моќна мажественост, какви што се црнечката мажественост, агилноста на работничката класа, дури и женската мажественост како инверзивна форма (иако Бедермен не го истражува последно). Во контекст на Англија, историјата на машкоста различно се внесува преку дискурси, не само за расната доминација, туку и за британскиот колонијализам и империјата, како што би можеле да очекуваме. Натаму, при преминот во новиот век, дебатите за мажественоста во Англија барем делумно биле придружени од општите стравови за дегенерацијата на западната цивилизација и падот на империјата и од специфичната вознемиреност поради ранливоста на мажите од владејачката класа. Судењето на Оскар Вайлд, во овој контекст, повеќе отколку боксерскиот меч, станува символ на британската мажественост која е загрозена и е навистина фрагилна.

As the work of historian Mrinalini Sinha has shown, the rise of a sexological discourse on homosexuality in Britain coincided in the 1890's with the Orientalist characterisation of Indian men as "effeminate." She argues in *Colonial Masculinity.* "One of the contributions of *Colonial Masculinity* is to demonstrate that late nineteenth century notions of English/British masculinity or Bengali/Indian effeminacy cannot be understood from the framework of discrete "national" cultures; instead, they must be understood in relation to one another, and as constitutive of each other."4 Sinha also usefully points out that recent work on British masculinity has "failed to address the full implication of the imperial constitution of British masculinity" (10). "British" masculinity, in the end, is never simply nor discretely British; rather it is the result of sustained comparisons, enforcements, abjections and negotiations between and among masculine subjects within colonial networks of power.5 Work on post-imperial masculinities must acknowledge the twentieth century history of English masculinity as precisely this history of overlapping national and colonial agendas; but, it also requires a shift in focus to the contemporary period where we have seen, in recent years, an efflorescence of representations of reinvigorated masculinities. These representations fall into two different categories: nar-
1. Among the Thugs: Imperial Masculinities

Between 1890 and 1920 in England, notions of both working class and ruling class masculinity underwent huge shifts and changes. As Seth Koven shows in an essay on “Boy Life, National Culture and Social Reform,” the category of the “rough lad” during this period was transformed into the category of the “hooligan” and, he writes, “boy life became a convenient shorthand for the assumption that working class, adolescent, urban male behavior was necessarily a social problem.”

While working class masculinity presented one kind of social problem, homosexual masculinity was another; and as Koven signals in his essay, growing fears of sexual perversion created new forms of surveillance of the relations between men and boys. New laws prohibiting male homosexuality were instituted at the turn of the century even as sexological studies struggled to articulate the naturalness of homosexual instinct. These new social, legal and medical definitions of normative and non-normative masculine expressions of desire coincided furthermore with the ravages of the First World War and a noticeable decline in British colonial power. Large scale shifts in demographics, in immigration, in national discourse and in sexuality and gender definitions brought to visibility diverse expressions of minority male masculinities. Sexological discourses of inversion even allowed for the possibility of non-male masculinity by attributing the cause of same-sex desire to a congenital gender disorder. Female homosexuals, therefore, were those women who felt themselves to be essentially and even physi-
and I'd found that it could be possible for a female to be masculine, as the cause for her desire was assigned to biologically feminine nature. From this, female homosexuals were those women who considered themselves essentially feminine. The discourses of inversion had contradictory effects upon gender ideology: on the one hand, they stabilized male femininity and female masculinity into the master signifiers of homosexuality and naturalized a heteronormative model of desire; on the other hand they detached femininity from women and masculinity from men and allowed for the “natural” occurrence of gender variation.

During World War 1, the insights of sexology had profound implications as hundreds of male soldiers returning from the front suffered from various forms of a debilitating hysteria and, at the same time, hundreds of women either took over masculine jobs on the home front or petitioned to drive ambulances at the front. Since male femininity had been tied so definitively to homosexuality, male hysteria was a particularly troubling neurosis and since female masculinity had been tied so definitively to female homosexuality, the participation of women in masculine occupations gave cause for concern about the impact of these new occupations on “female character.” We could say that the impotent and hysterical man (Virginia Woolf’s Septimus Smith in Mrs Dalloway, T.S. Eliot’s Prufrock and V.S. Naipaul’s Ralph Singh in Mimic Men for example) and the virile woman (Radclyffe Hall’s Stephen Gordon in The Well of Loneliness, Woolf’s Orlando) haunt modernism almost as vampires and ghosts had haunted an earlier generation. T.S. Eliot gave singular expression to the desperation of a white masculinity in decline: “We are the hollow men, shape without form, shade without color/Paralysed force, gesture without motion.”7 Eliot may have intended his Prufrocks and hollow men to warn society of the ruinous effects of a decline in traditional standards of manliness, indeed to ring in a new order of male power, but in fact, Eliot’s work actually created a vast lexicon of male crisis, a reservoir of images and metaphors, phrases and descriptions of masculine fallibility which we still draw upon at the end of the twentieth century.
дари на мажкоста, навистина да засвои за нов ред во мажката моќ, но, всушност, она што Елиотовото дело навистина го создало е голем лексикон за мажките кризи, резервоар на слики и метафори, фрази и описи на мажката грешност, од што се уште се инспирираме на крајот на двесеттиот век.

Розмари М. Џорџ, во една многу значајна расправа за односот меѓу модернизмот и појавата на глобалните литератури, ја коментира токму оваа тропа на кризата на мажкоста како отсуство или шуплив центар; таа тврди дека колонијалните и постколонијалните дела „мажкот неуспех е ендемски за самата колонијална состојба“. Џорџ се осврнува врз делото на Џозеф Конрад за да го покаже опсегот на мажката фрагилност во колонијалните записи. Елиотовата песна „Шупливите мажи“ се разбира, слика за празниот маж, разбира се, во „Срцето на темнината“, па словата завршува со цитат од романот: „Госпојн Курц, тој мртов.“ Конрадовиот роман за бруталноста на цивилизациската мисија многуумпати бил и критикуван и имитиран во последните 80 години и се уште се инспирираме на колонијалната ситуација. Џорџ корисно го ситуира Конрад како „важна појдовна точка за незападното сфаќање на запад“ (89) и како „фикационален засеток на цел жанр на интернационално пишување на англиски јазик во двесеттиот век“ (90). Навистина, Џорџ тврди дека Конрадовиот текст останува „жив“ како колонијалните и постколонијалните документи во нивните „реинкарнации“, што значи во романите и филмовите што ги поттикнале“ (90). На пример, кинематографскиот римек на „Срцето на темнината“, „Апокалипса сега“, ја потребува приказната за осамениот маж кој плави по својот пат низ хаосот и кошмарот за да ја оживее англиската и белгиската колонијална окупација на Конго како американската неоколонијална окупација на Виетнам. Во „Апокалипса сега“ ги наоѓаме остатоците на колонијалните ставови од кои се информирал Конрад, а Франсис Форд Копола употребува систем на империјална логика во кој „ре-

Rosemary M. George, in a very important discussion of the relationship between modernism and the emergence of global literatures comments precisely upon this trope of masculine crisis as absence or a hollow center; in both colonial and postcolonial works, she argues, "masculine failure is endemic to the very colonial situation." And George turns to the work of Joseph Conrad to demonstrate the reach of even the most colonial records of male fragility. Eliot's poem, "The Hollow Men," borrows the image of the empty male self, of course, from Conrad's paradigmatic record of colonial and imperial fears of impotence, Heart of Darkness and a quote from the novel frames the poem: "Mistah Kurtz, he dead." Conrad's novel about the brutality of the civilizing mission has been both critiqued and imitated many times over the last 80 years, and it still retains its power as both a paradigmatic expression of Western superiority and a scathing attack on modern methods of colonial governance. George situates Conrad helpfully as "an important starting point for a non-western understanding of the west" (89) and as "the fictional originary for a whole genre of international twentieth century writing in the English language" (90). Indeed, George argues that Conrad's texts remain "alive" as both colonial and postcolonial documents in "their reincarnations," that is, in the novels and films they have engendered" (90). For example, in a cinematic remake of Heart of Darkness, Apocalypse Now uses the narrative of the lone male navigating his way into chaos and nightmare to recast the English and Belgian colonial occupation of the Congo as the American neo-colonial occupation of Vietnam. In Apocalypse Now, we find the lingering remains of the colonial mindset that informed Conrad and Francis Ford Coppola deploys a system of imperial logic within which "order" and "bureaucracy" are established as representative of civilized rule and "disorder" and "chaos" are marked as the primitive terrain of the other.
While George's work tried to recognize the contributions of Conrad's oeuvre to the development of world literature, *Heart of Darkness* is, of course, more often read as the canonical articulation of imperial masculinity within which the imperialist masculine subject requires an other, abject masculinity to justify colonial intervention. It is precisely this articulation of imperialist masculinity in *Heart of Darkness* that leads Chinua Achebe to assert about Conrad: "Can nobody see the preposterous and perverse arrogance in thus reducing Africa to the role of props for the break-up of one petty European mind?" In a reading of another contemporary rewriting of *Heart of Darkness*, I want to pursue George's idea that Conrad's texts enable a contemporary international literature but also keep in mind the fact that they are equally, if not more, likely to generate a contemporary masculinist genre which simply reproduces the colonial logics that Conrad maps out in his novel.

Marlowe's first speech in *Heart of Darkness* describes a London shrouded in fog and stymied in history: "And this also," said Marlowe, "has been one of the dark places of the earth." Marlowe's haunting words which seem to spill from a multitude of prior conversations and other narratives could as easily open Bill Buford's celebrated 1990 book *Among the Thugs*. Buford, the editor of an English literary magazine GRANTA, wrote *Among the Thugs* as a narrative account of his time spent among football fans in England. Rather than citing Conrad at the opening of his narrative, however, Buford cites Lord Baden-Powell, the founder of the boy scouts, lamenting the decline of English masculinity in 1908 on account of the transformation of the athlete into the sports fan. After describing the early twentieth century phenomenon of paying crowds made up of "pale, narrow chested, hunched up, miserable specimens" flocking to watch football matches, Baden-Powell demands: "Get the lads away from this--teach them to be manly." Obviously, Baden-Powell's...
words are cited by Buford as an ironic reminder of the history of masculinity and its imbrication in sports and football in particular; however, as his narrative unfolds and as Buford descends into England's present heart of darkness—the world of the football thug—it becomes more and more obvious that Buford shares Baden-Powell's imperial conception of manliness as the civilized's man's compulsion towards order, vigor, activity, rugged individualism and self-restraint.

On the back cover blurb to Among the Thugs, Bill Buford is credited as a brave explorer who "enters an alternate society" of soccer hooligans "and records both its savageries and its social allure..." Buford himself describes his English encounters very much in terms of a descent into a savage territory peopled by bestial characters with names like Mutton Chops, Barmie Bernie, Daft Donald and Steamin' Sammy. These football fans are variously described as "fat," "bloated," "puffy and bloodshot." His first encounter is with a Manchester United fan called Mick whom he describes in the following terms:

He had a fat, flat bulldog face and was extremely large. His t-shirt had inched its way up his belly and was discolored by something sticky and dark. The belly itself was a tub of sorts, swirling, I would discover, with liters and liters of lager, partly chewed chunks of fried potato, and moist, undigested balls of over-processed carbohydrate. His arms—puffy, doughy things, were stained with tattoos (26).

Mick, in this description, defines excess. He has too much flesh, unmoving and doughy flesh at that; he is an indiscriminate consumer of bad food which then marks the body as un-nourished and unhealthful. Mick is also reduced to his un-sighty body parts as Buford moves from describing his "fat flat face" to commenting upon "the belly" as if it existed separate
from Mick himself. Similarly, Mick's arms are barely recognized as attached to Mick, they are instead "puffy, doughy things" which like his t-shirt have become "stained." Mick in this description is not much different from the "black shapes," the shadowy native figures which people Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*.

Buford presents his book to the reader, and indeed it is generally received as, an account football hooliganism which forms an alternative to the moralistic social science literature (of which there is a vast archive) which diagnoses the ills of British society through the figure of its most spectacular failure: the lager lout. Buford claims that his use of a set of personal voice narratives, as opposed to a sociological objective account, is best suited to represent the mercurial and explosive nature of "the crowd" in relation to the phenomenon of soccer hooliganism. He further argues that the social science literature views crowd violence in reductive ways as either "symptomatic of the rot of our times" or else "fundamentally no different from what it was yesterday." Buford then goes on to distinguish his narrative from these accounts by apparently rejecting the notion that crowd violence always represents the violence of the other; instead, he claims, "the crowd is in all of us" (249). In one passionate passage Buford asks us to contemplate why we always think the crowd is elsewhere:

"It is easy to dismiss an incident of crowd violence in South Africa or India, countries that removed in both geography and culture, are manifestly not us; it makes sense--does it not?-- that there, among the 'underdeveloped,' the 'underprivileged,' the 'uncivilized,' the primitive (our nineteenth century metaphors reemerge) there would be mob violence. But it is as easy to dismiss the violence outside the doors of our homes. Here, now, in England, in London, down a side street, not far from the center, there is a crowd assembling, but that crowd, we will insist, is not us (186)."
This is a complicated passage if only because Buford seems to be completely aware of the nineteenth century logics of civilization and development which subtend the characterization of working class youth in England. But when push comes to shove, literally, when the violence, in the thug slang, "goes off," Buford finds himself on quite the other side of this critique arguing over and over that though he may be among the thugs, he definitely is not one of them; though the crowd ultimately may be in them, it is not and never has been in him. Buford's flight of lyricism, moreover, echoes an Eliot poem, one of his Four Quartets, "Little Gidding," where Eliot writes about the bombed out England of World War 2 and finds that England has been transformed from the seat of empire to the world's end:

There are other places
Which also are the world's end, some at the sea jaws,
Or over a dark lake, in a desert or a city—
But this is the nearest, in place and time,
Now and in England.13

"Here, now in England," writes Buford, "in London, down a side street, not far from the center..." we will find a crowd, a mob, an insensible mass of otherness. "Now and in England," writes Eliot, we will arrive at the end of the world, we will arrive "where we started/And know the place for the first time." While Eliot, at least, acknowledges the end of empire, the end of exploration, the end of the search for the world's dark places and while he at least recognizes, like Conrad, that this too "has been one of the dark places of the earth," Buford seems shocked some forty years later to find that England is not the land of sweetness and light but a home to random violence, thug community and the ignominy of the crowd.

Among the Thugs is a compelling and compulsive read which moves to the rhythm of the football crowd and is punctuated by its continuous cycle of drinking, singing, fighting and puking. The narrative, as I have suggested, presents itself as an important record of one particularly repulsive form of nationalist skin head masculinity embodied in those figures variously referred to as "lads," "hooligans" and "thugs." The real agenda of
and "sleezenes". However, the central program of his narrative is a spirited defense of another form of masculinity that we can call imperialist masculinity and that functions precisely by drawing essential and definitive distinctions between the "bloated code of maleness" inherent to working class masculinities and the writerly and civilized codes inherent to middle-class masculinity however it may be defined. The book is rife with images that will the reader to recognize, notice and approve the shape and force of Buford's difference from the "miserable specimens" that surround him. Throughout the narrative Buford depicts himself as simultaneously repulsed, fascinated and contaminated by the violence he witnesses; but, ultimately, he fears that he will be drawn over the brink into complete dissolution. In the book's closing pages, he recoils from the violence and the horror of yet another crowd scene in which rabid English lads tear through the streets of Sardinia during a World Cup match, chased by the Italian police. In this brutal denouement, Buford finds himself curled up on the streets being beaten by Italian officers with truncheons and wondering why they have not recognized him as clearly not a thug. As he records the memory of each blow to his kidneys and head, he also recalls the thought that comforted him in the middle of the trauma of being beaten: "All of this was exceptionally painful, as would be expected, but my experience of it was different from that of the others who were being beaten up. Their experience was one of simply pain. For me, it was more complicated, because I knew that I would be writing about it" (307).
The practice of the thugs was considered by the English in India to be an elaborate kind of conspiracy since it combined quasi-religious secret fraternities with elaborate religious ritual and a hereditary system of membership; indeed, English men were so fascinated by thuggee that a number of novels appeared fantasizing about the life and times of the thug: and the best known of these is the supposedly ethnographic narrative _Confessions of a Thug_ inscribed by Philip Meadows Taylor.15 In all of these accounts, as Parama Roy comments, few attempts were made to provide thuggee with political or economic motivations. However, as Roy adds, “twentieth century scholars of colonial history have sought to posit alternative, more materialist histories of the phenomenon” (123). These other more materialist explanations see the thugs as either people working

normative and non-normative masculinities; and third Buford’s uninformed deployment of the term “thug,” an appellation with its own imperial history.

The OED defines “thug” as: “member of religious organization of robbers and assassins in India suppressed around 1825...THUGGEE - the practice of Thugs.” Hooligan also has an interesting history: “young ruffian, one of a gang of roughs, name of ruffianly Irish family in London.” Both names, it is clear, are marked by racial and colonial terms: “thug,” it turns out is a Hindi word which entered the English language through colonialism. The question in relation to Buford’s narrative then is this: What does it mean that a Hindi term for an Indian bandit becomes the term for working class English football fans? According to Parama Roy in “Discovering India, Imagining Thuggee,” thugs were a group of supposedly hereditary killers in India who preyed on travelers as an act of worship to the Goddess Kali in the 18th and 19th centuries. They killed quickly and silently, usually by strangulation, and, after robbing their victims, they disposed of the bodies so efficiently that authorities had a hard time ever finding proof that a crime had been committed.14

Deјствувањето на индиските силенции, Англичаните во Индија го сметале за усовршен вид заговор, бидејки ги комбинирал квазирелигиозните тајни братства со усовршениот религиозен ритуал и наследен систем на членство; навистина, англиските мажи биле толку фасцинирани од индиското разбојништво, што се појавиле многу романи со фантазирање за животите и времето на овие силенции: најпозната меѓу нив е божемно етнографската нарација _Исповеди на разбојникот_, записана од Филип Медоуз Тејлор. Во сиве овие записи, коментира Парама Рој, биле направени малку обиди на индиското разбојништво да му се дадат политички или економски мотивации. Сепак, како што додава Рој, „современите ученици на колонијалната историја сакале да дадат алтернативен, поматеријалис-
against colonial rule who had been displaced as rulers by the colonial powers, or as local groups, almost mercenaries, hired by neighborhoods for protection. What these accounts stress is that the English conceived of Thuggee as irrational, brutal and essentially criminal because such a depiction contributed to, as Roy puts it, “the still emerging project of discovering India.” Because thugs were secretive and difficult to track down, English colonial police solicited confessions from informers and then used their accounts to establish the “truth” of the thugs, to identify potential thugs but also to justify the project of colonial rule.

What are the implications of this colonial history for the contemporary phenomenon of documenting the football thug? First, in both contexts thug violence is essentialized to particular bodies, families and regions. Second, in both cases, thugs are used to justify extreme police violence but also to test drive certain policing techniques. Third, in both cases, the favored policing technique is that of ethnography. Thus, we can talk about a Thuggee archive in India made up of colonial accounts and novels about thugs and confessions by thugs; but we can also think in contemporary terms of a social science soccer “thug archive” in England made up of texts, narratives, security plans and police documents. Finally, the use of the term thug in relation to both the young soccer fan in England and the Indian bandit maps a particular colonial history of the relations between outlaw and dominant masculinities. The term “thug” maps a racialized and colonial plan of governance developed in India and then brought home to rule the dangerous lower classes. In a post-colonial England, the thug is no longer over there, he is here and the techniques for controlling and knowing him developed in India are deployed at home.
Buford's narrative, particularly since he is not English but an outsider, an American, contributes to the thug archive, an archive which produces the caricature of the dumb, bestial and savage football fan in order to glorify and reinvigorate middle-class masculinities after the decline of empire. While the crowd, for Buford, represents a herd mentality rather than anything as dignified as a political collectivity, his own individualist rejection of the crowd signifies to him not as an elite act of differentiation, but as a heroic gesture which confirms the essentially civilized and orderly nature of the middle-class man who writes rather than fights. No longer the hollow man, "shape without form, shade without color/Paralysed force, gesture without motion," the imperial masculinity recorded by Buford reveals in its proximity to but separation from what he calls the "anticivilized" excitement of "being in a crowd in an act of violence" (193). Buford thrills to the manly vigor of the crowd but simultaneously insists that the thrill is borrowed, a flair of obsession that confirms his masculinity and yet threatens to obliterate him. Ultimately he runs back to what he calls "this state of being a citizen, of being civilized." And he continues: "I see it as a net that holds me in place, keeps me from falling" (193). As he peers into the void--violence, the crowd, the toothless mouth of a thug--Buford knows that he has arrived deep in the heart of darkness and that he will survive to tell the tale.

2. "Trainspotting" and The Full Monty: Post-Imperial Masculinities

In this next section of my paper, I want to look at a different narrative of British masculinity, one told not by a subject desperately holding on to his place in an ordered universe but by male narrators who make impotence, humility and the loss of masculine authority into the very essence of their stories about late twentieth century masculinity. Recent scholarship in several different disciplines has tried to address the possibility of a new politics of manhood but all too often these new and
именуваат можности за нова политика на човештвото, но многу често овие нови и различни концепти за мажите и мажественоста ја наметнуваат идејата за решавање на „кризата“ на мажественоста. Филип Брајан Харпер во својата влијателна книга за црнечката мажественост, Не сме ли мажи, за цел го има токму овој метод на дијагностицирање на болестите на машинот род: „кога пошироката култура смета дека во африканско-американското општество има перманентна „криза“ на црнечката мажественост, заисленото решение секогаш е вистинска афирмација на авторитетот на мажот - црнец."17 Ова сфакане дека дестабилизацијата на мажественоста резултира со криза и дека кризата изискува моментна консолидација на машинот авторитет, го поткрепува она што јас го нарекувам империјална мажественост. Од друга страна, постимперијалните мажествености одбиаваат да му се потчинат на сфакането за кризата на мажественоста и намерно одбиваат да го зацврстат машинот авторитет; наместо тоа, тие активно придонесуваат за негово разјаснување.

Given the serious, dark, dire and moralistic tone of Buford's modernist account of the white working class punks and thugs in England, who threaten to push the nation to the brink of anarchy, it is interesting to note that the sites I have chosen to represent post-imperial masculinities all happen to be comic. These wickedly parodic refusals of male authority contrast depressing and earnest tales of middle-class manhood to irreverent, self-deprecating, foul-mouthed and humorous stories of post-imperialist masculinities. For example, Irvine Welsh's notorious punk classic novel Trainspotting (also made into a film in 1996) depicts the trials and tribulations of unemployed Scottish youth seeking some escape from Thatcher's Britain, (unemployment and blistering poverty) with ferocious humor and wit. Renton, the novel's anti-hero and one of about five narrators in the text, refuses the usual developmental trajectory of narrative progression and spends his time shuttling back and forth between the ecstasy of drugs and the agony of boredom. He undergoes no period of maturation, he makes no progress, neither he nor his mates learn any lessons, no one quits the bad life and ultimately many of them die from drugs, HIV, violence, neglect. Renton explicitly acknowledges his re-
Renton's choice to not choose "life" situates him in radical opposition to modes of masculine respectability but also gives him space to expose the contradictory logic of health, happiness and justice within the post-welfare state. In this brilliantly wicked speech, Renton justifies his choice of drugs over health as a choice "not to choose life," where "life" signifies in his words: "mortgage payments, washing machines, cars, sitting on the couch watching mind numbing and spirit crushing game shows, stuffing junk food into your mouth, rotting away in domesticity." Society, he tells us, "invents a spurious convoluted logic to absorb people whose behavior is outside its mainstream" (187); within this logic "life," a numbing mode of domestic passivity constitutes a better moral "choice" than a life of drugs and drink; this same logic offers the armed forces to young men over street gangs and marriage over sexual promiscuity.
Even in his intellectual moments, Renton's theorizing is driven by a deliberate refusal of masculine authority, a self-conscious rejection of the logic of methodical argumentation; Renton selects the curse rather than rational thought as his analytic tool. For example in a scathing diatribe against the English for colonizing Scotland and the Scottish for letting them, he rants: "Begbie and the like are fucking failures in a country ay failures. It's no good blaming it on the English for colonizing us. Ah don't hate the English, they're just wankers. We are colonised by wankers. We can't even pick decent, vibrant, healthy culture to be colonized by. No. We're ruled by effete arseholes. What does that make us? The lowest of the low, the scum of the earth. The most wretched, servile, miserable, pathetic trash that was ever shat into creation. I don't hate the English. They just get on with the shit they've got. I hate the Scots" (78). Renton's diatribe may not win points for its inspirational qualities; however, it is a mean and potent critique of British colonialism on the one hand and of the falsely optimistic rhetoric of anti-colonial nationalism on the other. In a very different context, Lisa Lowe has called writing which refuses the binary of colonialism versus nationalism as "decolonizing writing" which she calls "an ongoing disruption of the colonial mode of production." 

Trainspotting, a Scottish decolonizing novel, envisions drugs, theft and violence as the only tools left to the colonized and working-class males of Edinburgh's slums.

This novel, unlike novels aimed at fortifying imperial masculinities, reveals an increasing dissatisfaction with the conventional plotting of both the present and the future in terms of either utopia or dystopia and Welch forces us to come up with other more complex mappings of space and time. Michel Foucault in an article called "Of Other Spaces" develops the notion
Foucault defines heterotopia with reference to certain special spaces that “have the curious property of being in relation with all other sites.” Such heterotopic sites function “either in order to contradict, neutralize, mirror or invert” the sites they juxtapose. And he lists as examples: mirrors (a place that neither simply reflects, represents nor refracts); boarding schools (a place where crisis and transition is managed through disciplinary regimes); asylums/prisons (places to separate out deviant individuals from the normative population). Of “heterotopia” as an alternative history of space. Foucault maps a conventional model of history within which the past represents the space of the dead and the future represents the space of possibility. He argues however that we can no longer make clean breaks between past, present and future - we live in an age of simultaneity - "an epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed." Life, within this model, is not simply a road stretching into the future but a network of relations, points, intersections - such a concept of time and space is produced by different ideologies and different notions of subjectivity within which a unitary notion of the individual and his freedoms makes no sense since freedom in one place always entails unfreedom in another. Renton's fabulous rejection of bourgeois life, for example, in the speech quoted above articulates just such a model of time and space, choice and oppression. He recognizes the false promise of individual health and happiness and the ways in which individual freedoms cover over much more systematic modes of oppression.
Interestingly enough for our purposes, Foucault also describes the train as a heterotopic space. He writes: "a train is an extraordinary bundle of relations because it is something through which one goes, it is also something by means of which one can go from one point to another, and then it is also something that goes by..." In *Trainspotting*, the train between London and Edinburgh is a heterotopic space which connects two sites, two capitals, two tourist havens but which also stops along the way and maps a relations between London, Edinburgh and all the places in between. Begbie and Renton take the train together and with disastrous results in a chapter called "Inter Shitty." This title makes a joke out of the relations between time, space and transport by folding city into "shitty" which makes an external journey across the country into an internal journey through the bowels.

Welch repeatedly refers to the "internal" in *Trainspotting* as not psychic but intestinal; and all the discourse on inner life in this novel revolves around the body as a heterotopic space for consumption and production of shit and "pish" and vomit.

"Inter Shitty" is told through the rabid consciousness of Begbie who constitutes the voice of outrage and raw violence in the novel as well as what gets called "fascism" in the book. His nicknames, "Franco" and "Generalissimo" pointedly link him with the violence of authoritarian rule. As Renton and Begbie sit on the train drinking, Begbie comments that the train should not stop anywhere between Edinburgh and London: "it should jist be Edinburgh to London, end ay fucking story" (113). Within his authoritarian framework, only two places exist for him - where he is and where he is going, all other places are useless "shitties." Begbie, as usual, begins a fight on the train. He becomes enraged by the fact that many empty seats cannot be occupied by him or his mates because they are reserved for other travelers due to board the train in other cities. Begbie calls the reservation system a "fucking liberty" (114) and continues in his own unique and horrifying voice about the class politics of the train:
The novel's title, *Trainspotting*, takes its name from the harmless boyhood occupation of watching for trains in small towns across Great Britain. Freud writes about the fascination that trains hold for boys as a sexual fascination with the particular motion and "sensations of movement" brought on by the train ride. Freud writes: "It is a puzzling fact that boys take such an extraordinarily intense interest in all things connected with railways, and at the age at which the production of phantasies is most active (shortly before puberty), use those things as the nucleus of a symbolism which is particularly sexual." For boys, according to Freud, the train represents both a phallic symbol and the motion of sexual activity itself. The activity of "trainspotting" then becomes less of an asexual hobby and more of an autoerotic or homoerotic activity. An encounter between Begbie and his father at the site where the old "Central Station" of Leith used to be, becomes all the more relevant then, when the old man says to Begbie and his mates: "What yis up tae lads? Trainspotting, eh?" Begbie rejects his drunken and down and out father here at the site of male sexual awakening calling him a "fucking auld cunt" and striding away. The rejection of the father is more than simply the resolution of an oedipal complex; in many ways, it represents the rejection of male sexuality itself. Few of the Skag Lads in the novel engage in any form of "successful" sexual interaction and most of the time they are more interested in drinking of doing drugs than in sex. The deserted station at Leith, haunted as it is by the ghost of Begbie's father and the lost past of male sexual promise, represents now the breakdown of male lines of authority and inheritance; the disintegration of phallic power and the end of trainspotting.
"Trainspotting" is just one of a handful of new British films and novels which inhabit the consciousness of the thug in order to allow the “empire to speak back.” We should not be surprised, moreover, that when the empire does reply it is in the form of Caliban’s curse: filthy and slang-laden, colored by spite and rage. While Trainspotting takes aim at respectable masculinity by refusing domestic manhood and bitterly critiquing the dominant forms of masculinity embodied in the soldier, the police man, the business man and the father, it still anchors its new forms of masculinity to violent and unruly males, schooled in homophobia, racism and sexism and licensed to kill. Trainspotting ultimately, articulates a minority masculinity that is bound to dominant masculinity by virtue of representing its opposite; this counter-masculinity still cannot acknowledge the possibility of a masculinity forged from gay and female bodies. Another post-imperial masculinity text, however, The Full Monty, directed by Peter Cattaneo, fully explores the possibility of depicting male humiliation and humility without blaming women and without representing a decline of masculine strength as the result of the rise of a corrosive and castrating form of feminine power.

The Full Monty, starring Robert Carlyle (who played the terrifying but humorous Begbie in Trainspotting) takes place in the aftermath of the decline of Sheffield’s steel industry. The film opens with a short documentary, a public service film, which recounts the glory of Sheffield’s steel works in the early 1970’s. The film begins some 20 years later when the steel works have closed and thousands of steel workers are unemployed. Steel, in this film, work as a metaphor for past models of masculinity,
masculinities dependent upon “hard bodies” to use Susan Jefford’s term but, the decline of the steel works also serves as a grim reminder of the ravages of Thatcherism on British nationalized industry. Many men in Sheffield are out of work while their girlfriends, wives and mothers who work in the service industry still have jobs. The economic disparities between the blue collar men who are now unemployed and the blue collar women who retain their service jobs shifts significantly and irrevocably the coordinates and meanings of gender and sexuality. When a Chippendale’s show comes to town, some of the local lads decide that they should try and make some money by stripping and erotic dancing. Amazingly, the process of developing a show throws the men into a series of dilemmas which we almost never associate with masculinity but which have come to define femininity: the men worry about their bodies, their clothes, their ability to dance, their desirability.

The film opens with a series of assaults upon male privilege: the film’s protagonist, Gaz, is unemployed and struggling to make custody payments to his ex-wife in order to maintain a relationship with his son. Dave, his mate, has, in the words of his wife, “given up” and resigned himself to redundancy at work and at home. Gerald, the former boss of Gaz and Dave, cannot bring himself to tell his wife that he is out of work, so he leaves for work every morning and heads to the job center, desperately hoping to find work before she finds out that their money has run out. The conventional masculine roles of father, husband and breadwinner are all under serious pressure as the film begins and masculinity is defined from the outset as a category threatened on all sides by redundancy.

As Gaz and Dave return home one day after a hard day of stealing scrap metal from the old factory, they encounter a long line of women waiting to be admitted to the Working Men’s Club where the Chippendale dancers are performing. Gaz slips into the men’s bathroom through a window to survey
Judith Halberstam

THUGS, GEEZERS AND KINGS: POST-IMPERIAL MASCULINITIES

The growing redundancy of old forms of gender relations and old forms of masculinity is underscored in *The Full Monty* by this abrupt but irreversible reconfiguration of the male gaze. In Hollywood cinema, the male gaze structures the look of the viewer and allows for the male spectator to identify with activity in the scene and to desire the female who is positioned as the object of his gaze/desire. The masculine woman in this scene, the woman at the urinal, restructures the male gaze by insisting that the male gaze be routed through alternative modes of masculinity. In the men's room scene, then, Gaz can peer voyeuristically at the women in the mirror only if he also looks at the woman at the urinal. Gaz's struggle, here and in other key scenes of watching and being watched, indicates how thoroughly

The scene changes abruptly from a feminine scene of display to a masculine scene of activity when one of the women hikes up her skirt and pees standing up at the urinal to the delight of her friends. Rather than conforming to simply a psychoanalytic model of either castration or female phallicism, this scene, I think, registers a refusal of several gender logics: first it refuses to mark maleness as the place of sexualized voyeurism, and second, the scene suggests the effects of even casual invasions of male space by women. Finally, the framing of the shot—which locates a man hiding behind a door, two women in front of a mirror and another woman at a urinal—predicts the politics of the gaze that will be elaborated in the film and will culminate in the film's final shot.

Gaz slips into a stall and watches what transpires through a hole in the door. While Gaz here occupies the seemingly traditional male position of the voyeur or peeping tom, what he sees changes radically the gendered roles of spectatorship. At first, Gaz takes pleasure in watching the women transform the men's room into a women's room by applying make-up in the mirror. He watches them watching themselves. Right before his eyes, however, the scene changes abruptly from a feminine scene of display to a masculine scene of activity when one of the women hikes up her skirt and pees standing up at the urinal to the delight of her friends. Rather than conforming to simply a psychoanalytic model of either castration or female phallicism, this scene, I think, registers a refusal of several gender logics: first it refuses to mark maleness as the place of sexualized voyeurism, and second, the scene suggests the effects of even casual invasions of male space by women. Finally, the framing of the shot—which locates a man hiding behind a door, two women in front of a mirror and another woman at a urinal—predicts the politics of the gaze that will be elaborated in the film and will culminate in the film's final shot.

Растечката редундантност на старите облици на родови релации и старите облици на мажественост е потцртана во *Како од мајка родени* со оваа нагла, но неповратна реконфигурација на мажиот поглед. Во холивудскиот филм, мажиот поглед го структурира погледот на гледачот и на мажиот гледач му овозможува да се идентификува со активноста во сцената и да ја посакува жената што ги гледа како се гледаат себеси. Сепак, пред негови очи, сцената трансформира формата на визуелната интимност на мажиот свет од страна на жените. Конечно, рамката на кадарот — што го лоцира мажот кој што се крие зад вратата, двете женки пред огледалото и онаја пред писоарот — предвидува темата на погледот што ќе биде елаборирана во филмот и ќе кулминира во последната слика.
male-female relations have been transformed by changes at the level of economy and labor practices. It would be inaccurate however to say that the lack of economic power exercised by the working class men of Sheffield “castrates” them; rather, it allows them to see themselves, rather than women, as the subjects who represent and figure lack.

When Gaz reports back to his friends at the unemployment office about what he has witnessed in the men’s room, their responses record unfamiliar forms of male paranoia which are inflected less by rage at women and more by a sense of the impending redundancy of heteronormative maleness once masculinity circulates through different bodies. Gaz himself suggests: “When women start pissing like us, that’s it, we’re finished Dave, extincto.” Another man adds: “They’re turning into us...in four years men won’t exist except in zoos, obsolete, dinosaurs, yesterday’s news...like skateboards.” This theme of male self-deprecation reaches its nadir when Dave and Gaz find a man trying to kill himself in his car. The rescue and resuscitation of the suicidal character, Lamper, is unsentimental and yet it precipitates a strong fraternity between men in trouble. The fraternity crosses class lines when the lads recruit their former foreman Gerald to be their dance instructor. His ballroom dance skills, once the mark of a refined and respectable masculinity, now become the basis for a new male collectivity inspired by disenchantment and exclusion but productive of a new model of maleness centered upon masculine display and vulnerability.

The dance fraternity grows in numbers when Gaz and his new friends begin auditions for their stripper troupe and they find two more members: a black man named Horse and a
gay man named Guy. The Full Monty hints at alternative constructions of masculinity and associates them through these characters with race and sexuality. The character of Horse, despite his name, manages to rise above the stereotype of a black masculinity anchored by a huge phallus and it is the gay man, generically called Guy, who assumes the role of alpha male in the group. Furthermore, when Guy begins a relationship with Lamper, their alternative versions of masculinity only persuade the other men that dominant masculinity (like the dying steel industry) is a totally bankrupt form.

The film ultimately suggests that when men and women reverse places socially, financially and even culturally, the effects are not all bad. Women with power, we discover, do not simply behave like men, they cultivate their own relations to masculinity and femininity and they encourage the men around them to do the same. Similarly, disempowered men may easily fall into conventional concerns about impotence, but they also learn lessons in objectification. In a hilarious scene at Gerald's where the men first try stripping in front of each other, a whole array of issues come up about embodiment. When Dave confesses that he feels fat and out of shape, Gerald shoots back: "Fat is a feminist issue you know." The men proceed to give Dave and each other advice about dieting and working out. The fact that this scene takes place in the 'posh' suburban home of the former foreman also recalculates the class differentials within the group and the relationships between men and domesticity. Just as we found women in the men's room at the working man's club, so we find men at home during the day discussing body issues.

One final scene suggests how new conceptions of masculinity can and indeed must be routed through feminism and the female body. Gaz steals a copy of Flashdance in order to give his dancers some sense of what good dancing should look like. But as the film begins, Dave peers at the screen in wonder
кога ќе почне филмот, Дејв зјапа во екранот чудејќи се поради почетната сцена кога Џенифер Биле, ноќна танчерка, денски заварува во фабриката. Глетката на женска танчерка како заварувач, како и сликарата на жената пред писоарот, уште еднаш ја предизвикуваат идејата за жената како изложен предмет, но креираат и неприродна слика на женска мажественост, што ќе сега ќе мора да ја достигнат. Мажественоста низ целиот филм Како од мајка родени е почитувана форма на заедништвото на мажественостите на помалите групи. Конечно, овој филм за мажите под притисок креира нови стандарди за опишување на мажественоста во водечките филмови, а завршува со табуизираната претстава на машката голотија. Во својата конечна успешност, оваа британска комедија открива дека мажественоста на помалите групи може да ја прикаже водечката мажественост како опасен мит за потенциналот, неранливоста и насилството. Последната слика што треба да ја сочини главната финта на соблекувањето, всушност одби да го открие фалусот при тоталитетот на машкоста; финалето на машкиот стриптиз е снимано од зад сцената и статичниот кадар ги фиксира шеснаесет мужјаци одзади и целата толпа жени што врескаат.

Така, целосниот приказ е овој кадар што ја вклучува жената како воајер, а машкото тело е изложен, а според формата и содржината тој е одек на поранешната сцена со жената пред писоарот. Во обете сцени го гледаме само фалусниот субјект одзади и во обете сцени погледот на машкиот воајер е извлечено преку погледот на жената. Двете сцени заедно го сочинуваат "the full monty".

3. Кралеви и чудаци: Заклучок

Би сакала да завршам така што ќе го исполни ветувањето од мојот наслов и многу накратко ќе се осврнем врз империјалната мажественост на женскиот травестит. Иако Како од мајка родени представува можноста на жената да ја употреби и да ја отелотвори мажественост, овој филм се задоволува со тоа ваквата примена да ја опишем на начин на полов пресвртување. Во мојот заклучок, сугерирам дека изведбите на женските травестити прават повеќе од имитирање на машката мажественост at the film's opening scene of Jennifer Beals, dancer by night, welding by day in a factory. The spectacle of the female dancer as welder, like the image of the woman at the urinal, challenges once more the idea of woman as an object of display but also creates the uncanny image of a female masculinity that the men must now emulate. Masculinity throughout The Full Monty is precisely welded together from a collectivity of minority masculinities. This film, finally, about men under pressure creates new standards for the depiction of masculinity in mainstream film and it ends by referencing the taboo representation of male nudity. In its final flourish, this British comedy reveals that minority masculinities can expose mainstream masculinity as a dangerous myth of potency, invulnerability and violence. The final shot which should constitute the "money shot" of "the full monty" actually refuses to make the visibility of the phallus into the totality of maleness; the finale of the strip show is filmed from the back of the stage and a freeze frame captures the six naked men from behind and the crowd of screaming women full on. The full monty then is this shot which includes the female voyeur looking and the male body on display and it echoes in form and content the earlier shot of the woman at the urinal. In both scenes, we only see the phallic subject from behind and in both scenes the gaze of the male voyeur is routed through the gaze of women. The two scenes together make up the full monty.

3. Kings and Geezers: A Conclusion

I'd like to end by fulfilling the promise of my title and referencing very briefly the post imperial masculinity of the drag king. While The Full Monty imagines the possibility of women deploying and embodying masculinity, it was content to depict such deployments in the mode of sex reversals. In this my conclusion, I suggest how drag king performances do more than imitate male masculinity or deploy the signifiers of dominant masculinity from a recognizably female position. Rather drag king masculinities remind us that masculinity is
On the night that I attended Club Geezer in London there were at least 300 queer people in a crowded pub. Lesbians, gay men, straight people, transsexuals and transgender people all sported a lively mix of mustaches, goatees, sideburns, full beards, suits, ties, leather daddy gear, and construction uniforms. The theme, of course, was "geezer," and the evening predictably led up to a "Geezer Contest" to award prizes to the best geezers in the crowd. The Geezer contest featured an array of Benny Hill type stand up comics, a lip-synching impersonation of Liam Gallagher from Oasis, a strip act within which a king stripped off one layer clothes to reveal yet another layer and a scene from a James Bond film. Geezer, of course, references a peculiarly British brand of masculinity that may loosely translate in American vernacular as "a man's man." Club performer Jewels, himself a geezer-style drag king, defines geezer as "a cocky wide-boy who's full of confidence and a bit too flash." Drag king performer Stanley elaborates on this definition: "I think geezer references a particularly repulsive laddish English masculinity." Some of the butch drag kings suggested in interviews that the drag king space gives them room to flirt with excessive versions of masculinity but also to break down the essential connections between masculinity and maleness. Jewels explains that the Geezer show, for example, was an opportunity to take on a particularly crude form of masculinity. Jewels says: "Most geezers are men, some are women, some are drag kings. But it is one of those masculine roles that is completely divorced from identity."

By performing precisely the "laddish" forms of masculinity that were so reviled in *Among the Thugs*, the drag king
show draws our attention to both the liabilities of thuggish masculinity and the insidious construction of the thug in the popular imagination. Through a form of loving parody, the drag king geezers make visible how the working class man has been turned into a repository for the most glaring failures of male masculinity in general. Like the men in *The Full Monty*, the drag kings deploy performance and masculine display to unhinge masculinity from maleness, maleness from phallic power and phallic power from social legitimacy.

This paper has compared some select modern and postmodern, imperial and post imperial forms of masculinity and argued that the time is upon us for a thorough going rearticulation of masculine norms. The particular configurations of class and race and sexuality in post-colonial Britain allow for a range of extraordinary representations of fragile and vulnerable masculinities. In *The Full Monty* the power of the female gaze shatters the myth of male self-sufficiency and male perfection, and insists upon a new form of masculinity that is powerful and pleasurable without relying upon conventional modes of misogyny. In *Trainspotting* the Skag lads revel in their abjection and refuse outright the respectability of ideal manhood; and the drag kings at Club Geezer relay the most performative aspects of male masculinity through their own female masculinities. As we enter a new century, the abject forms of masculinity so feared by male modernists--the gay man and the virile woman among others--have come to define millennial masculinity. Eliot's nightmare vision of apocalypse at the close of "Hollow Men," may indeed be the soundtrack to a new beginning: "This is the way the world ends, This is the way the world ends, this is the way the world ends, not with a bang but a whimper."
NOTES

1 Lisa Lowe has written about the relationship between dominant and minority cultures as "unstable and unclosed." In an extremely useful articulation of the dynamic motion of hegemony, Lowe writes: "We might say that hegemony is not only the political process by which a particular group constitutes itself as "the one" or "the majority" in relation to which "minorities" are defined and know themselves to be "other," but it is equally the process by which various and incommensurable positions of otherness may ally and constitute a new majority, a counter-hegemony." Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1996): 69.

2 On a trip to London in the Summer of 1999, I was surprised to find the newspapers full of articles about an apparent full-fledged crisis in masculinity. The Sunday Observer Magazine for example featured on its cover a picture of a naked male baby with the caption: "Oh dear - it's a boy," and a subtitle: "But is that really such bad news?" However, this same article concluded, "there's a lot we can do to change this future. And in the end few of us would want to change Harry. Vive la difference, and thank heaven...for little boys." Neil Spencer, "The Trouble With Boys" in The Sunday Observer Magazine (June 20, 1999): 15. The optimism here is both puzzling and disturbing - the trouble with boys, we discover, is not really a problem inherent to maleness of social power, rather it is a problem with the ways boys are treated. While I am heartened by the fact that the English press notes that there is some trouble with boys, I think that the tendency to seek therapeutic rather than political solutions needs to be tempered by other popular discourses which seek to refashion dominant masculinities.

3 Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1995):

БЕЛЕШКИ


Сина, на пример, се фокусира врз формулатите за мажественоста што се појавуваат поради легалните контроверзи во Британска Индија кон крајот на деветнаесеттиот век, каква што е контроверзноста во врска со Илберт Бил. Илберт Бил се обидел да им даде некој вид криминалистичка јурисдикција врз Британците во Индија, па се соочил со голем отпор од британските колонијалисти што живее ве во Индија.


9 This peculiarly generative quality to Conrad's texts makes them suitable for sequels and adaptations. George discusses Kazuo Ishiguro's The Remains of the Day as one remarkable remake of Heart of Darkness, and V.S. Naipaul's A House for Mr. Biswas as a retelling of Almayer's Folly.

10 As quoted by Rob Nixon in London Calling. Nixon argues for the more obvious reading of Conrad as a writer who enables the disseminations of colonial culture.


Parama Roy, "Discovering India, Imagining Thuggee" in Indian Traffic (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998?);

15 Philip Meadows Taylor, Confessions of a Thug (18??). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19??).


19 Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: 108. Очигледно е дека тука Лоу зборува за азио-американските текстови и за нивната многу специфична врска со историјата на американскот империализам во Азия. Сепак, "деколонизираното пишување" секако може да примени како објаснувающий поим во текст како Возовите минуваат кој со другите текстови го делен "повекеслојниот и повекецентричниот напад врз... специфичните форми на колонијално владеење."


21 The cemetery is one of Foucault's prime examples of heterotopic space since it is transformed over time from being a place to honor the power of the church, to a place to preserve the memory of the individual, to a place associated with disease and illness; at the same time, the cemetery moves from the church side to the outskirts of urban areas. Other heterotopic sites include but are not limited to: the theater, the cinema, the garden, the fairgrounds, motels, ships, brothels, entertainment parks, malls, and most important for my purposes here: trains.


LGBTQ FETISHISM?

In psychoanalytic discourse, fetishism is a uniquely male perversion.¹ In the psychoanalytic literature it has been generally agreed, (with very few exceptions), that fetishism is a male perversion, and its existence in women is assumed to be impossible. While in one sense I do not want to disagree with this claim—in psychoanalytic terms, it makes no sense for women to be fetishists, and it is unimaginable that women would get gratification from the use of inanimate objects or mere partial objects alone²—in another, more strategic and political sense, it seems plausible to suggest, as Naomi Schor does in her analysis of George Sand (1985) that there can be a form of female fetishism, and to claim, further, that lesbianism provides its most manifest and tangible expression.

Like the fetishist, I too want to have it both ways: along with psychoanalytic orthodoxy, I will agree that female fetishism is psychically inconceivable, while I also want to claim that both "normal" (i.e., heterosexual) femininity and female homosexuality can be seen in socio-political terms in excess of their psychoanalytic descriptions, as modes of fetishism (in the same way that, I would claim, feminism can be seen as a form of mass or collective psychosis, a political disavowal of women's social reality as oppressed). I will not deal specifically with any quasi-fetishistic variations of lesbianism (sadomasochism, trans-

ELIZABETH GROSZ
Elizabeth Grosz

LESBIAN FETISHISM?

половитично порекнување на социјалната реалност на жените како угнетувани). Посебно нема да се занимавам со никакви квази-фетишистички варијации на лезбејството (садо-мазохизмот, трансвестизмот, употребата на сексуални парафернални, исполнувачи, или протези). Без оглед на нивната фасцинантност, тие не може да се сметаат како фетиши се додека најнапред не се покаже дека женскиот фетишизам е возможен.

Во првот дел од овој есеј ќе ги испитувам ортодоксните психоаналитички теоретичари, скицирајќи ги Фројдовите и Лакановите сфакања; во вториот дел ќе си поигрувам со овие ортодокски гледишта, растегнувајќи ги во границите на нивната толеранција. Полусериозно, полуигриво, ова нема да биде само читање на психоаналитичките концепти и методи, туку исто така и испитување на начините на кои феминистичката теорија може да ги исполнува токму оние дискурси кои сака - и треба - да ги подржи за да ги исполни сопствените цели и заложби, ползувајќи ги нив како стратегиски орудија во нејзините сопствени борби. Стремежов е комбинација на полезност на психоаналитичките концепти и илустрација на тоа како феминист(к)ите можат да ги читаат патриархалните текстови кои не им се по волја, така што истите да можат да бидат активно разработени и стратегиски впрегнати за исполнување на заложби за кои не биле наменети. Истовремено, есејот може да се смета како крајно спекулативно и крајно препознатливично истражување на можноста за „лесбејска теорија", теорија на и за лезбејките. Дали психоанализата ќе се докаже или не како полезна за такви проекти останува една од моите одречни клучни, иако недоразвиени, преокупации.

Психоанализата и фетишизмот

Фројд го покрена прашањето за фетишизмот рано во неговата кариера (во првото издание на Трите есеи за теоријата на сексуалноста (1905)) и повторно му се врати во еден од последните натписи во неговиот живот, „Расцепнување на егото во процесот на одбрана“ (1938). Тој се

vestism, the use of sexual paraphernalia, implements, or prosthesis). Fascinating as these may be, they cannot be regarded as fetishes until it can first be shown that female fetishism is possible.

In the first part of this essay I will examine orthodox psychoanalytic theorists, outlining Freud's and Lacan's notions; in the second part, I will play with these orthodox views, stretching them beyond the limits of their tolerance. Half-serious, half-playful, this will be not only a reading of psychoanalytic concepts and methods, but also an examination of the ways in which feminist theory may utilize precisely those discourses it wishes—and needs—to subvert in order to ensure its own goals and purposes, using them as strategic tools in its own struggles. This effort is both substantive and methodological, an analysis of the usefulness of psychoanalytic concepts and an illustration of how feminists may read patriarchal texts against the grain, so that they may be actively worked upon and strategically harnessed for purposes for which they were not intended. At the same time, it may be regarded as a highly speculative and preliminary investigation of the possibility of "lesbian theory," theory of and for lesbians. Whether psychoanalysis will prove useful or not for such projects remains one of my key, if underdeveloped, concerns here.

Psychoanalysis and fetishism

Freud raised the question of fetishism early in his career (in the first edition of The Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905a) and returned to it again in one of the last papers of his life, "Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence" (1938). He turned to the topic every few years, in Jensen's
In the first of *The Three Essays*, Freud distinguished two types of sexual aberration, those in which there is a deviation in the sexual *object* (here he mentions homosexuality, pedophilia, and bestiality), and those in which there is a deviation in the sexual *aim* (transvestism, voyeurism, exhibitionism). He included fetishism in the second category, although he claimed that it could equally well be included in the first, because its main characteristic is a sexual overvaluation of a part of the body or an inanimate object. Overvaluation, a characteristic of anaclitic or masculine forms of loving, creates the fetish as such, the fetishistic object's attainment being sufficient in itself to bring about orgasmic gratification.

Freud regarded the perversions as the opposite of neuroses: they are positive and negative sides of the same coin. The perversions avoid the repression that characterizes the neuroses. The pervert expresses precisely what it is that the neurotic represses: the pervert does what the neurotic subject would like to do but is unable to because the expression of a perverse impulse yields more unpleasure than pleasure. Insofar as sexual "normality" has any meaning for Freud, it is defined in social terms as copulative, non-incestuous heterosexuality. Lesbianism, like male homosexuality, is classified as a perversion. (It is quite clear that for Freud the notion of normality is used descriptively rather than normatively, and that he seriously destabilized the term wherever he invoked it.)
chini, поминува низ Ојдиповиот комплекс со еден главен елемент кој ја разграничува неговата положба од онаа на евентуалниот хомосексуалец или хетеросексуалец. Во последните случаи, момчето е светод на призор од женски гениталии и е под загроза од кастрација во два временски одделени мига - редот е неважен. Фројд тврди дека има временски период во кој момчето е кадарно да го порекнува еден или друг, во зависност од тоа кој прв се јавил. Малот Ханс (Freud, 1910a), ни дава прекрасна илустрација: со ракането на неговата сестра Хана, тој го порекнува она што го гледа кога бебешката пелена е тргната настрана. Тој и извикува на неговата мајка „но таа нема заби”(!) - преместување, сугерира Фројд, од неговата перцепција на нејзината кастрација. Тој не може веднаш себеси да си припомни дека таа нема пенис (тоа би загрозило сигурноста на неговото поседување на органот), па така тој ја преместува својата перцепција на она што недостасува од гениталите кон забите. Згора на тоа, подоцна момчето е под директна загроза од кастрација за мастурбаторските активности. Таа му се загрозува дека ќе вику доктор, кој ќе му го отстрани неговото "мрдло". Уште еднаш, тој ја порекнува заканата и брачно извикува: "Па што? Јас ќе мрдам со мојот задник". Ваквиот вид порекнување е "нормален" психички одбранбен механизам кој им стои на располагање на децата од обата пола, и тој функционира првенствено во поглед на заканата од кастрација (за момчињата) или нејзината симболичка актуалност (за девојчињата). Но во случајот на фетишизмот, различно е доколку обата фактори [т.e., призорот на женски гениталии и заканата од кастрација] се јават едновремено. Во тој случај заканата го оживува споменот на перцепцијата што дотогаш била сметана за безопасна и во тој спомен наоѓа ужаснуваачко потврдување. (Freud, 1940: 276, курсивот додаден)

Oedipus complex with one major element that differentiates his position from that of the eventual homosexual or heterosexual. In the latter cases, the boy witnesses the sight of the female genitals and is threatened with castration at two moments separated in time—the order is unimportant. Freud claims that there is a period of time in which the boy is able to disavow one or the other, depending on which occurs first. Little Hans (Freud, 1910a) provides the perfect illustration: with the birth of his sister Hanna, he disavows what he sees when the baby girl’s diaper is removed. He exclaims to his mother "but she's got no teeth"(!)— a displacement, Freud suggests, from his perception of what is missing from the genitals to the teeth. At a later time moreover, the boy is directly threatened with castration by his mother for his masturbatory activities. She threatens to call the doctor, who will remove his “widdler.” Once again, he disavows the threat and brazenly proclaims: "So what? I'll wid-die with my bottom." This kind of disavowal is a "normal" psychical defence mechanism available to children of both sexes, and it operates primarily with respect to the threat of castration (for boys) or its symbolic actuality (for girls). But in the case of fetishism, it is different if both factors [i.e., the sight of female genitals and the threat of castration] occur simultaneously. In that case the threat revives the memory of the perception which had hitherto been regarded as harmless and finds in that memory a dreaded affirmation. (Freud, 1940: 276. emphasis added)
seeking sexual impulses and his submission to the Oedipal interdict:

He replies to the conflict with two contrary reactions, both of which are valid and effective. On the one hand, with the help of certain mechanisms he rejects reality and refuses to accept any prohibition; on the other hand, in the same breath he recognized the danger of reality, takes over the fear of that danger as a pathological symptom and tries subsequently to divest himself of the fear...

The instinct is allowed to retain its satisfaction and proper respect is shown to reality. But everything has to be paid for in one way or another, and this success is achieved at the price of a rift in the ego which never heals but which increases as time goes on. The two contrary reactions to the conflict persist as the centre-point of a splitting of the ego (1940: 275-76).

For the moment, what is crucial is the Oedipal configuration of the fetishist's etiology. The fetishist is the boy/child who, for some reason, whether these two events occur simultaneously or not, is unable to resolve the Oedipal conflict in its various alternatives. He is unable or unwilling to take up the prescribed heterosexual path by abandoning the mother as love-object and accepting the post-Oedipal restraints on his sexual impulses through identification with the authority of the (symbolic) father; nor can he, like the homosexual son, accept symbolic castration in order to take on the "feminine" position and adopt a passive sexual role in relation to his father. Unlike either the heterosexual or the homosexual, the fetishist wants to have his cake and eat it too: he is not prepared to "pay" for his desire by facing the Oedipal prohibition, which gives the boy the ghastly choice—give up the mother or lose the penis—a choice between his most precious object and his most precious organ.
[The fetish] remains a token of triumph over the threat of castration and a protection against it. It also saves the fetishist from becoming a homosexual, by endowing women with the characteristic which makes them tolerable as sexual objects.... What other men have to woo and make exertions for can be had by the fetishist with no trouble at all. (Freud, 1927: 154)

Ironically, then, the fetishist is the least likely of analysands to enter a psychoanalytic contract. He remains perfectly happy with his love object (an object unlikely to resist his wishes and fantasies). In all likelihood, if he enters analysis at all, it will be at someone else's request. The fetish is a substitute for, a talisman of, the phallus, but not just any old phallus. For the pre-Oedipal boy, the most valued of phalluses is not his own (for his pre-Oedipal, imaginary penis is not yet elevated to the function of phallus), but his mother's—the phallus, that is, that endows her with power and authority. (Incidentally, it is precisely her role and function as phallic mother that covers over and hides her status as a woman, her sexual difference from the son.) He must disavow maternal castration if he is to protect himself against the possibility of his own castration. The fetish is his homage to the missing maternal phallus, his way of both preserving his belief in it and at the same time accepting her castration and, with it, the possibility of his own:

Yes, in his mind the woman has got a penis, in spite of everything; but this penis is no longer the same as it was before. Something else has taken its place, has been appointed its substitute... and it now inherits the interest which was formerly directed to its predecessor. But this interest suffers an extra-ordinary increase as well, because the horror of castration has set up a memorial to itself in the creation of this substitute. (Freud, 1927: 154)
The fetish cannot simply be equivalent to the maternal or female penis because it both affirms and denies women's castration. There is no symbolic equation between the fetish and the penis because, as Lacan so cogently argues, the phallos is not the equivalent of the penis (this is why the mother's phallos is the most significant one in the child's erotic life). The relation between phallus and fetish is already entirely bound up with the order of signifiers. The penis (as real organ) can only take on the role of the phallus because it is missing, i.e., because women are castrated. The two terms affirmed and denied as equivalent are both signifiers; at no point does the (Lacanian) Real enter the equation. Lacan suggests that Freud's case of the young man with a fetish for shiny noses (Freud, 1927) can only be explained in terms of a displacement initiated in language, a displacement from one signifier to another, a shift from the English "glance at the nose" to the German "Glanz auf der Nase." The penis, insofar as it is conceived as detachable, as something the mother "has" and can "lose"—is as much a representation, a signifier, as the phallus. The fetish is (at the least) the third term in this metonymic chain:

We are now in a dimension where meaning seems lost, the dimension where is to be found, apparently, the fetishist perversion, the taste for shiny noses. And, if there were no elaboration upon the nose... this would be as impossible to analyse as a true perverse fixation. Indeed, if a slipper were, strictly speaking, the displacement of the female organ and no other elements were present to elaborate primary data, we would consider ourselves faced with a primitive perversion completely beyond the reach of analysis. (Lacan and Granoff, 268-69)
Elizabeth Grosz

LESBIAN FETISHISM?

The penis must already function as a signifier, an imaginary object, from the moment the boy attributes it to the mother. The fetish is not a representation of the penis any more than a pore of the skin can represent the vagina. The child's perception of the mother's lack, and his symbolic utilization of the last object witnessed before he "sees" the missing phallus—shoes, stockings, underwear, fur, etc.—do not adequately explain fetishism because the fetish is a substitute for the phallus. The penis takes on the function of the phallus only because it is a mark or trace that excludes at least half the population. From being a real organ, the penis is transformed into an imaginary object dividing the sexes according to its presence or absence, possessed by some and desired by others. Only then can it
function as a symbolic object (an object of union/exchange) between the sexes. The phallus distributes access to the social categories invested with various power relations: "It is the ultimately significative object which appears when all the veils are lifted. Everything related to it is an object of amputations and interdictions" (Lacan, 1977a: 104). When the veil is lifted there is only the Medusa, women's castrated genitals, lacking, incomplete, horrifying (for men). Salome's dance, like striptease, can only seduce when at least one veil remains, alluring, yet hiding the nothing of women's sex. The fetish thus plays the role of the veil, both outlining and yet covering over women's castration.

**Disavowal**

Freud attributes the peculiarities of fetishism to its reliance on the psychical defence mechanism of disavowal. Disavowal must be distinguished from three other major forms of psychical defense; repression (the mainspring of neurosis), negation or denial, and repudiation or foreclosure (the major mechanism functioning in the genesis of psychosis). In order to understand what is unique about fetishism and why Freud restricted it to masculine development, it is worth exploring these defense mechanisms in a little more detail.

**Negation** is a provisional lifting of repression, on the condition that the repressed contents are verbally and affectively negated: "[Negation] is also a lifting of repression, though not of course an acceptance of what is repressed.... The outcome of this is a kind of intellectual acceptance of the repressed, while at the same time what is essential to the repression persists" (Freud, 1925: 236). In negation, there is an affirmation of what is repressed: to negate or deny something one must have previously affirmed it. **Affirmation** is the process of registering or
to mera prethodno istoto da go afirmiral. Afirmaciijata e prosesot na zabelezhuvane ili fiksiraane na porivot vrez ideacionalata sodrzhina, oznacivaajki go prvoto so vtoroto. Afirmaciijata e em uslov za oznacivaane i potisnuvanje - neksto mera da bide oznacen pred da bide degradiroano vo nevesnoto - em vraakaane na potisnatom. Edo-nostavno dodavajki edno "ne" na afirmaciijata, negacijata dopuhta svesno zabelezhuvane na potisnata sodrzhina i go odbegnuva cenзорството. Ta e mnogu ekonomichen nachin na psikichka odbrana, prifaakaajki gi nevesninite sodrzhini pod uslov tие da se odreceni.

Repudiation involves the rejection of an idea that emanates from external reality rather than from the id. It is a failure to register an impression, involving a rejection of or detachment from a piece of reality:

The ego creates, autocratically, a new external and internal world. This world is constructed in accordance with the id's wishful impulses, and the motive of this dissociation from the external world is some very serious frustration by reality of a wish—a frustration which seems intolerable. The close affinity of this psychosis to normal dreams is unmistakable. (1924: 151)

The psychotic's hallucination is not the return of the repressed, i.e., the return of a signer, but the return of the Real that has never been signified—a foreclosed or scotomized perception, something falling on the subject's psychical blind spot. The subject's perception is not projected outward onto the external world. Rather, what is internally obliterated reappears for the subject as if it emanates from the Real, in hallucinatory rather than projective form. It confronts the subject from an independent, outside position.

Disavowal exists somewhere mid-way between these psychical defences. Like repression and negation, it involves the psychical registration of an impulse, most notably the Oedipal impulse; but, like foreclosure or repudiation, it refuses the contents of a perception or a piece of reality. It does not rely
upon or utilize the unconscious. It predates the establishment of
the unconscious, and, like repudiation, involves a split in the
ego. Unlike psychosis, disavowal does not involve a failure of
representation, for it is remarkably prolific in representational
means. Its structure is anchored by the child’s acceptance of
reality and its simultaneous refusal of reality, which generate
the impulse to produce profuse significatory contexts and fant¬
sy scenarios.

The fetishist maintains two attitudes in disavowal: the
denial of women’s lack and its recognition and acceptance. The
two attitudes “persist side by side throughout their lives without
influencing each other. Here is what may rightly be called a
splitting of the ego” (Freud, 1940: 276). Unlike repression, where
the ego represses a representative of the id, in disavowal two
parts of the ego utilize contradictory forms of defense. In this
way the fetish, as a substitute for the maternal phallus, affirms
and denies women’s castration. The fetishist is midway between
neurosis and psychosis: he preserves himself from psychosis
by representing the maternal phallus through fetishistic substi¬
tution, yet he is saved from neurosis by his repression of the
castration threat. It is as if one part of the ego (which accepts
castration) is neurotic, and the other part (which repudiates cas¬
tration) is psychotic.

What is the major difference between the psychotic and
the fetishist if both share disavowal and rejection of a piece of
reality? The difference seems to lie in the opposition between
hallucination and substitution. The fetishist “did not simply con¬
tradict his perceptions and hallucinate a penis where there was
none to be seen, he effected no more than a displacement of
value—he transferred the importance of the penis to another
part of the body” (1940: 277). This displacement of value from
the penis to another part of the body or onto an inanimate object
will become crucial in the following discussion of the possibility
of female fetishism, and particularly lesbian fetishism.
Fetishism and femininity

Why is female fetishism an oxymoron (Schor, 365)? On Freud's account, female fetishism is not possible because there is no reason or motive for the girl to disavow the mother's castration. Disavowal will not protect her against the acknowledgement of her own castration as it might in the case of the boy. Unlike the boy's threatened or possible castration, the girl has already been castrated and her task is the passive one of accepting her status. Disavowal in girls is by no means uncommon, but it makes no sense for her to disavow the mother's castration. Rather, she tends to disavow her own castration. This is indeed the perfectly "normal" first reaction on the girl's part to the idea of her castration.

Freud's position is generally accepted by contemporary psychoanalytic theorists, even where there are reported cases of female fetishism. For example, Juliet Hopkins describes the case of a six-year-old female who develops a foot and shoe fetish. The girl had a particular fetish object, a tobacco tin, that "she used exclusively for sexual purposes... when she masturbated" (Hopkins, 82). Underlying the girl's fetishism, however, (and perhaps explaining it), was a form of psychosis in which "the girl believed herself to be a boy" (83). Hopkins refers to Phyllis Greenacre's claim that the "symptoms of fetishism only develop in females in whom the illusionary phallus has gained such strength as to approach the delusional" (83); that is to say, fetishism is possible in females who believe themselves to be male. Schor also cites four cases of female fetishism, but they all similarly seem to exhibit a strong identification of the girl with the phallic position of masculinity. These girls border on psychosis because they repudiate the psychical reality of castration rather than disavow it. They refuse their castrated condition and continue to believe in their own phallic position. They do not exhibit the ambivalence, the duplicity, of the fetishist's disavowal,
for there is no simultaneous affirmation and denial of the kind which saves the fetishist from psychosis.

In order to understand why Freud considered it impossible for women to be fetishists, and yet to understand that lesbianism could be seen as a form of female fetishism, we need to explore the operations of disavowal, and its effects on feminine development. There are three distinctive paths which may result from the girl’s disavowal of her own castration: heterosexual (secondary) narcissism, hysteria, and the masculinity complex. In "On Narcissism: An Introduction" (1914), Freud outlines a series of object-choices open to the feminine or what he calls the "narcissistic" type. Here the feminine subject (whether male or female) loves an object according to its resemblance, identity, or connection with the self. Indeed, Freud claims that, as a kind of compensation for her recognition of her inferiority, the girl may develop a (secondary) narcissistic investment in her own body, treating it as the corresponding male would an external love-object. She pampers her body, treats it with loving care; it becomes a vital instrument, her means of ensuring that she is loved. It is also her way of developing criteria for measuring her own self-worth. She phallicizes her whole body. If man believes he has the phallus (the object of desire), then woman believes she is the phallus. The man's penis and the whole of the woman's body are rendered psychically equivalent. In Lacanian terms, he has the object of desire while she is the object of desire.

Vo процесот на себепретворање во објект на желба, нарцистичката жена ja преместува вредноста на фалусот...
Elizabeth Grosz  LESBIAN FETISHISM?

her own body, taken as a whole. She has the phallus, then, only inasmuch as she is the phallus (for someone who loves or desires her). This so-called "normal" path of femininity, the compensation for (and thus acceptance of) her castration, involves the compensatory phallicization other body. In this sense, "the narcissistic woman" is an effect of the function of the phallus in the constitution of sexual identity. The narcissistic woman, contrary to Kofman's characterization, is far from independent and autonomous. She strives to retain her position as the object of the other's desire only through artifice, appearance, or dissimulation.

Illusion, travesty, makeup, enticement become techniques she relies on to both cover and make visible her "essential assets." They are her means of seducing or enticing the masculine or anaclitic lover, becoming a love-object for him. While thus concealing her "deficiency" by these means, she secures a mode of access to the phallic. Ironically, in this aim of becoming the phallus, the object of the other's desire, she is revealed as the site of rupture, lack, or castration, both idealized and debased, bound up with the masquerade of femininity, the site of both excess and deficiency: "Paradoxical as this formulation may seem, I am saying that it is in order to be the phallus, that is to say, the signifier of the desire of the Other, that a woman will reject an essential part of femininity, namely, all her attributes in the masquerade" (Lacan, 1977a: 289-290).

If the narcissistic woman effects a phallicization of the whole of her body, then in a sense she takes to one extreme the strategies utilized by the hysteric. Hysteria is a specifically feminine neurosis in which, through a somatic compliance of a part of the body, the "hysterogenic zone," the subject's sexuality is able to be displaced. Like the narcissistic woman, the hysteric accepts her castrated position; but unlike the narcissist, her investment is not in a phallic subject who, through his desire, can bestow on her the position of being the phallic object. The

на сопственото тело, земено во целина. Значи, таа го има фалусот, само во онаа мерка во која таа е фалусот (за некој кој ја љуби или посакува). Оваа таканаречена „нормална“ патека на женственоста, компензирањето (и на тој начин прифаќањето) на нејзината кастрираност, подразбира компензационо фалицизирање на нејзиното тело. Во оваа смисла, „нарцистичката жена“ е последица на функцијата на фалусот во конституирањето на сексуалниот идентитет. Нарцистичката жена, наспроти карактеризирањето на Кофман, е далеку од тоа да биде независна и автономна. Таа се стреми да ја зачува нејзината позиција како објект на желбата на другиот само со умешност, изглед, или прикривање.

Илузијата, травестијата, шминката, намамувањето, се техниките на кои таа се потпира и за да ги прикрие и за да ги обелодени нејзините "суштински предности." Тие се нејзиното средство за заведување или намамување на маскулинот или анаклитичкиот љубовник, за да стане негов ѕуберен објект. Додека вака, со овие средства ја затсгрива нејзината „непотполност“, таа обезбедува начин на пристап до фалусот. Иронично е тоа што во оваа заложба за станување фалус, објект на желбата на Другиот, таа е откриена како место на расцеп, недостаток, или кастрираност, и идеализирано и понижено, омегено со маскарадата на женственост, место и на изобилство и на недостаток: "Колку и да изгледа парадоксално оваа формулација, велам дека: велам дека за да стане фалусот, односно, означителот на желбата на другиот, жената ќе отфрли суштествен дел од женственоста, имено, сите нејзини атрибути во маскарадата" (Lacan, 1977a: 289-290).

Ако нарцистичката жена спроведе фалусирање на целото нејзино тело тогаш, во извесна смисла, таа ги доведува до крајност стратегиите користени од хистериот. Хистеријата е специфично менина неуроза во која, преку соматското угодување на еден дел од телото, „хистеричната зона“, сексуалноста на субјектот е во состојба да биде преместена. Како и нарцистичката жена, хистеричката ќе прифаќа нејзината кастрирана позиција; но, за разлика од нарцистичката, нејзиното вложување не е во фа-
The difference between the hysteric and the narcissist is the difference between the displacement of the phallus onto a part or onto the whole of the subject’s own body (perhaps a difference of degree rather than kind?). Whereas the narcissist’s whole body is the phallus (and thus she requires an external love object to bestow on her the status of the object of desire, accounting for her reliance on an anaclitic lover, whether heterosexual or homosexual), the hysteric gains a self-defined status as phallic: a part other own body takes on the function of the phallus (confirming her object-like status in patriarchy), while her subjectivity remains in an active position (one which takes her own body as its object).

Disavowal, then, is by no means unique to men; it is a defense mechanism open and available to women. Its operations do not necessarily signal psychosis, but may function as a
form of protection, though not—as in the case of boys—against potential loss, but rather against the personal debasement and the transformation of her status from subject to object, active to passive, and "phallic" to "castrated"—Freud's "definition" of femininity. It is a strategy of self-protection, even if it implies a certain mode of detachment from socio-symbolic "reality."

The third distinctive effect of the girl's disavowal of her castration is what Freud calls the "masculinity complex." The girl "suffering" from such a complex refuses to accept her secondary and subordinated status; she aspires to be treated like and to act the same as men. Freud suggests that although the masculinity complex may not necessarily imply lesbianism, nevertheless many lesbians can be classified under this label. Where the so-called "normal" path to femininity involves accepting her castration and transferring her libidinal catheces from the mother to the father (via penis envy), with the accompanying transformation other leading sexual organ from the clitoris to the vagina (with its associated position of passivity), the woman suffering from the masculinity complex retains the clitoris as her leading sexual organ and the position of activity it implies. She may also retain the maternal figure as the model on which to base her later object attachments, in which case she will continue to love a female mother-substitute: "Thus the girl may refuse to accept the fact of being castrated, may harden herself in the conviction that she does possess a penis and may subsequently be compelled to behave as though she were a man" (Freud, 1925a: 253).

Indeed this is how Freud explains female homosexuality in those rare passages and texts when he refers to lesbianism at all. In the case of the unnamed female homosexual (Freud, 1920), he describes her as behaving like a chivalrous male lover, displaying many of the characteristics attributed to the anaclitic or...
masculine type. She loves "like a man." While we may dispute this description as appropriate to all kinds of lesbian love relationships, it seems clear that it certainly describes the butch-femme relation, which seems to replicate the structural positions of a patriarchal heterosexuality, distinguishing a narcissistic (feminine) lover from an anaclitic (masculine) lover. Here the latter disavows her castration, while the former accepts her castration but refuses to convert her love object from maternal to paternal.

As with male homosexuality, for psychoanalysis female homosexuality generally takes on one of two forms, based on one or the other path of infantile development. In the path that produces the masculinity complex, there is a disavowal of women's castration and a refusal to acknowledge the socially sanctioned meanings of sexual difference. The girl will continue to identify with the phallic mother, and may even see the father as simply another embodiment of the phallic status of the mother (it is significant that this is the fate of the male fetishist, as well). But refusing to acknowledge her difference from the phallic position, she retains the masculinity other pre-Oedipal position and the mother as love-object. The other path of female homosexuality involves an acceptance of her castrated status and the temporary taking on of the father as a love-object as in "normal" femininity; but, instead of transferring her attachment from the father to a suitable male father-substitute, the girl seeks out a "phallic" woman, a woman precisely, one may suspect, with a masculinity complex. The latter seeks a feminine love-object (as men do) while the former seeks a masculine love-object (whether male or female): this could be described as the homosexual equivalent of the complementary heterosexual association between anaclitic and narcissistic love-objects.
What relation does lesbianism have to female fetishism? In the case of the girl who has accepted her castration complex, there seems to be little or no relation. But in the case of the woman suffering from the masculinity complex, it may be possible to suggest some connection. Like the fetishist, she disavows women’s castration, but this castration is her own, not that of the phallic mother. And like the fetishist, she takes on a substitute for the phallus, an object outside her own body. It is this which differentiates her from the narcissist and the hysteric, both of whom phallicize or fetishize their own bodies, and not really preserving the fetishistic structure of the displacement of phallic value from the mother’s body to an object outside of one’s self. By contrast, the masculine woman takes an external love-object—another woman—and through this love-object is able to function as if she has, rather than is, the phallus. As with the fetishist, this implies a splitting of the ego: it is this which inclines her to feminism itself, insofar as feminism, like any oppositional political movement, involves a disavowal of social reality so that change becomes conceivable and possible.

Where the fetishist remains the most satisfied and contented of all perverts, the masculine woman remains the least content. The more equal—or superior—to men she feels, the less her position is socially acknowledged as such, the less her convictions are validated by others, and presumably the more she is socially ostracized. She displaces phallic value onto an object outside the mother’s (or her own) phallus; but, in contrast to the fetishist, her love-object is not an inanimate or partial object, it is another subject. Her "fetish" is not the result of a fear of femininity, but a love of it; it does not protect her from potential danger, for it introduces her to the effects of widespread social homophobia.
What is to be gained by describing this form of female homosexuality as fetishistic? This is not entirely clear to me, and it is for this reason that my answer must remain strategic. Like the fetishist, I want to say both that she is or could be seen in terms of fetishism, and at the same time, that she is not. At stake for me here, in this ambivalence, is the very structure of psychoanalysis itself: Insofar as psychoanalysis may be said to offer real insights about women in general or lesbians in particular in patriarchal society, we need to stretch Freud's terms in order to show that in themselves they do not exclude or discriminate against women—that women are treated with historical accuracy as to their various social positions. Insofar as psychoanalysis can be seen as an active participant in patriarchal social values, we need to show how its terms do not adequately accommodate women's particularities, and differences from men.

The categories that Freud proposed as universally relevant—the function of the phallus, the Oedipus complex, the ubiquity of the castration threat, and women's status as passive—surely need to be contested in order that social relations themselves can be transformed. The choices available to feminist theorists are either to accept psychoanalysis more-or-less wholesale (which implies bracketing off political questions raised by patriarchal power relations); reject it in its entirety (in which case one is left without an account of psychical and fantasy life); or else a little of both (the fetishist's solution), specifically selecting a notion that is deemed impossible or foreclosed by the theory to show how it may not be as implausible as it seems, if the terms themselves are stretched beyond their normal confines. In short, developing paradoxes and contradictions to see how the theory itself copes (or does not cope) with its own unspoken assumptions or unacknowledged implications.
I prefer to have it both ways: psychoanalysis does indeed describe patriarchal power relations and their adoption and internalization by both sexes; yet it is also limited in its historical and socio-geographical specificity. It does not adequately describe cultures not based on the nuclear family, nor does it describe the potential transmutations and revolutionary upheavals feminism seeks to effect. Above all, it does not adequately account for female sexuality even within the confines of Western capitalism, and is thus unable to deal with its most direct expression in lesbian sexual relations. This does not mean women/lesbians must abandon psychoanalytic models and concepts altogether. They still provide among the more useful terms in clarifying our psycho-social interrelations. But a cultivated ambivalence may provide the distance necessary to extract what may be of use in psychoanalysis while using psychoanalytic concepts, such as fetishism, to problematize psychoanalytic assumptions and to move beyond them.

NOTES

1 Fetishism shares this characteristic with exhibitionism, where kleptomania is considered the equivalent feminine perversion.

2 This is analogous to the claim that pornography, like fetishism, is a male preserve; in themselves, they remain inadequate as forms of sexual satisfaction for they reduce women to the position of (voyeuristic/fetishistic) objects, not subjects.

3 Incidentally, Freud quite dramatically changed his mind about the negative and positive roles of the perversions and neuroses in his paper "A Child Is Being Beaten" (1919a), where he claims that even perversions are the result of repression.
Interestingly, Lacan claims that fetishism is the only perversion for which there is no corresponding neurosis (Lacan and Granoff, 265).

This quote is worth reproducing in full: "The word is a gift of language and language is not immaterial. It is subtle matter but matter nonetheless. It can fecundate the hysterical woman, it can stand for the flow of urine or for excrement withheld. Words can also suffer symbolic wounds. We recall the 'Wespe' with a castrated W, when the wolf man realized the symbolic punishment which was inflicted upon him by Grouscha.... The imaginary is decipherable only if it is rendered into symbols" (Lacan and Granoff, 286-89). In short, the fetish is interpretable, not because of any analogy or correspondence between the penis or vagina and the fetish, just as dreams are not interpretable based on visual resemblances. Psychoanalysis is the talking cure and as such it relies on the verbal elaboration of the symptom and its linguistic context, provided by the web of free associations. Fetishism emerges at the moment when the imaginary tilts into the symbolic, the pre-Oedipal is transformed into the Oedipal, or anxiety is transformed into guilt.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


**REFERENCE**


——. 1919b. "Beyond the Pleasure Principle." S. E Vol. 18, 7-64.


identities
Мируше Хоса

ПАТОТ, ЦИКЛICHНОСТА И ТЕАТАРОТ
(Или: Врз кој темел го дефинираме поимот на универсалноста во контекст на театарот?)

Вистина, што е патот?

1. Аллегоријата на една дефиниција:

_Пер_ беше името на еден корен, многу стар и многу широк: се простирал, велат, од Индија до Европа. Патникот Јулиус Покорни, кој бил маѓепсан од корените, едно утро го прашал: Корену, кажи ми, што значи твоето име? Коренот му одговорил: да се обидеш, да се осмелиш, да возвратиш.

_Хипотетично, зарем не_ - му возвратил патникот и продолжил да патува, за да провери дали е вистина тоа што му го рекол коренот. Така сретнал еден друг корен, кој се викал _пеира_. Му се обратил, го прашал што значи неговото име и дознал дека _пеира_ значело _искуство_. Потоа му се обратил на друг корен, кој се викал _фераз_. Дознал дека _фераз_ значело _опасност, неочекувана смрт_. Амазо, и спаки и исплашен, оние магијата што ја чувствувал имала некаква си врека со смртта, патникот решил да им се обрати на стеблата од корењето, и од нив да дознае да ли е вистина тоа што го тврдат нивните „родители“. Едното „дете“ се викало _експериентиа_, а другото _перикулум_. Откако првото му одговорил дека значело _обид и експеримент_, а второто _претизвик, опасност и смрт_, патникот помислил дека магијата влеана во неговото битие е токму она што денес го наредуваат подвиг за движење, поврзан со ризик и криза, чиниш, со некаква „драма“. Аром ама, наместо да престане, патникот продолжил понатаму;

Mirushe Hodja

THE PATH, CYCLICITY AND THE THEATRE
(Or: On What Ground Do We Define the Term Universality, In the Context Of the Theatre?)

Truly, what is the path?

1. The Allegory of a Definition:

_Per_ was the name of a root, very old and very wide: it spread, or so they say, all the way from India to Europe. The traveler Julius obedient, enchanted by roots, asked it one morning: O root, tell me, what does your name mean? The root answered: _to try, to dare, to retaliate_. Hypothetical, isn't it - the traveler replied and continued his traveling so that he can see if what the root said was true. Finally, he met another root, whose name was _peira_. He turned to the root, asked what its name meant and found out _peira_ is _experience_. Then he turned to a different root, whose name was _feraz_. He learnt that _feraz_ stood for _peril, unexpected death_. Amazed, and somewhat scared, since it seemed that his enchantment was somehow connected with death, the passenger decided to turn to the trunks of the trees and find out if what their “parents” said was true. The first “child” was called _experientia_, and the other _periculum_. After the first one told him it stood for _attempt and experiment_, and the second for _challenge, peril and death_, the traveler thought the enchantment that possessed his being is exactly what today is called drive for movement, related to risk and crisis, per-chance even a “drama” of a sort. However, instead of stopping, the traveler continued his research; he now demanded the branches to attest to what the roots and the trunks had already said. The branches’ names were: _peiran, peirates_ and _perao_ –
сега посакал гранките на овие стебла да му ја потврдат вистината што му ја кажале стеблата и корените. Гранките се викале: пеиран, пеиратес и пеиро - да навалиш, да нападнеш; тој што напаѓа; напред, низ, минувам низ. Тогаш патникот застанал и си рекол: Сега разбрав нешто: Патот е искуството, а тоа сум јас, патникот. Ако е коренот искуство, а искуството сум јас, яс сум и коренот. Яс сум искуствен патник низ времето; Яс сум дрвото чиј корен е идејата на смртното мнување низ самоиспитување. Яс сум кругот, цикличноста.

Среќен оти есапот му излегол на арно, патникот продолжил да патува се до својата смрт...

2. Расказот за Трудната Божица Мајка

... и во тој миг пред него се отвораат одаите на елевзинските мистерии. Нестрплив каков што беше, таков и останува: од прагот вџашено зјапа кон внатрешноста на одаите. Што гледа внатаре? Го гледа анимистичкото, цикличното и холистичкото; вели Тој/Таа, и само Тој/Таа, правата божествена сила: Трудната Божица Мајка. Што слуша внатаре? Шепот. Нешто како шепот одекнува внатаре, чиниш, разговор околу неа. Шепотот кажува: Трудната Божица Мајка е творецот и изворот на животот, отелотворението на вклученост, а не на исклученоста. Тие зборови толку многу му го привлекуваат вниманието, што патникот решава да влезе внатре и да го дослуша остатокот на, како што сега разбира, расказот за неа:

Мајката Божица Деметра е растревожена поради судбината на нејzinата ќерка Персефона, затворена во подземниот свет на мртвите. Кој еднаш се нашол таму, вркање му нема. Тагата на Деметра ја чувствува и нејzinата слугинка Имабе. Проживувајќи ја болката, таа проникнува во неа. Што се случува? Имабе одеднаш почувствува некаква си снага во внатрешноста на својата утроба, токму подвиг за продолжување, нешто противно од запирање: таа почнува да танцува. Таа танцува за да го изрази тоа што во тој миг го разбира: сите нешта што ги носи животот се опфатени во самата смисла на животот; се проникнува од циклусот нарачен живот, што е спротивен од падот и смртта, а чиј составен дел е и падот, и

2. The Story of the Pregnant Goddess Mother

...and then the quarters of the Eleusinian mysteries were laid open to him. Impatient as he is, from the doorstep he stares inside the quarters. What does he see? He sees the animalistic, the cyclical and the holistic; says S/He, and only S/He, the primary divine power: The Pregnant Goddess Mother. What does he hear? A whisper. Something like a whisper is heard form inside, a conversation, it seems. The whisper says: The Pregnant Goddess Mother is the creator and the beginning of life, the embodiment of inclusion, not exclusion. Those words draw his attention so, that the traveler decides to go inside and hear the rest of the, as he now understands, story about her:

The Mother Goddess Demeter is disquieted by the faith of her daughter Persephone, imprisoned in the lower world of the dead. No one has returned after going there. Demeter's sorrow is felt by her servant Imabe. Feeling her pain, Imabe permeates through her. What happens? Imabe suddenly feels a certain strength inside her womb, a drive to continue, something exactly opposite from stopping: she starts to dance. She dances to express what she understands in that moment: everything life brings is contained in the meaning of life, is imbued with the cycle called life, opposite to the fall and death, a part of which are the fall and the pain and the death. She dances because the cry is not sufficient to express what she wants to say: the new life and the strengthened body of the immortal Demeter do not stem from life and joy, but from death and the deadly female body.
болната, и смртта. Таа танцува затоа што крикот не е доволен за да го каже тоа што сака да го каже: новиот живот и закрепнатата снага на бесмртната Деметра не никнува од животот и радоста, ами од смртта и смртното женско тело.

Така бесмртноста продолжила во вечноста на Постоенето, па женското заоблено тело вклучило во себе се што постоело. Колку ли многу патишта имало во неа! А сите тие патишта биле поврзани преку една релација: круг, облината, цикличноста. Круг, односно, цикличноста бил(а), всушност, самата релација.

Откако Јулиус Покорни го слушнал расказот, си рекол: Сега разбрав нешто; заобленото, округло тело на Трудната Божица Мајка е мојата парадигма. Таа е парадигма на човекот. Парадигмата на човекот ја включува цилкличноста, а цилкличноста релацијата. Ако нејзиниот расказ е симбол на самото преобање во тоа што денес го нарекуваат театар, тогаш театарот е воскресение на нејзиниот расказ. Вистина, театарот постои, и тоа насекаде. И ја некаде. И туку тоа, и тоа насекаде. Зарем постоело нешто што се темели врз поимот релација и што ја потхранува релацијата помеѓу разните нешта! Да, и тоа не само пред мојот нос, туку и во и од мојот нос. Хе ... чудно ... кој би рекол! – промрморел среќниот патник.

И тогаш патникот си решил да се врати во живот и да си оди в театар. В театар останал се до својата смрт. И после смртта.

3. Театарската транскултурност и поимот на универзалноста

Пред шест години Патрис Павис се запрашал: Што е универзалноста на човековото постојание? Си одговорил: тоа е театарската транскултурност. Јас пред неколку години се запрашав: А што е универзалноста на човековото постојание? Си одговорив: Тоа е токму тоа за што зборува Питер Брук: културата на врските, третата култура, загубените релации, релациите. Релациите помеѓу човекот

Thus, immortality continues in the eternity of Existence, and the round female body includes within itself all that exists. How many paths are there within her! All those roads are interconnected with one relation: the circle, the roundness, the cyclicity. The circle, i.e. the cyclicity, is that relation.

After Julius Obedient heard the story, he said to himself: Now I have understood something – the round, circular body of the Pregnant Goddess Mother is my paradigm. She is the paradigm of man. The paradigm of man includes cyclicity, and cyclicity includes the relation. If her story is the symbol of the passage into what is today called theatre, then theatre is the resurrection of her story. Truly, the theatre exists, and it exists everywhere. People exist as well, and they exist everywhere. Has there been anything grounded on the term relation, something that has nourished the relation between various things! Yes, and not just in front of my nose, but in and of my nose. Huh...strange....who would have said! – the happy traveler mumbled.

It was then the traveler decided to come back to life and go to the theatre. He stayed in the theatre until the day he died. And after that.

3. The Transculturality of the Theatre and the Notion of Universality

Six years ago, Patrice Pavis asked himself: What is the universality of human existence? He answered: it is the transculturality of the theatre. I asked myself a few years ago: What is the universality of human existence? And answered myself: It is just what Peter Brook is saying: the culture of connections, the third culture, the lost relations, relations. Relations between man and society, the one and the other culture,
и општеството, едната и другата култура, расите, кате­
горите, родовите, јазиците, микрокосмосот и макрокос­
мосот, човекот и машинеријата.

А што е културата на врските? – ме запрашаа моите „душевни органи“ (како што би рекол, впрочем, Јунг). Култу­
rата на врските е мултимедијалната вредност на уни­
верзалноста – одговори мојата свест. Што е мултимеди­
јалната вредност на универсалноста? Тоа е само-организирачката цикличност – гласеше одговорот на дијалек­
tичкото пресметување помеѓу мојата свест и подсвест. Зошто? Затоа што, кога Тоj/Taa одлучува нешто да влезе во постојење, Тоj/Taa на тоа му вели едностоенно: Биди! А тоа нешто, во знак на одговор влегува во постојење, а самото негово влегување во постојење е чин на „заобленото тело“ на тоа нешто, што и да е тоа нешто, и не е Негов/Нејзин чин - возврати объективно несвесно, која патникот Ибн д'Араби ја нарече суфизмам, патникот Карл Јунг колективно несвес­
но, а која, потоа, и двајцата ја нарекоа архетип.

Поглед зад сликата во која сме се заробиле

Во последните две децении дискурсот на интер­
kултурниот театар станува се повозбудлив. Одговорот на прашњето што е универсалноста во рамките на теа­
tарот го даваме врз основа на изразувачкото ниво на теа­
tарскиот организм, т.е., поаѓајќи од знакот на веќе кре­
ираната театарска претстава. Се прашуваме, на пример, дали Бруковата Махабхарата верно ги имплементира или изневерира туѓите кодови во домашната структура. Доа­
ѓаме до разни заклучоци; доколку Брук ги изневерили ту­
ѓите кодови, заклучуваме дека туѓиот не може да се вдо­
ми, а при тоа да не се искриви. Консеквентно, се прашу­
ваме: Does all transcendence necessarily entail the negation of the voice of the other?1, а врз основа на претпоставката дека the universal (...) can be and has been a dangerous and self-deceptive vision, denying the voice of the Other in an attempt to transcend it.2

Моите скорешни истражувања докажуваат дека секоја трансценденција не го негира гласот на другиот и races, categories, genders, languages, microcosm and macro­
cosm, man and the machine.

So, what is the culture of connections? – queried my "psychic organs" (as Jung would have said). The culture of connections is the multidimensional value of universality – my consciousness replied. What is the multidimensional value of universality? It is the self-organized cyclicity – was the answer to the dialectical clash between my consciousness and subcon­
sciousness. Why? Because when S/He decides that something will come to existence, S/He says to it: Be! And that thing, as if answering, comes into being, and the very act of it coming to existence is an act of the "round body" of that something, whatever it is, and it is not an act on behalf of Him/Her – replied the objective subconsciousness, which the traveler Ibn d'Araby called sufism, the traveler Carl Jung collective unconscious, and which was afterwards entitled archetype by both.

A Look Behind the Picture We Are Trapped In

The discourse of the intercultural theatre is becoming increasingly impressive in the last two decades. We can an­
swer the question what is universality in terms of the theatre based on the expressive level of the theatre organism, i.e. from the sign of the theatre play already created. We wonder, for example, whether Brook's Mahabharata has incorporated for­
eign codes into native structure faithfully or not. We come to various conclusions. If Brook has betrayed foreign codes, we conclude that the foreign cannot be embraced, without bending. Consequently, we wonder: does all transcendence necessar­
ily entail the negation of the voice of the other?1, and based on the assumption that the universal (...) can be and has been a dangerous and self-deceptive vision, denying the voice of the Other in an attempt to transcend it.2

My recent researches prove that every transcendency does not negate the voice of the other and that universality –
дека универсалноста, онтолошки, знае да биде и позитивна стратегија. Меѓутоа, понаквите аспекти на универсалноста не сме во состојба да ги сознаеме, се додека не се ослободиме од сликата во која сме се заробиле. Вистина, сликата на онто-вредносниот дуализам успева да ги ограничи нашите релации со самите себеси, а потоа и со другиот, нагласувајќи ја хиерархијската опозиција помеѓу едното и другото, едното и другото. Токму тоа се случува и со нашите проценки во однос на поимот на универсалноста во контекст на театарот, кога ставот за универсалноста го градиме исключиво врз темелот на изразувачкото ниво. Потценувањето на предизразувачкото ниво е, всуност, ситуација добиена од позитивниот feedback loop што го покренал картезијанскиот дуализам.

Имено, доколку театрската транскултурност е одредена како трансценденција на партикуларните култури во корист на универсалноста на човечкиот услов, проблематиката на театрската транскултурност треба да се третира врз темелот на таа онто-вредносна концепција којашто го поддржува прашањето на релациите, која се разликува од онто-вредносната опозиција помеѓу рационалниот ум и телото, а која е сепак слична со неа поради тоа што е начин на разбиране на инкорпориранот живот темелен врз феноменологијата. Оваа онто-вредносна концепција сакам да ја наречам онто-вредносната концепција на Трудната Божица Мајка.

Понатаму,

1. Доколку театрската транскултурност е одредена како потрага кон универсалноста, поимот на универсалноста и на театрската транскултурност треба да ги градиме врз темелот на предизразувачкото ниво на театрскиот организам, затоа што ова ниво го поддржува и поттикнува пристапот на недуалистичната онто-вредносна концепција. Потоа би следела неговата релација со изразувачкото ниво. Оттука би делим одредени нови сознанија - коишто даваат простор за слободно одредување (помеѓу едната, другата или третата онто-вредносна концепција) во однос на изразувачкото ниво - а коишто се важни затоа што ја ублажуваат суровоста на реалноста.

1. If the transculturality of the theatre is determined as the search for universality, the notion of universality and the transculturality of the theatre should be built on the base of pre-expression level of the theatre organism, because this level supports and incites the approach to the nondualistic onto-value conception. Then its relation to the expression level would follow. Hence we will get a certain new cognizance – one giving space to free determination (among the first, second or third onto-value conception) of the expression level – which is important because it alleviates the cruelty of reality.
2. If the transculturality of the theatre is determined as the universality of the “human condition”, the multidimensional value of universality should include the human condition itself, and this is the interpretive aspect of experience. In other words, if universality is not treated as an ambiguous notion, this notion becomes an abstraction or, to say the least, the transculturality of theatre becomes a donation to the behavioral science.

3. If the onto-value conception, which supports relations, is different from the onto-value dualism and yet similar to it, just like this one, because it says how things are and how they should be, the term transculturality must not be abandoned when we seek to define the essence of transculturality in the context of the theatre. This means that, besides the fact that the engraved (basically dualistic) meaning of the term transculturality is an implementation of the codes, the term transculturality should be kept even when we want to portray it in a different perspective. If not:

a. We lose the counterpoint of the Cartesian dualism, and with it our own ground;

b. We are threatened by the danger to enter a different type of dualism.

4. If the Diltheyian certain expirience is a process that strives toward the expression that encircles it, this term is an example of cyclicity, i.e. of what is the sign of universality. If the certain expirience was not a certain expirience unless it was not mediated through expression, this is an example that treats the self-organised cyclicity in terms of cultural happenings. If culture exists solely in practice, expirience is what proves we exist as a body-mind, and really, based on this onto-value conception, which is different from the onto-value opposition between the rational mind and the body. If the thesis that supports the oppinion that culture exists only in practice is seen by science as an objective thesis, then our onto-value conception is an objective conception.
5. Доколку театарот (потово, тоа што го прави театарот театар, а тоа е театарската претстава која му се нуди на гледачот) е пример што стои за одреденото искусство, објективните ставови во врска со театарската транскултурност, како дел од театологијата, треба да ги црпиме од објективните ставови во врска со одреденото искусство.

Поимот на одреденото искусство во однос на културните манифестации открива многу нешта. Предлагам да се ограничиме само во еден контекст, кој е неопходен за да се даде заклучната реч во врска со градивото на театарската транскултурност, што следи во продолжение. Тој контекст е следниот:

Ако е вистина дека општествениот простор ја дефинира свеста на носителите на културата и дека културата постои само во практика, вистина е тоа дека општествената практика не може да се проучува врз исклучива референција на индивидуалните избори (поради тоа што постојат одредени заеднички концепции кои не учат да учиме), но вистина е и тоа дека концептот на културата е непоимлив надвор од аксиолошки јасно одредената средина.

Според тоа, културната индивидуалност, реално и самата по себе, ја потврдува релацијата помеѓу партикуларностите, а не хиерархискиот однос помеѓу партикуларностите. Самоорганизирачката цикличност, која импицира развој и трансформација, насочена е кон реализацијата на индивидуалноста, кон средиштето на личната вредносна проценка.

Проблематиката на цикличноста е проблематика на индивидуалноста. Прашането на индивидуалноста е прашање на интегритетот. А што е прашањето на интегритетот?

Проблематиката на интегритетот е проблематиката на реализацијата на човековото Jac. Тоа што кај човекот треба да се интегрира за тој да биде вистинско Jac

5. If theatre (more exactly, what makes theatre a theatre - a theatre play, offered to the viewer) is an example that stands for the certain expirience, we should draw our objective attitudes, related to the transculturality of theatre, as a part of theatrology from the objective attitudes related to certain expirience.

The notion of certain expirience regarding cultural happenings reveals many things. I suggest we limit ourselves to one context, which is necessary to make the closing statement regarding the essence of the transculturality of theatre, which will follow shortly. Let us look at the context.

If it is true that social space defines the consciousness of the carriers of culture and that culture exists only in practice, then it is true that social practice cannot be studied on the sole reference of individual choices (because there are certain common concepts that teach us to learn), but it is also true that the concept of culture is inconceivable outside the axiologically clear determined environment.

According to this, the cultural individuality, realistically and in itself, confirms the relation between the particularities and not the hierarchical relation between particularities. The self-organised cyclicity, implicating development and transformation, is directed towards the realisation of individuality, towards the center of the personal value judgment.

The problematics of integrity is the problematics of individuality. The issue of individuality is an issue of integrity. And what is the issue of integrity?

The problematics of integrity is the problematics of realisation of the human Me. What should be integrated in a man, for him to have a real Me, are the multidimensional levels
Of his being, whose extremities are called conscious and unconscious. The individuality of man, especially in terms of integration, is an ambiguous condition that excludes aporia; integration is a step "from me to me" and is simultaneously a "step from me to you". This is a discovering of the real me, but is, simultaneously, a potential condition of my all-inclusiveness, of my "rounded body" that encompasses you too, as well as everything that can exist around you and me. Completeness is all-inclusive (and not only dualistic) insofar as I am allowed to feel the connection between your ego and my Me, and through this Me and the connection to your I and with everything that makes this human I. If I find out who I am, I will know how much you and I have in common - and then, you have absolutely no reason to not believe I love you. I will learn to love you only if I learn who I am - if I am, and remain, an individual.

This problematics is the one that should be incorporated in the essence of the pre-expressive level of the theatre organism and called transculturality of the theatre.

True, the actor is in a desirable position; his profession is a rare profession, one that can explicitly teach him (if he is willing) how to learn, i.e. to accomplish his personal integration. The investment is worth making; if he invests, the actor will learn how and why to respect the inculturated body-mind of the other, different from his inculturated body-mind.

If this is the real path of liberation, achieved by conscious efforts, and there is the will to love the other, as a drive to continue, then the notion of universality is not a dangerous strategy, but, on the contrary, a necessary strategy. The road of the "mortal" passing thorough self-questioning is not a transformation of the actor's profession. On the contrary, the path of selfrelating is the landmark of the perfectioning of the actor's profession.
And what is the exact significance of the transcendency of transculturality of theatre (incorporated in the essence of the pre-expressive level of the theatre mechanism), the relation of the transculturality of theatre with the rest of the terms, including the syntagma "intercultural theatre", as well as the many other evidence that support what has already been said and what has not – in short, about the "path" of science based on the transculturality of theatre, from the beginning to the end – I will tell that in another "story". In a suitable time and circumstance.

P.S. I have found a very interesting fragment in the journal of Julius Obedient, describing his fight with "Tom Thumb in the Woods", before he decided to stay in the theatre, in the phase when he was enchanted by the roots, before he found the Pregnant Goddess Mother. The traveler said: O dumb Thumb, how did you manage to lose your way? Well, that was not my path – he replied. And if I did not find my way, I would not have known the story of "death" threatening me from behind the curtain and the Witch's "bottomless barrel!"

Tom Thumb went on his way, but suddenly stopped, turned around and said "O laughable little Julius, you are the confused one: am I not the one, the "Tom Thumb in the Woods", in fact, you, the true traveler and the true path?

NOTES

3 Patrice Pavis, ibid., page 6.
La construction de toute identité, qu'elle soit pensée comme religieuse, culturelle, linguistique, ou autre se fait au moyen d'une définition préalable des rapports sociaux des sexes. Il en va de même de l'identité dite ethnique et/ou nationale.

Il sévit dans toutes les sociétés, toute proportion gardée, une plus ou moins absolue ségrégation des sexes. C'est aussi ce que certains appellent le genre. Cette séparation est certes beaucoup plus présente dans les sociétés dites traditionnelles, mais elle reste encore perceptible, à certains égards et à divers degrés, même dans les sociétés modernes. Or, le sexe n'est peut-être que cela : une scission première de/dans la pensée elle-même, un partage avant qu'elle ne (se) réfléchisse. Il s'agit d'un partage de la raison, auquel correspond en même temps le partage entre la nature et la culture. Ce dernier est régulièrement reconstruit (toujours en, et à partir de, la différence des sexes) car toujours fragile. Notre nature, en effet, est toujours déjà culture, et le "sexes" lui-même est loin de se présenter à l'état "pur" de nature. Cette division constamment reconfigurée est aussi une tentative pour contenir l'humain, lui qui a toujours tendance à déborder vers ce qu'il aimerait pouvoir considérer comme animal, comme autre. La séparation des sexes est la vaine tentative toujours re-tentée de recentrer l'anthropocentrisme, dont la forme prévalente n'a été qu'androcentrisme.1 Le genre (le sexe social) est "un modèle
е направен обид, секогаш наново практикуван, да се ре-
центририва антропоцентризмот, чија предоминантна
форма бил самоот андроцентризам. Родот (социјалниот
пол) е „еден модел на социјални односи, конструиран и
оперативен во социјалната практика“.2

„Создавајќи го тој имагинарен елемент каков што
е дполоте“, пишува Мишел Фуко, „половиот диспозитив
разбуди еден од оние најосновни внатрешни принципи на
функционирање. (...) Нужно е да се ослободиме токму од
инстанцата на полот доколку сакаме, преку едно тактичко
навраќање на различните механизми на половоста, да ја
истакнеме, наспроти достигањата на мокта, вредноста на
tелото, задоволството, знаењето, во нивната разновид-
ност и нивната можност да се спротистават. Наспроти
dиспозитивот на половоста, потпорна точка на противна-
падот не треба да биде полот- желба, туку телото и задо-
волствата“.3 Бидејќи половоста отсега станува еден вид
полиција која функционира во најразлични домени.

Риту Менон насловува една од своите статии „Дали
жените имаат татковина?“.4 Во неа таа покажува како
национа се конструира со посредство на една веќе вос-
тановена хиерархија на половите и без жената да биде
земена предвид. Ваквата хиерархија е еден од главните
услови, а во исто време и механизми за интеграција на
национа. Но ние мораме да го разгледаме „урездувањето
на односите меѓу половите“ и во други формации за да
можеме да го разбереме и на ниво на нацијата.

„Било да е тоа во Израел, Босна или во Северна
Ирска, жените беа во голема мера изсклучени од плановите
за решавање на конфликтите како и од процесите на конс-
титуирање на нацијата-Држава“, пишува Наџе Ал-Али.
„Иронично, но нивната маргинализација во однос на по-
официјалните и поформални канали на политиката можеше
da ја зголеми способноста да се мисли и да се делува
надвор од идеологијата и од текстот на акцијата предвидена
од страна на доминантните елити, воглавно од машка
природа. Наместо да се потчинат токму на улогите кои им се
припишани како биолошки и културолошки создателки на

de rapport sociaux, construit et opératoire dans la pratique
sociale“.2

"En créant cet élément imaginaire qu’est ‘le sexe’," écrit
Michel Foucault, "le dispositif de sexualité a suscité un de ces
principes internes de fonctionnement les plus essentiels. (...) C'est de
l'instance du sexe qu'il faut s'affranchir si, par un
tourment tactique des divers mécanismes de la sexualité,
on veut faire valoir contre les prises du pouvoir, les corps, les
plaisirs, les savoirs, dans leur multiplicité et leur possibilité de
résistance. Contre le dispositif de sexualité, le point d'appui de
la contre-attaque ne doit pas être le sexe-désir, mais les corps
et les plaisirs."3 Car la sexualité est désormais devenue une
sorte de police qui fonctionne dans les domaines les plus divers.

Ritu Menon intitule l’un de ses articles "Les femmes ont-
elles un pays?"4 Elle y montre comment la nation se construit
au moyen de la hiérarchie des sexes maintenue et sans con-
sidération pour les femmes. Cette hiérarchie est l’une des prin-
cipales conditions ainsi que le mécanisme d’intégration pour
la nation. Mais nous devons observer les "régimes de rapports
des sexes" dans d’autres formations pour le comprendre aussi
au niveau de la nation.

"Que ce soit en en Israel, en Bosnie et en Irlande du
Nord, les femmes ont été largement exclues des projets de
résolution des conflits ainsi que des processus de construction
de la nation-Etat", écrit Nadje Al-Ali. "Ironiquement, leur
marginalisation par rapport aux canaux plus officiels et formels
de la politique pourrait avoir augmenté l’abilité à penser et à
agir en dehors de l’idéologie et du courant de l’action prévu par
de élites dominantes, principalement masculines. Au lieu de se
soumettre exactement aux rôles qui leurs sont assignés, en tant
que reproductrices biologiques et culturelles de la nation, les
femmes (...) résistent activement non seulement aux rôles
La nation, dans sa constitution, prend explicitement modèle sur la famille. Et il est encore d'usage de mesurer le statut et la réputation d'une nation, parfois d'un État, par le degré de ses attributions masculines. Le père-de-la-nation serait comme le père de famille, de l'entreprise etc., ce qui déploïs en tout cas le rapport des sexes. Cela veut dire que la différence des sexes informe, traverse et lie entre elles des institutions de niveau différent, du plus bas, au plus haut. Toute formation sociale est sexuée d'une manière ou d'une autre. Pour Michel Foucault, le sexe lui-même, qui sert largement à discipliner et à réglementer les corps et les populations, est un pli particulièrement puissant du pouvoir. Nous avons l'habitude de discerner la problématique de la différence des sexes (ou des genres) surtout au micro-niveau, là où elle saute aux yeux du fait d'une expérience directe et personnelle: réveil sexuel, famille, vie privée, école, division sexuelle du travail à domicile plus qu'ailleurs, violence ponctuelle contre des femmes isolées etc., tout cela témoigne de "régimes de rapports des sexes" ou de "régimes des genres" différents. Par les féministes, les sociologues, les statistiques, nous apprenons que la différence des sexes apparaît également à d'autres niveaux (au niveau moyen) : la communauté, la société, la culture, et l'État même articulent de manières différentes le rapport social et politique des sexes. Là déjà, la perception en est moins directe, et elle dépendra aussi en grande partie de la sensibilité de chacun. Les sciences dont nous disposons sont construites sans prendre en compte le régime des sexes. La perception du rapport des sexes est en tous cas (aussi) culturellement conditionnée, et n'est pas neutre. A un niveau encore plus abstrait, au niveau de l'État, des rapports entre les États, donc des affaires internationales, et, aujourd'hui, de la mondialisation, il est encore plus difficile de saisir l'articulation sexuelle/des genres. Il est difficile de dire, sauf de manière très générale, en quoi tous ces rapports sont aussi conditionnés par la hiérarchie des sexes et d'en calculer la mesure et les effets. Certes, il y a à ce sujet aujourd'hui des bibliothèques entières, et nous sommes très loin de les avoir toutes parcourues. Ce qui nous intéresse cependant, c'est aussi un problème méthodolo-
rote of her articulation. It is to say, even more so in the case of a whole situation or of a whole context, when one’s life is in a certain way determined by a hierarchy of gender relations, in what measure and with what effects. So, of course, it is difficult to say, perhaps in a general way, to what extent all relations are determined by gender hierarchies. Moreover, concerning this question, there are whole libraries existing, and we are far from being able to go through all of them. What is necessarily of interest is also the problem of methodology. Apart from the obvious patriarchical bias that regularly and consistently affects any reflexions on this subject (and that we have to overcome), it is certain that when we encounter some difficulties in conceptualising a given problématique, it is that the theoretical apparatus, the terminology, with which we dispose are not adequate for expressing. We introduce in our work the concept of “regime of social relations between sexes” that we borrow from Sylvia Walby, “Gender, nations and states in a global era”.8 There are all sorts of regimes of the sexes, and at all levels of observation, and they can be distinct from each other even within the same society: the familial regime of the sexes, the national regime of the sexes, the regime of the sexes in business, the regime of the sexes in the state, the regime of the sexes in regional integrations or relations between states, the regime of globalization, that of the United Nations etc. For example, the familial regime may be different from the regime school or medical of the sexes etc., and the communal (identitarian and “ethnic”) is very different from the regime social (civic) of the sexes etc., in turn it diverging from the cultural regime or the regime “sexual” of the state at the same that this last one himself may diverge from a manner important from a regime international, plus or less extended, of the sexes. For women themselves, between a traditional society and a modern society, there is a very great difference between a domestic and familial regime that keeps them at home, and a public regime where they go out in the society for numerous economic and political activities. The introduction of the concept of gender regime by Sylvia Walby is extremely important and will allow us to grasp and express the phenomena that escaped analysis, at levels where, in general, it was difficult to apply the category of sexe/genre.
Les concepts de "nation", "communauté", "patrie", "origine", "culture"9 sont hautement connotés sexuellement. Ils sont liés à des images de (corps de) femme. L'idée que l'on se fait de son propre corps, de la sexualité, du rapport social des sexes et de l'ordre moral sexuel, ainsi que le langage par lequel on en parle, font référence à ces concepts. C'est d'ailleurs le cas de toutes les hiérarchies: toutes sont sexuées. Que ce soient les classes ou les castes, les groupes d'âge, le "système symbolique", la discipline administrative au sein des institutions et de l'État, les idéologies dominantes, le régime des sexes, le racisme ordinaire, l'ordre mondial etc., ils s'installent tous en commençant par redéfinir le rôle des deux sexes et ceci semble être fondamental et préliminaire à leur construction.10 Une représentation de la nation ou un projet national (un patriotisme), toute proportion gardée, ont toujours des élaborations d'images plus ou moins arrêtées de chacun des sexes. Ces descriptions normatives ne changent que très difficilement, poussées par les grands moments de crise et de reconfiguration générale. Ce facteur crucial de la constitution de la nation est complètement négligé chez la plupart des auteurs qui étudient la dynamique de la nation et des nationalismes, à l'exception d'Étienne Balibar et plusieurs chercheurs indiens, tels que R. Samaddar,11 Partha Chatterjee, Amartya Sen et autres.

Mais en amont de la sexuation des concepts, il y a déjà le partage de la raison selon la distribution ou la répartition des "valeurs" sexuelles. Il correspond à la distinction entre raison et monde, sujet et objet, masculin et féminin etc. Sans être complètement équivalentes, ces dichotomies sont toujours corrélatives et comportent la "valence différentielle des sexes" (F. Héritier).

Y-a-t-il un rapport entre le patriotisme en tant que sentiment (éuphémisme pour "nationalisme") et la différence des sexes? De manière apparemment plus anecdotique, il existe une connexion étroite entre le patriotisme12 et l'amour. Dans
bought. Во известни стереотипни и скамени форми на литературата, една искуствоформа на аскетизам, сублимация и патриотска преданост се състои в това да се замени, кај еден национален херој, кај еден човек од политиката, љубовта спрема жената со љубовта спрема татковината. Обратното важи за жените: клишето бара може да биде вистинска татковина или вистинска религия на жената, неизминат маж да биде неизминат единствен Бог, според индийската поговорка. Во исто време, при таквия идеал за националност „мажествен“ маж, јуришот кон непријателот ќе биде проследен со напад на женственоста (внатрешна), на слабост како таква. Во една мащо-национална и едностранна верзија, овој маж го „сака“ својот народ, својата татковина, својата војска, своето знаме, својата култура на која й нема рамна (направено, својата единственна Култура), својата пушка. На последната и посветува песни како на своја сакана, тој спие со своето оружье. Неговиот говор станува декламативен. Објектот на неговата љубов е обезживотен, дури и кога се работи за форма на човеко същество. Тоа е всушност секуларизација на религиозниот модел кој започнува со Романтизмот, или уште ближе од Просветителството наваму. Заедницата така го обезличува свештенички поредок, но ги има сите шанси да се уназади и самата себе си.

"Жените се наоѓаат во една релација на угнетеност во однос на мажите, општеството и државата." И, треба ли да се додаде, посебно во однос на заедницата и на нејзината специфична форма, нацијата. Различните улоги што им се припликуваат на мажите и жените преку една историска полова социјализација се диференцираат посебно по однос на моќта, која пак, ја определува нацијата како една хиерархија, вертикална и исключителна конструирана. Сепак, таа почива во однос на една хиерархија.

Наспроти ваквата историска добро документирана очигледност, во она што следи ќе се интересира посредно за родовата детерминирање ("gendering") на извесни институции и на размислувањата во врска со нив. Филозофите или хуманистичките науки ќе бидат исчитувани на мес-
certains cas stéréotypés et figés en littérature, une forme particulière d’ascétisme, de sublimation et de dévotion patriotique consiste à remplacer, chez un héro national, chez un homme politique, l’amour pour une femme par l’amour pour la patrie. L’inverse vaut pour les femmes: le cliché veut que l’homme soit la véritable patrie ou la vraie religion de la femme, que son mari soit son seul dieu selon le dicton indien. En même temps, dans l’idéal de l’homme “viril” violent, l’assaut à l’ennemi sera corroboré par l’attaque à la féminité (intérieure), à la faiblesse en tant que telle. Dans la version macho-nationale et étatique, cet homme “aime” son peuple, sa patrie, son armée, son drapeau, sa culture sans égale (la Culture tout court, la seule), son fusil. A ce dernier il dédie des poèmes comme à sa bien-aimée, il dort avec son arme. Son discours devient déclamation. L’objet de son amour est dévitalisé, même quand il s’agit pour la forme d’un être humain. C’est la sécularisation du modèle religieux, qui commence depuis le Romantisme, et plus précisément à partir des Lumières. La communauté défait ainsi l’ordre ecclésiastique, mais a toutes les chances de se replier sur elle-même.

"Les femmes se trouvent dans une relation d'oppression par rapport aux hommes, à la société et à l'État." Et, faut-il ajouter, par rapport surtout à la communauté et à sa forme spécifique, la nation. Les rôles différents assignés aux hommes et aux femmes par une socialisation historiquement sexuée sont différenciés surtout par rapport au pouvoir qui, lui, détermine la nation en tant que construction hiérarchique, verticale et exclusive. Cependant celle-ci repose également sur d'autres formes de pouvoir et de hiérarchie.

Au delà de cette évidence aujourd’hui historiquement bien documentée, dans ce qui suit on s'intéressera plutôt à la sexuation ("gendering") de certaines institutions et de la réflexion à leur propos. La philosophie ou les sciences humaines seront lues sur les lieux de leur occultation constitutive, pour elles-mêmes,
Celle des sexes est la différence intra-générique la plus ancienne que nous connaissions, non dans un sens biologique mais dans un sens politique. Sous l’angle politique, la différence est différend et s’écarte du biologique, tout en prétendant se justifier par lui. Mais ni l’un ni l’autre (le biologique, le politique) ne peuvent être définis sans équivoque. En tant que naturelle, la différence est moindre que celle qui nous distingue des autres espèces, bien que la perception en soit chargée de valeurs symboliques et imaginaires. Culturellement et par époques, elle a pu être cédée comme plus importante, quand on a voulu faire croire que la femme était plus proche des femelles animales que de l’homme. Cela nous amène à voir la différence des sexes comme le plus ancien différend politique qui soit, celui qui désigne la première frontière de l’altérité. Celle-ci est au cœur du rapport au pouvoir. Traditionnellement au contraire, jusque dans les philosophies où cela peut étonner, la différence des sexes est vue comme seulement naturelle.20 Le différend des sexes n’est généralement pas pris en compte. "Le décalage des revendications des femmes par rapport aux acquis des hommes ne permettait pas de comprendre cette attente en termes politiques", pourrait-on paraphraser Michèle Riot-Sarcey.21 Cet écart est d’emblée inscrit dans le langage comme neutralisé, dépolitisé, sujet à un jugement tacite préalable qui présuppose l’adhésion de tous. Le silence à son propos est la condition de son fonctionnement en tant qu’agencement, producteur d’ordre
подложено на една претходна премолчена проценка која претпоставува вклученост на секој поединец. Молчењето по однос на тоа раздување е услов за негову функционирање во смисла на поредок, продуцирање на ред и смисла. Она што овде е окупно, тоа е „уделот на оние без удел“.22 Овој спор е вушност тенденција да се избегне проучувањето. Тешко е да се разграничи разликата и спорот меѓу половините како предмет на опсервација. Со самото тоа што се запишани во јазик кој исто така е половопределен, се чини дека тие отсекогаш биле таму. Уште пред човекот, уште пред јазикот кој веќе ги предвидува. Тешкотијата доаѓа од тоа што не може да се идентификува ниту една определувачка и одлучувачка карактеристика на полот или на родот, иако и двете претпоставуваат кон есенцијалност. Овој спор, согледан како фундаментален – бидејќи е услов за живот – успева да го „о-полови“ нашиот универзум во сите негови детали благодарение на неговиот специфичен статус кој е многу повеќе од една природна разлика. Тоа е токму затоа што тој е политички. Спорот меѓу половините се уште останува прекопкување на специјалисти или на активистите. Многу спор, преку аргументите на феминистичката критика, тој го прошири својот пат во хуманистичките науки почнувајќи од антропологијата, станувајќи предмет на проучување исто колку и фактор на промени во постапките. Според Пјер Бурдје, „специфичната сила на машката социо-единка доаѓа од акумулацијата и кондензацијата на две операции: таа легитимира една релација на доминација впишувајќи ја во една билошка природа која и самата е конструкција на едно натурализирано оштестство.“23

Најчесто, спорот меѓу половините е асимилиран во разликата меѓу половините, последнава од фантазамгорична природа, при што спорот е политички, а разликата, и покрај убедувањата дека е природна, сепак е конструирана. По-меку двата термина има еден мобилен, нестабилен однос, и една тензија, па дури и поврзаност, без таа да биде предетерминирана, дефинитивна и идентификативна. Политиката е конечно средиште на потенцијална власт-мок.24 Токму спорот меѓу половините е интересен за филозофската бидејки е од политичка природа, што не е случај со разликата. Спротивно на она што стекнатата идеја за разлика

et de sens. Ce qui y est occulté, c'est la "part des sans part".22 Ce diffèrent a en effet tendance à se soustraire à l'examen. Il est difficile de cerner la différence et le différend des sexes comme objet d'observation. Du fait qu'ils sont inscrits dans le langage lui-même sexué, ils paraissent comme ayant toujours été là. Dès avant l'individu, dès avant le langage qui déjà les prévoit. La difficulté vient de ce que l'on ne peut identifier une caractéristique de sexe ou de genre déterminante et décisive, bien que les deux se prêtent à l'essentialisation. Ce différend, préçu comme fondamental - puisque condition de la vie - réussit à sexuer notre univers dans tous ses détails grâce à son statut très particulier, bien au delà de la différence naturelle. C'est bien pour cela qu'il est politique. Le différend des sexes reste encore une préoccupation de spécialistes ou de militants. Très lentement, par les arguments de la critique féministe, il a fait son chemin dans les sciences humaines en commençant par l'anthropologie, aussi bien en tant que sujet d'étude qu'en tant que ce qui modifie la démarche. D'après Pierre Bourdieu, "la force particulière de la sociodiscée masculine lui vient de ce qu'elle cumule et condense deux opérations: elle légitime une relation de domination en l'inscrivant dans une nature biologique qui est elle-même une construction sociale naturalisée."23

On assimile le plus souvent le différend des sexes à la différence des sexes, celle-ci fantasmée, mais le premier est politique alors que la seconde, tout en étant supposée être naturelle, et aussi construite. Entre les deux termes il y a un rapport mouvant, instable, et une tension, une correspondance même, sans cependant qu'elle soit prédéterminée, définitive ou même identifiable. Le politique est finalement un pli de pouvoir-puissance potentiel.24 C'est le différend des sexes qui est philosophiquement intéressant car politique, et non la différence. Au contraire de ce que l'idée reçue de la différence des sexes peut faire entendre, le différend des sexes renvoie à la tension...
de l'asymétrie ou de l'injustice qui brouille constamment, et dépasse, la dichotomie insuffisante à exprimer ce rapport d'inadéquation du dehors et du dedans. Cette asymétrie, c'est même le fait que l'on ne puisse jamais mettre le doigt sur la différence qui ne peut que rester indécidable, l'indécidable par excellence. Il s'agit là de quelque-chose qui sème la confusion entre les termes de la dichotomie et en traverse le rapport, s'entremêle entre les deux. C'est dire que le différend des sexes porte en lui le bouleversement, en tout cas la menace constante de bouleversement de la hiérarchie déguisée en simple opposition binaire. Le résultat en est la signification ambivalente ainsi que la force créatrice de la différence des sexes.25 Ce seuil imaginaire incarne la différence et représente en même temps l'indécidable de la relation: aucun parti pris, aucune idéologie, aucun destin, aucune fatalité. Car bien que l'histoire ait privilégié le sujet masculin, le jeu est recommencé à chaque fois, jamais escompté. En effet, la situation de la palanque26 peut être résolue de manières très différentes, la forme n'en est pas donnée d'avance.

La différence en question envahit et surcodifie le social, le politique, le symbolique, l'imaginaire, elle est un repère en toute chose, bien qu'elle s'articule en des régimes sexuels différents. Même les prises électriques sont pensées comme sexuées. Elle imprègne symboliquement par des valeurs sexuées toutes les autres différences dans la sphère de ce qui est historiquement consensuel. De même, elle traverse la légitimation historique des hiérarchies qui se nourrissent des différences. Non pas la différence des sexes elle-même, mais les valeurs qu'on lui attribue culturellement, constituent le préalable conscient et inconscient de tout ordre social.

Le consensus patriarchal global27 (la première des globalisations) sur la soumission de toutes les femmes à tous les hommes est intéressant, au-delà de ce qu'il représente pour l'histoire des femmes, par ce qu'il sert universellement à rendre
јата на жените, туку и по тоа што универсално служи да станат воз можни и оправдани сите други потчинетости. Патријархатот не го разгледува посебно односот меѓу мажите и жените. Поскоро, тој е широко поле на кое се организира усогласување на различните типови доминација. Тоа се постигнува со помош на еден механизам на симво лична „аналогија“. Овој последниов потврдува еден претходен „договор меѓу половините“ и кој de facto ги потчинува жените во однос на мажите.28 Патријархатот е одржуван и станува неопходен, однатре, како подршка на секој тип доминација по аналогија, и однавдор, како генерална рамка („неутрална“ и неосознана) на секоја социјална и етатистичка организација. Бивајќи и самоиот еден вид хегемонија, тој е круцијален, неопходен и запишан во основа на секој друг тип на неегалитарна хегемонија. „Сексуалната контрола“ (онаа на односите меѓу половините како и на сексуалноста) е првата и најефикасна „полициска“ власт. За да постои, таа нема потреба од државата, и й претходи бидејќи е присутна во секој вид заедница. Половот пофис поредок значи му претходи на етатистичкиот пофис во таа смисла што последниов ке се потпира врз претходниот.29

Наационалната и светската економија, исто како и системот на држави, еволуираат преку помалку или повеќе препознатливи циклуси без да го допрат, освен можеби за да го реорганизираат, самиот патријархат. Можната и веројатна цикличност на односите меѓу половините й бега на опсервацијата затоа што режимот на половините социјални односи е исключително спор при големи размери и задржува еден заединен именител на потчинетоста на жената на сите нивоа, што привати тоа да изгледа непроменлив (иако тоа не е). Патријархалната хегемонија тогаш останува „нормалност“ и е теоретизирана во различни дисциплини како неовладлива. Полот станува една нормативна категорија дупак кои се надминува сексуалноста. Ваквата инструментализација на една состојба на нештата која е веќе историска (доминацијата) преку неизено претставување како транс историска и природна, ја прави и самата инструментализација историска. Аналогијата кои што преку тоа се извлекува за да се примени на други видови неправда, е врска доделување есценција. Историјата на социјалните односи на половините е

 possibles et à justifier d'autres assujettissements. Le patriarcat ne concerne pas particulièrement la relation entre les hommes et les femmes. Plutôt, il est ce vaste champ où s'organise la concordance des différents types de domination. Cela se fait au moyen d'un mécanisme d''analogie" symbolique. Celui-ci entérine un "contrat sexuel" préalable et qui assujettit de facto les femmes aux hommes.28 Le patriarcat est entretenu et rendu indispensable par l'intérieur en tant que soutien à tout type de domination par analogie, et par l'extérieur en tant qu'il est le cadre général ("neutre" et non perçu) de toute organisation sociale et étatique. Tout en étant lui-même une hégémonie, il est crucial, nécessaire, et inscrit à la base de tout autre type d'hégémonie inégalitaire. Le "contrôle sexuel" (celui du rapport entre les sexes, et aussi celui de la sexualité) est le premier et le plus efficace pouvoir "policier". Pour exister, il n'a pas besoin d'Etat, et lui précède, étant présent en tout type de communauté. L'ordre des sexes précède donc l'ordre étatique dans ce sens que ce dernier s'appuiera sur lui.29

L'économie nationale et mondiale, ainsi que le système des Etats évolue en cycles plus ou moins repérables sans toucher, sauf pour le réorganiser, au patriarcat. La cyclicité possible et probable du rapport des sexes, elle, échappe à l'observation car le régime des rapports sociaux de sexe est extrêmement lent à grande échelle et qu'il garde un dénominateur commun de subalternité des femmes à tous les niveaux qui le fait paraître inaltérable (ce qu'il n'est pas). L'hégémonie patriarcale reste alors la "normalité" et est théorisée en de différentes disciplines comme insurmontable. Le sexe devient une catégorie normative dont la cible dépasse la sexualité. Cette instrumentalisation d'un état de choses déjà historique (la domination) par sa présentation comme trans-historique et naturel, est elle-même historique. L'analogie qui en est déduite pour d'autres types d'injustice est une essentialisation. L'histoire des rapports sociaux des sexes est normalement masquée pour faire paraître inaltérable (ce qu'il n'est pas). L'hégémonie qui en est déduite pour d'autres types d'injustice est une essentialisation. L'histoire des rapports sociaux des sexes est normalement masquée pour faire paraître celle-ci comme
La prohibition de l'inceste, tout interdit qu'elle est, s'accompagne aussi par les transgressions régulières de certains pères qui violent leurs enfants. C'est que l'inceste (du père sur sa progéniture) est constamment invité et défendu en même temps, du fait que le message de son interdiction est brouillé: car cette dernière doit légitimer la plus grande liberté sexuelle du père (qui confirme la règle en tant qu'exception à cette liberté) et lui donner une autorité sur les autres. Si sa socialisation est un peu dérangée (un ego trop "fort", ou un super-ego trop faible), le père peut trouver l'interdit de l'inceste être pour lui une contrainte contradictoire insupportable. Le contrôle de la sexualité, d'une manière ou d'une autre, est un instrument de base du pouvoir et un moyen de répression. Il dépasse de loin la simple sexualité, il touche à la liberté psycho-physique aussi bien de la personne que de son groupe sous différents angles. On instrumentalise la sexualité pour manipuler la communauté, la société, pour organiser l'État. Le prix en paraît élevé, car il s'agit en général de réprimer la féminité et la "faiblesse" sexuelle imposée aussi bien à l'extérieur qu'en soi, d'où des contraintes également pour le groupe dominant. Mais ces "sacrifices" seront rémunérés...
Ozakonuvanjeeto i opravduvaneeto na izvessci soocjalni neednaknosti so drugi, podrazbira isto tako edna xierarchija na tise neednaknosti. Sekoja opozicija koja implikira xierarchiska perspektiva (vnotrenno/nadvoroshno, telo/dusha itd) sadrzi isto tako iskluchenie na klasata, rasata (imaginarna), polot. Samata priroda e invoovana kako posleden dokaz vo postapkata na sekularizacija na bojstveniot model: ne Bog, tuku samata pri-

La legitimation et la justification de certaines inegalites sociales par d'autres comprend elle-meme une hierarchie de ces inegalites. Toute opposition impliquant une perspective hiérarchique (intérieur/extérieur, corps/âme etc) contient aussi bien l'exclusion de classe, de race (imaginaire), de sexe. La nature, elle, est invoquée comme preuve ultime dans un tour de sécularisation du model divin: ce n'est pas dieu, mais elle-meme, la nature, qui veut la domination. Ainsi, dans la séparation
рођа ја посакува доминацијата. Така, во одвојувањето на 
душата од телото, душата може да го претставува поко-
ренот, благодарение на едно лукавство со које филозо-
фот си ги обезбедува двата краја на равенката: душата е 
всушност тело на жената.32

Како било можно импрегнирањето на половите не-
еднаквости со другите хиерхии, и зошто половиот крите-
риум поскоро од кој било друг е земен за базичен модел?

Нормативниот пол, т.е. половите улоги, правото 
на половост или не, се значително селективни и хиерар-
хиски расположени, припаѓајки на доменот на власт. Ток-
му преку важното ефикасно влијание, еден режим на по-
лови односи на најелементарно ниво (во семејството, оби-
чаете, социјалната практика итн.) може да формира и ус-
лови создавање на една посредна формација, онаа од јавен 
ред или едноставно политички систем. Со забранување 
или лимитирање на половоста може да се узнетуваат, каз-
нуваат, скротуваат, уценуваат, инструментализираат и ма-
нипулираат не само индивидуите туку и колективите. На-
сиството е пред се се греци иа половите 
или насил-
ството ја започнува сегрегацијата која ќе послужи како 
символична аналогија за другите нејзини форми. Културите 
кои што знаеле да негуваат меки и еластични форми на 
полови идентитети (што воопшто не е случај со Западот, 
освен од неодамна), како и помалку хиерархиски поставени 
односи меѓу половинете, се токму онаи кои развиле и одр-
жале изведен отпор кон насилството. Во таа смисла, пози-
ната е врската меѓу колонијалната конструкција и упот-
ребата на половоста за таа цел, односно егзалтацијата на 
хиер-мажественоста.33 Колонијализмот само допол-
нително ја зацврсти традиционалната мачо-суровост преку 
понижување на мажественоста на колонизираниот, кои 
се бисе си доживуваат споредувани, о каков ли срам, со 
жените, и принудувани уште посилно да применуваат на-
сиството спрема жената (и спрема потчинетите касти-klä-
си) за да му се протистават на колонизаторот кој ги сог-
следува како феминизирани итн. Едно наддавање на поло-
вата символка се воспоставува меѓу нив, во исто време 
додека кастите, за кои што веруваме дека се непромен-

де на хипер-мажественоста.33 Колонијализмот само допол-
нително ја зацврсти традиционалната мачо-суровост преку 
понижување на мажественоста на колонизираниот, кои 
се бисе си доживуваат споредувани, о каков ли срам, со 
жените, и принудувани уште посилно да применуваат на-
сиството спрема жената (и спрема потчинетите касти-klä-
си) за да му се протистават на колонизаторот кој ги сог-
следува како феминизирани итн. Едно наддавање на поло-
вата символка се воспоставува меѓу нив, во исто време 
додека кастите, за кои што веруваме дека се непромен-

Comment le télescopage de l'inégalité des sexes sur les 
autres hiérarchies sociales a-t-il été possible, et pourquoi le 
critère du sexe plutôt qu'un autre pour modèle de base?

Le sexe normatif, c'est à dire les rôles sexuels, le droit à
la sexualité ou non, sont hautement sélectifs et hiérarchisants,
relevant du domaine du pouvoir. C'est ainsi que, par cette emprise
efficace, un régime des rapports de sexe au niveau le plus
élémentaire (dans la famille, dans les coutumes, dans la pratique
sociale etc.) peut informer et conditionner une formation
intermédiaire, celle de l'ordre public ou simplement le système
politique. En interdisant la sexualité ou en la limitant, on peut
opprimer, punir, maîtriser, faire chanter, instrumentaliser,
manipuler non seulement des individus, mais des collectivités.
La violence est avant tout ségrégation des sexes, ou elle
comence par celle-ci qui va servir d'analogie symbolique pour
ses autres formes. Les cultures qui ont su cultiver des formes
souples et fluides d'identités sexuelles (ce n'est pas du tout le
cas en Occident sauf plus récemment), ainsi que des rapports
moins hiérarchisants entre les sexes, sont également celles qui
ont développé et maintenu une certaine résistance à la violence.
Dans ce sens, le lien entre la construction coloniale et l'utilisation
à cet effet de la sexualité, l'exaltation de l'hyper-virilité, sont
connus.33 Le colonialisme a donné un tour de vis supplémentaire
au machisme traditionnel de la cruauté, par l'humiliation de la
virilité des coloniaux, qui se voient comparés, ô déshonneur,
aux femmes, et obligés de recourir plus encore à la violence
contre les femmes (et contre les castes-classes soumises) pour
faire face au colonisateur qui les voit comme efféminés etc.
Une surenchère de la sexualité symbolique se met en place
entre les deux, en même temps que les castes, que l'on voudrait
croire immuables, s'adaptent très bien à la reconfiguration
hégémonique. Mais dans la construction de la colonie, qui se
fait aussi bien par les uns que par les autres, l'oppression des
femmes redoublée fera bon ménage avec les tentatives de
ливи, могу добро се адаптираат на реконфигурираната хегемонија. Но во конструкцијата на колонијата, во која подеднакво учествуваат и едните и другите, удвоеното угнетување на жените добро се спојува со обидите за по-мирување преку модернизација, интеграција и прифаќање на мешањето на расите иако тоа не значи и еднаквост.

Денеска, додека се води една бесконечна дебата околу различните места (квоти) за жените, забележуваме дека доминантните елiti се интересираат за нив во онаа мера во која тоа може да им помогне да се спротистават на барањата на дефаворизирани касти, додека овие се спротиставуваат на претставувањето на жените освен ако немаат сопствена полза. Помеѓу доминантните мажи и доминирани мажи, премолчен договор е секогаш можен по повод една иста тема - „природната” угнетеност на жените. Ваквиот компромис, ако се признат или не, е често потребен и претходи на секој друг односен договор. Така, уште еднаш, жените во сопственото тело сврзуваат конструкции на социјално и политичко експериментирање.

Односот меѓу половините е етаблиран во нормативна категорија, дефиниран по обичај и инерција, и како таков, ниту е неопходно експлицитно искажан со политички термини, ниту е нужно испишан во законот, односно невидлив со силата на самата негова евидентност, универзално и хегемониски „консензуален”, тој директно влегува во дефиницијата на секој друг идентитет. Националниот идентитет е најпрв идентитет и оној кој најмногу го потпира врз еден „социјален договор” кој се подразбира, повикавајки се на него сè до самоот израз. Секое конституирање на нацијата започнува, значи, со една рефлексија на односите меѓу половините и дескрипција на очекуваната улога на секој од нив во раскажувањето кое тече само од себе.

Le rapport des sexes est établi en catégorie normative, défini par la coutûme et l’inertie, et en tant que tel, n’est pas nécessairement énoncé explicitement en termes politiques ni forcément inscrit dans la loi, ou invisible par la force même de son évidence, universellement et hégémoniquement “consensuel”, il rentre directement dans la définition de toute autre identité. La première et celle qui le plus s’appuie sur ce “contrat social” sous-entendu, est l’identité nationale, qui en reprend jusque le langage. Toute constitution de la nation commence donc par une redéfinition des rapports de sexe et la description du rôle attendu de chacun d’entre eux dans le récit que l’on se fait de soi.

* Cet article est un extrait de l’introduction à Nation et différences des sexes, manuscrit de livre en cours de rédaction.
NOTES


2 Robert W. Connell, "Understanding Change in Gender", communication au colloque "Women and Radical Change", Institute for International Studies, University of Technology, Sydney, Bowral, 2-3 April 2001. Selon cet auteur, les rapports sociaux des sexes pourraient un jour rendre la catégorie de "genre" inoffensive et caduque en termes de discrimination "par une dissociation intérieure de sorte que les rapports dans un domaine de pratique cessent de renforcer ceux d'un autre."


7 Les élections du 13 mai 2001 amènent au pouvoir en Italie Silvio Berlusconi, populiste de droite, qui déclare plutôt vouloir organiser l'Etat à l'image de l'entreprise. L'imagination de l'Etat-nation s'éloigne ici encore plus des valeurs (patriarcales) "féminines", pour annoncer une prévalence du modèle masculin et une "masculinisation" majeure des femmes dans la mesure où elles réussissent et avancent dans la modernité et dans leur visibilité publique.

8 Sylvia Walby, "Gender, nations and states in a global era", in *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 6, Part 4, October 2000, special issue on "Gender and Nationalism", ed. by Deniz Kandiyoti, pp.523-540. J'adapte pour mes besoins le concept, en l'appliquant à différents niveaux de l'échelle sociale.


"Une dernière envoiée qui dure" in *Transeuropéennes*, n. 19/20, 2001, и целиот специјален број кој се односува на поделбите.

Патриотизмот како секуласирани форма од љубовта кон Бога.


Иван Чоловиќ, *Борodel ратника*, XX век, Београд 1993, стр. 73.

После религијата, секуласираниот филозофија е таа која што всушност настојува систематски да ја рефундира и пренесува патријахалната нормативност на поредокот. Валерия Валкарсель, *La politica de las mujeres*, Ediciones Catedra, Валенција, стр. 74.


Има мноштво можни дефиниции на нацијата, но, за несреќа, сите биле соодветни за развој од системот што трае над системот, а системот духовен принцип што се повикаат на религијата (дефиниција која е глобално недооценена), засебно, културата, потеклото, економијата, заедничките проекти, па дури и на војната како "работа" итн.


Под "потенцијален" подразбирам дека може во истото време да биде реализиран или не.

Par "potentiel", j'entends qu'il peut à la fois être réalisé ou ne pas l'être.


27 "patriarcal", loin d'être masculin ontologiquement ou biologiquement, n'est ici que le fait que le masculin a historiquement prévalu en tant que système symbolique et rapport de forces. Il concerne tous, et exclut ceux et celles à qui il attribue la nature ou nie l'accès à la raison. Il est la configuration première de toute hiérarchie.


30 La distinction anglosaxone entre sex et gender est théoriquement insoutenable bientôt politiquement souvent utile. Elle l'a surtout été au début des deux vagues de luttes féministes du 20e siècle. Elle ne sera pas maintenue strictement dans ce texte, d'autant plus qu'elle est mal acceptée en français. Le cadre conceptuel de ce dernier est différent de celui en vigueur dans la langue anglaise. Cette distinction ne vaut pas mieux que la distinction anthropologique structuraliste entre "nature" et "culture", elle même pratique, mais théoriquement ambiguë et finalement non viable, car elle même en dernière analyse à l'essentielisation des catégories. Comme toute démarche ou conceptualisation en faveur des défavorisés, cette distinction est à double tranchant : le concept de gender a l'avantage de montrer qu'il n'est pas légitime de justifier l'exclusion symbolique et sociale des femmes par analogie avec la biologie. Mais il a le désavantage de faire supposer qu'il y aurait une "nature biologique" de la femme (et d'ailleurs, de l'homme) bien définie et anhistorique, sex, laissée pour compte par les sciences sociales et la philosophie.
Zarana Papic, Polnost i kultura, XX vek, Belgrade, 1997, стр.333.


Spogodbite megu posledovatelnye eliti vo vraska so polozhata na zhentse se del od dogovorot pri primopredavaeteto na vlasta. Taka, revolyucijata na Xomeini koja veturuva jednakost za vreme na nemirniq period na borba, po negovoto doqanje na vlast vovedeni sharija (charia) za seto ona chto se odnesjva na zhentse (cepak tie uspeva da go smenat nejzinoi pravec so toa chto iznudja uknuvanje na pravoto na proterovaneto na zhentse). Vo Aljir, iako fransuzskijat grahanski kodeks ostanja na sila i po olsoboduveneto, islammistite od 1973 g. im prepuvitja na su­dite pravo na izbor da go pochitvat ili ne, pred da bihe voveden vo 1980 g. Zakonot za semejni odnozi koji go regulira lichnito stat­tus na zhentse i ja ograniciva nezjina slobovd. Vo 1979, vo Egi­ipt, najprvina pretsevodatelot Sadat preku dekretp donesjva zakon koji go podobura legaali statust na zhentse, a pojota otstapiva pred islammistite i proglosiva sharija vo 1980. Vo Indija, zakonodavstvoto cje prezema od Anglichanite grahanski zakoni od­voeni od religijata, so chto sekpe pravanje vo vriska so prava dazaj za zhentite cje prepusteno na samata religijozna zaednica i na obi­cnaioi pravo, interpretirajki cje na taj nochin razlichno grahanski statust na zhentse, opredelen od prigadnosta kon religijata i zaednica, i grahanski statust na majot, koji cje od laicika i unitar pusha. Vo etnikratite koji proizpleo od Jugoslavija, pravoto na zhentite cje disponee o swoeto telo (kontrola na grahanska iti) kako i necoje drugi prava, vednash bea podloženi na revizija bez toa da predizvika osobena reakcija od strana na starite eliti ili na anti-nacionalistichite intelektualci (ma­jki). So doqaqevo na C. V. Bush na vlast, isto taka, tokmu vo SAD izvesni prihodovki na zhentite bea stavene pod prashanje.
1. Monstrous bodies: The Eastern Europe paradigm as a Woman

I would like to start with a theoretical-political positioning of feminist theory and practice and subsequently deal with the relationship between philosophy and cyberfeminism. The idea of taking a conceptually specific stand is in order to philosophically identify and articulate a position specific to Eastern Europe. This desire does not grow out of the identity politics game as used by certain feminists to legitimize their right to colonize cyberspace; rather, it is a militant response to this constant process of fragmentation and particularization. Furthermore, I insist on the re-politicization of the cyberworld by taking a stance that is based neither on a geographical space nor on a location on the map of the "New Europe" but is, as E. Said would say, a concept.

It is important to emphasize that the cyberfeminists' posture is not, as it was during the legendary period of feminism in the 1960's (or even earlier, paralleling the period of modernism in art), a product of a natural and in fact, existential position, but is a strictly artificial and conceptual position owing its existence to theory and not to the existential universe. This is what renders it so problematical; if it were existential, it would be easy to deal with; but being purely theoretical, mediated and artificial, it now
Moje pre-obmisluvanje na deneshnata pozicijata na (post)feminizмот e reakcija i na chrestata zamernka deka sega ne e vremce da se delat (Evropskiot) Istok i Zapad, i deka, sooceni so segashna ideologija na globalizacija, tOkmu domot e vazhen, za shoto svedochki i izrekata „Nitu zapad nitu istok kako doma ne se isto!“.

Osavajki go nastrana ideolokskoto sloplilo na vakviot stav, koi ne glede podalku od klaustrofobichnite i totalitarini tendencii woobiacheni za sekoja ideologija vtemelena vo nacionalnотo i vkoreneta vo „domot“, morem povtorno da se zaprashame, kade e ovoj „dom“ kade shto se loziirani spiritalnijot i konceptualniot kontekst, ako voopsto mogome da postavime vako kontekst?

Ja pravam ova zabelelka nasproti cela niza pisuvanja, tekstovi i ideolokski pozicioniraanja, rasiriieni preku popularni slogani kako onoj pogore, ko se stremit da gi igniroirat razlikite megu Istokot i Zapadot, fokusirajki se na koncepti kako „doma“, nebare ima nekoje mesto na planeta koe e nadvor od sfereite na politichkoto, socioijalnотo i posreduvanoto! Ili, poznaku kajano, „doma“ vo ovoj kontekst se perciira kako intimno i лично mesto, na nekoj nachin iskluceno od diferencijacijata, i gere sino implikira deka postoi nekoje „jadro“ chit vrednosti, kako shto se intimnosta, odnosno yetvennosta, mogat da se spristestavat na promenite.

Namesto da se opishuvam sebesi kako sajber-feminist od Istochna Evropa, jac pretpohtam radikalni obrt na ovaia istochevropska poziciija, ili paradigma. Predlagam redefinicija na mojata istochevropska poziciija (ili, ako gi pretpohtate terminite na Liotar: mojata istochevropska sostojba) na (post)feministka, na „sajberfeministicka paradigma“.

Moje pre-obmisluvanje na deneshnata pozicijata na (post)feminizмот e reakcija i na chrestata zamernka deka sega ne e vremce da se delat (Evropskiot) Istok i Zapad, i deka, sooceni so segashna ideologija na globalizacija, tOkmu domot e vazhen, za shoto svedochki i izrekata „Nitu zapad nitu istok kako doma ne se isto!“. 

Моято преобмислување на денешната позицијата на (пост)феминизмот е реакција и на честата замерка дека сега не е време да се делат (Европскиот) Исток и Запад, и дека, соочени со сегашната идеологија на глобализација, токму домот е важен, за што сведочи и изреката „Ниту запад ниту исток како дома не се исто!“. 

My rethinking of the position of (post) feminism today is also a response to the frequent complaint that now is not the time to divide into East and West (Europe), and that in the face of the current ideology of globalization, it is home that matters, as exemplified in the expression: "Neither East, nor West, home is the best!"

Apart from the ideological blindness behind such an attitude, which fails to see beyond the claustrophobic and totalitarian tendencies natural to any nationally-grounded, "home"-rooted ideology, we have to ask again, where is this "home" in which the spiritual and conceptual context is located, if indeed we can posit such a context?

I make this remark in the face of a barrage of writings, texts, and ideological positions spread by popular slogans such as the one above which endeavor to ignore the differences between East and West by focusing on a concept such as "home", as though there were any place on earth outside the sphere of the political, the social and the mediated! Or, to put it differently, "home" in this context is perceived as an intimate and personal site in some way excluded from differentiation, and implying, wrongly, that there exists a "core" whose features such as intimacy, or the feminine, can resist change.

Instead of describing myself as a cyberfeminist from Eastern Europe, I prefer a radical reversal of this Eastern European position or paradigm. I propose to redefine my own Eastern European position (or, if you prefer in Lyotardian terms: my Eastern European condition) as a (post) feminist, as a "cyberfeminist paradigm".
Eastern Europe is to be seen as a Woman paradigm, in other words, as the female side in the process of sexual difference, whether grounding ourselves in the real or the cyberworld. This concept is a very precise one, as it indicates a re-politicization of the real and the cyberworld. It is rooted in a much deeper universal demand for identity, politics, strategy and tactics of action, theorization, emancipation and uselessness (to fight capitalism, we have to insist on a position that is equal to absolute uselessness, which is not productive at all for the capitalist machine). It can be perceived as the militant theorization, on entering the third millennium, of a particular position in the crucial debate regarding ways and modes and, last but not least, protocols for entering the (cyber)space of hopes, uselessness, theory and terror.

To return to radical politics means to demand the universal of politics, and not to be squeezed into the narrow confines of a politics of constant exaggeration and of incessantly renewed identities and needs. This is crucial for an understanding of the changing position of the self and identity.

What becomes apparent here is that in front of the computer console the relation of the subject, along with her body, history, geography, space, etc., takes on a kind of paradoxical communication which is not direct, but a communication with the excrescence behind her, mediated by the third gaze: that of the computing-machine.

What is at stake here is the temporal loss of the subject's symbolic identity: she is forced to perceive that she is not what she thought herself to be. What does this mean? We find ourselves within all media, in all bodies, in all possible spaces at once. This calls into question some fundamental positions concerning art and culture.

Operating from this new standpoint, from a new position of identity, other internal media and social processes are revealed to us. We are faced with leaving a historically defined
historiski definirana pozicija koja gо imitirala pri-
rodniot svet na našite setila. So novite mediumi i tehn-
ologija imame moguost за veshacki interfејs, so koj
vladee neidentitet. Namesto proizveduvaњe na nov iden-
titet, proizvedeno je nesho mnogo poradikalno: цело-
snoto gубeњe на identitetot. Subjektot e prисilen/a da pret-
postavi deka ne e ona што mislел/a deka e, туku nekoj-
neшto сосем друго.

Ова некој-нешто друго што може да се сфати како
telo со географска и организациска политика може исто
tака да се прикачи на реториката и логистиката на прос-
tорот. Може да бидеме однесени некаде и никаде.

Трин Т. Мин-ха предлага модел за пре-обмислува-
ње на азискиот простор и т.н. трет свет преку концептот
на „неприсвоен(иот) Друг“. Ова може да се смета и како
потенцијално корисен алат за развивање специфични кон-
ceptи за читање на поранешната источноевропска тери-
torija. Време е да се најдат и да се пре-напишат парадиг-
ми на специфични простори, уметности и медиумски произ-
dвици во Источна Европа.

Целата Источна Европа функционира како симптом
на состојбата на развиениот Запад, посебно во медиумите
или при користењето авангардни медиуми и арт стратегии. Истражувајќи ги паралелите Исток/Запад, во источноев-
ропските медиуми и артистичка продукција ќе најдеме зна-
чажни примери на перверзната и/или симптоматична логика
на западните медиумски стратегии и визуелната претстава,
искористени на сосем поразлични начини. Ова, на при-
мер, може да се покаже во употребата на порнографската претстава, нешто што се смета/ше како генерално неп-
рифатливо на Запад, бидејќи на порнографијата се гледа
како на дел од комерцијализацијата или консумеризмот
и на телото и на медиумите. Меѓутоа, ако ние во Источна
Европа употребиме порнографија или порнографска визу-
елизација во медиумите како еден вид на политички став
или форма на отпор наместо како сексуална либерализа-
ција, тогаш добиваме комплетно обратно читање на пор-
нографијата и што таа претставува.

position, which imitated the natural world of our senses. With
new media and technology, we have the possibility of an artifi-
cial interface which is dominated by non-identity. Instead of
producing a new identity, something much more radical is pro-
duced: the total loss of identity. The subject is forced to assume
that s/he is not what s/he thought her/himself to be, but some-
boby-something else.

This somebody-something else that can be perceived
as a body with geographical and organizational politics may
also be attached to the rhetoric and logistics of space. We can
be taken elsewhere and nowhere.

Trinh T. Minh-ha has proposed a model for re-thinking
Asian space and the so-called third world through the concept
of the "inappropriate/d Other". This can also be seen as a
possibly useful tool for developing specific concepts for reading
the former Eastern European territory. It is time to find and to
re-write paradigms of specific spaces, arts and media produc-
tions in Eastern Europe.

The whole of Eastern Europe functions as a symptom
of the condition of the developed West, especially in media or
when using avant-garde media and art strategies. In examining
the parallels between East and West, in Eastern European me-
dia and artistic production we can find significant examples of
the perverted and/or symptomatic logic of Western media strat-
egies and visual representation, employed in quite different ways.
This can be shown, for example, in the use of pornographic
representation, which has been something generally not regarded
as acceptable in the West because pornography is seen as
part of the commercialization or consumerism of both the body
and the media. In Eastern Europe, however, if we use pornog-
raphy or pornographic visualization in the media as a political
stance, a form of resistance to political conformity rather than
sexual liberalization, then we get a completely inverted reading
of what pornography represents.
To be more precise, the process of pornographic visualization was effected in Eastern Europe through the externalization of sexuality that had been adopted from the underground film tradition exemplified by Fassbinder, Rosa von Praunheim, Warhol, etc., whose films were shown in underground venues in the 1980's.

The externalization of sexuality took the form of overtly staged pornography and gender confusion ('gender-bending') of gay, lesbian and transvestite sexual attitudes. It was a process that can be simply explained: the sexual and civil rights (!) stereotypes and prototypes were not only consumed in and by the underground, but also immediately performed. In front of a VHS camera, in private rooms and bedrooms, an unparalleled political repositioning of the sexual and social could be acquired. In these works, the masquerade of re-appropriation ensured not only the simple question of the formation of the identity of the artists or of the underground community, but also the process of negotiation required to produce continually ambiguous and unbalanced situations and identities.

The acquired hybrid and non-heterosexual positioning of sexuality, in the context of the remarkably impermeable gender boundaries of Communist Eastern Europe, was a way of overtly politicizing the sexual in Socialism and Communism, and fighting for civil rights.

With regard to the parallels between Eastern European space and Woman: just as Woman is not the "weaker part" of Man ("God's second mistake" - Nietzsche) so Eastern Europe is not simply the distorted mirror or, more accurately, the "ailing member" of the West. However, it is perceived as such - inasmuch as Western Europe wishes to see it as ailing, since for the West, Eastern Europe functions as a deceptive illusion of Western desire. The same can be said for Woman: She can be seen as the "weaker part" of the man but that does not define her ontological status. Similarly, one can say of Eastern Europe that it may be a "symptom" of the West's condition but that does not define its ontological status either.
In the dawn of the third millennium, collective, simultaneous processes of reception and communication in cyberspace have become a determining metaphor for the new media environment. What is happening on the Internet is increasingly seen and utilized as the "new" public space. The Internet and the World Wide Web are becoming spaces which are not only parallel to the existing public one but are also increasingly becoming a substitute for it. So called public opinion is being formulated via the Internet and is perhaps replacing any actual public opinion.

Firsthand information transmitted via email and then spread through the Web, but without additional analysis and reflection, is sometimes enough to lead certain people to proclaim that they are also taking part in the media revolution because they are obtaining firsthand and "eyewitness" information through the Net; although the community on the Net and its opinions are, in most cases, the sum total of read-and-forwarded messages and the information obtained therein.

An important issue concerning the Internet today, following the decade of the fall of the Berlin Wall, is to identify who the old and the new actors are in the construction of this brave new world (which could be renamed the World Wide Web); and to ask, who is allowed to develop a criticism of the Internet? Generally speaking, I have identified two broad lines of critical thought that form positioning matrices in this debate.

The first emphasizes individuals or groups linked neither historically nor geographically, but who consciously take the position of the counter-culture. I name this position the "Scum of Society Matrix" - not as a mere critical label but to indicate that this matrix represents a condition of life and activism, a...
Marina Grzinic
MONSTROUS BODIES AND SUBVERSIVE ERRORS

odka matrica pretstavuva sostojba na zhivot i aktivizam, parazit koji живее vo institucionalni i nevladini strukturi. Se odnesuva glavno na pozicijata na t.n. kritichki ucesnici - korisnici od Zapadna Evropa i Severna Amerika i na krougovite na zaednici na internet, koji oformujuat eden vid parazitsko telo obiduvajcki se da iscedat shto e moeno povekte od postoeckite sozialni strukturi. "Matricata na otpadnici od opsthestvoto" predlaga nova, avtonoma ekoonomija i novi strukturi razvjeni so prezemanje i re-structurirane na t.n. stari strukturi.

As Peter Lamborn Wilson, alias Hakim Bey, stated in the lecture at the Nettime meeting "Beauty and The East" in Ljubljana in 1997, it seems that the second world has been erased and what is left is the first and third world. Instead of the second world, Bey argued, there is a big hole from which one jumps into the third. To extend the metaphor of the title of the Nettime conference with its reference to the fairy tale, I will call this hole and my second line of thought "The Matrix of Monsters".

When it comes to the differences between East and West, it should be made clear that the actors from the black hole, i.e. the Eastern European web-users who are critical of the WWW, do not want to merely mirror the first world's "developed, capitalist societies", but to articulate and interpret, and further, to adopt a distinctive position in this changed constellation.

"The Monsters" insist on pointing out a difference - a critical inherent difference, not simply a special classification method based on markers, such as apartheid, as Trinh T. Minh-ha suggests. The question of who is allowed to write about the history of art, culture and politics in the area once known as Eastern Europe has to be posed along with the questions of how and when important political, cultural and media events are marked. The following questions or synthetic moments are crucial, as formulated by Yvonne Volkart: "Which spaces do subjects and agents cross when they communicate? What do they call themselves? Are they subjects, cyborgs, monsters, nomads or simply hackers?"
Мораме да се запрашаме кој простор, кои актери, чии агенти и кои субјекти? Концептите на матрицата, структурата, позицијата и констелацијата треба да се гледаат и сфакаат стриктно теоретски а не на егзистенцијален начин.

Овој обид да се дефинира нова позиција на субјектот е беспрекорно покриен, посебно со оглед на потенцијалните средства за организација на Интернет и во вистинскиот свет.

Дона Харевич го измисли „киборгот“ и ни дозволи да сфатиме нешто многу поважно: дека секој може да биде повторно измислен како таков; секој може да биде во позицијата на киборгот, на „совршениот изметски остаток“. Баш како што едно време беше пролетеријатот, така киборгот денес не е нешто предефинирано, т.е. особините кои го диференцираат киборгот од другиот не се объективни, позитивно дефинирани и разбрани. Позитивна дефиниција на киборгот не постои однапред, туку се оформува точно во моментот на поjavувањето; не постои позитивна разграничувачка особина. Позиционирањето е еднакво на реполитизацијата. Можеме да прашуваме и понатаму: со што "исметскиот отпадок" заслужува повторно измислување? Мојот одговор е дека оваа реинвенција мора да се види и сфати во смисла на значење и позиционирање. Појавата не е дека сајбер-феминистичкиот идентитет одновно да се открие себеси, туку дека оваа реинвенција ке биде ре-артикулирана, препрочитана преку теорија.

Кажав дека на крајот на милијумов, двете матрици, западноевропската „Матрица на отпадниците од општеството“ и источноевропската „Матрица на монструмите“, не само што поставуваат прашања за размислување, туку и нагласуваат елементи на политички и аналитички пресек кои треба уште порадикално да се дискутираат и артикулираат.
Establishing the difference between East and West on historical premises only is extremely limiting, and I would like to proceed in a different way, albeit in a way not indifferent to history. I will attempt to explicate some generative principles behind the matrices and their complex functioning, and try also to explain why the Eastern Europe paradigm is to be seen as a 'Woman paradigm' or as the female side in the process of sexual differentiation, as a means of grounding ourselves in (cyber)space. The "Monsters' Matrix" acts in comparison to the Western Matrix as a purely theoretical entity, and as such is fully permissible.

Thesis One: That East and West, despite our constantly redefining them, are not predicates (positively existing entities); which means that the label East or West, rather than increasing our knowledge of the subject, qualifies the mode of failure of our knowledge; and failure is assumed, according to Copjec, to be inherent.

Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment first made the distinction between the two ways in which reason falls into contradiction with itself. In both works, he demonstrated that the failure of reason was not simple, but based upon an antinomic impasse through two separate routes: the first failure was mathematical; the second was dynamical. The first thing to note is that the two propositions that compose each side appear to have an antinomic relation to each other, i.e., they appear to contradict each other. Subsequently, in his Seminar XX entitled Encore, drawing upon the Kantian antinomic relations, Lacan defined the two formulas of sexuation (Of Sexual Difference) as two ways, or paths, of failure: the male and the female.

In her book Read my Desire: Lacan against the Historicists, which may be defined as a user's manual of Lacanism, Joan Copjec strongly emphasized these two antinomic ways as two ways of failure. The antinomies and the formulas of sexuation are presented through a scheme that is clearly divided between
шематски прикажани со јасно подвоени леви и десни страни. Левата страна на шемата е назначена како машка страна, а десната е женска. Левата, машка страна одговара на кантовските динамички антиномии, а десната, женска страна, одговара на кантовските математички антиномии.

Втора теза: Источноевропската Матрица на монструми е истородна со десната, женска страна, ја окупира, и затоа ја претставува кантовската математичка грешка, а пак западноевропската Матрица на отпадниците од општеството е истородна со левата, машка страна, односно кантовската динамичка грешка.

Во неверица, ќе запрашате: како е можно ова? Што дозволува ваква истородна позиција?

Од суштинска важност е што Лакан, во неговите формули на сексуација, ги употребува термините аргумент и функција наместо субјект и предикат (кои се спомнуваат во формулите на Кант). Оваа замена означува важна, а за нас и критична, концептуална разлика.

Принципот на класификација (се мисли помеѓу Исток и Запад) веќе не е дескриптивен, т.е. не е прашање на исти особини или заедничка материја. Коме Јелиќ вели „Дали некој припаѓа во класата на мажи или жени (или, јас би додала во матрицата на грешки „Отпадници“ или „Монструми“ - MG) зависи, всушност, од тоа која позиција ќе се заземе“.

Антимоните треба да се гледаат како позиции на Мебиусова лента, односно како континууми на разлики.

Постои неоспорна асиметрија помеѓу математичките и динамичните антиномии. Повторно според Јелиќ, кога се движење од една до друга, како да влегуваме во сосема различен простор.

the left and right sides. The left side of the scheme is designated as the male side, while the right side is female. The left, male side corresponds to the Kantian dynamical antinomies, and the right, female side, corresponds to the Kantian mathematical antinomies.

Thesis Two: That the Eastern European Monsters' Matrix occupies, and is homologous with, the right, female side, and therefore represents the Kantian mathematical failure; while the Western European Scum of Society Matrix is homologous with the left, male side, or the Kantian dynamical failure.

Dubious, you may ask: How is this possible? What permits such a homologous position?

Of crucial importance is the fact that Lacan, in his formulas of sexuation, employs the terms argument and function instead of subject and predicate (as they are referred to in the Kantian formulas). This substitution marks an important, and for us a critical, conceptual difference.

The principle of classification (between East and West, I mean) is no longer descriptive, i.e., it is not a matter of shared characteristics or of common substance. Copjec states, "Whether one falls into the class of males or females (and I would add, whether one falls into the Scum or the Monsters failure matrix - MG) depends, rather, which enunciative position one assumes."

The antinomies should be read as positions on a Moebius strip, i.e., as a continuum of differences.

There is an unmistakable asymmetry between the mathematical and the dynamical antinomies Again, according to Copjec, on moving from one to the other, we seem to enter a completely different space.
I am not starting with the Monsters just to get some sympathy. Contrary to the fairly common prejudice that psychoanalysis constructs the Woman as secondary - as a mere alteration of man - these formulas suggest, according to Copjec, that there is a kind of priority, an advantage of sorts on the right side.

This reading of the formulas is also consistent with the privileged position accorded the mathematical antinomies by Kant, who grants the mathematical synthesis a more immediate certitude than its dynamical counterpart. In Kant's analysis, it is the dynamical antinomies (the male side of the formula, or the Western European's Scum Matrix in our reading) that appear in many ways secondary, a kind of resolution to the more complete impasse manifested by the mathematical conflict. I will proceed in a very schematic way to reach my point.

What is a mathematical antinomy? First, every antinomy is composed of two propositions: thesis and antithesis. The mathematical antinomy we borrowed from Kant is occasioned by the attempt, generally speaking, to think the world. The thesis of the mathematical antinomy is this: the world has a beginning in time and is also limited in regard to space. The antithesis of the same mathematical antinomy is this: the world has no beginning and no limits in space but is, in relation to both time and space, infinite.

"After examining both arguments, Kant concludes that while each successfully demonstrates the falsity of the other, neither is able to establish convincingly its own truth. This conclusion creates a skeptical impasse, and the solution he arrives at is the following: rather than despairing over the fact that we cannot choose between the two alternatives, we must come to the realization that we need not choose, since both alternatives are false. The thesis and antithesis, which initially
appeared to constitute a contradictory opposition, turn out to be contraries.\textsuperscript{4}

We might note that the structure of a contrary opposition that we find in a mathematical antinomy is demonstrated by the kind of joke Slavoj Zizek uses widely in his lectures:

In your village there are no cannibals anymore.  
When did you eat the last one?

The form of the question does not allow the addressee to negate the accusation implicit in the question, but only to choose among contraries. Having demonstrated the impossibility of the existence of the world, Kant can then dismiss both the statements of thesis and antithesis. Kant's two statements regarding the solution of the first mathematical antinomy formally reduplicate those that Lacan gives for Woman, who, like the world, does not exist.

Lacan argues that a concept of "Woman" cannot be constructed because the task of fully unfolding her conditions cannot, in actuality, be carried out. Since we are finite beings, bound by space and time, our knowledge is subject to historical conditions.

And here we come to the most important point: "The existence of Woman is not only denied; it is also not condemnable as a normative and exclusionary notion; on the contrary, the Lacanian position argues that it is only by refusing to deny - or confirm - her existence that normative and exclusionary thinking can be avoided. That is, it is only by acknowledging that a concept of Woman cannot exist, that it is structurally impossible within the symbolic order, that each historical construction of her can be challenged. After all, nothing prohibits these historical constructions from asserting their universal truth; witness the historical assertion that a general, trans-historical category of Woman does not exist."\textsuperscript{5}
It is crucial to see that Woman is the consequence, and not the cause, of the nonfunctioning of negation. She is the failure of the limit, not the cause of the failure.6

Now, following this rather crude and schematic cutting up of one part of the excellent chapter on the forms of sexuation in Copjec’s book Read my Desire: Lacan against the Histori­cists, we must return to our Monsters Matrix - to accept the consequences of such a homologous position.

Thesis Three: Similarly to Lacan’s positing the nonexistence of Woman, we can speak of the nonexistence of the Matrix of Monsters. If the Matrix of Monsters does not exist, this is because it cannot be found. The Matrix of Monsters cannot be constructed because the task of fully unfolding its conditions cannot, in actuality, be carried out. Our conception of the (Matrix of) Monsters cannot run ahead of these limits and thus, we cannot construct a concept of the whole of the Matrix.7

The existence of the (Matrix of) Monsters is not only denied; it is also not condemnable as a normative and exclusionary notion; on the contrary, the Lacanian position argues that it is only by refusing to deny - or confirm - its existence that normative and exclusionary thinking can be avoided. That is, it is only by acknowledging that a concept of the (Matrix of) Monsters cannot exist, that it is structurally impossible within the symbolic order, that each historical construction of this Matrix can be challenged. As long as it can be demonstrated that the world or the (Matrix of) Monsters cannot form a whole, a universe, then the possibility of judging whether or not these phenomena or signifiers give us information about a reality independent of us vanishes.

It is crucial to see that the Matrix of Monsters, to paraphrase Copjec, is the consequence, and not the cause, of the nonfunctioning of negation. It is the failure of the limit, not the cause of the failure.
THE LEFT, MALE SIDE:
DYNAMICAL FAILURE
and the Western European
"Scum of Society Matrix"

Where the thesis and antithesis of the mathematical antinomies were both deemed to be false because both illegitimately asserted the existence of the world, the thesis and antithesis of the dynamical antinomies, the dynamical failure, are both deemed by Kant to be true. In the first case, the conflict between the two propositions was thought to be irresolvable (since they made contradictory claims about the same object); in the case of dynamical failure, the conflict is resolved by the assertion that the two statements do not contradict each other.

The thesis of the dynamical antinomy is, according to Kant, the following: Causality according to the laws of nature is not the only causality operating to originate the world. A causality of freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena. The Kantian antithesis of the dynamical antinomy, or failure, is: There is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world happens solely according to the laws of nature.

Kant says that the antithesis in the dynamic antinomy is true, just as Lacan confirms the existence of the universe of men. Since the existence of the universe was regarded, in the case of Woman, as impossible because no limit could be found to the chain of signifiers, it would be logical to assume that the formation of the all on the male side, in fact, depends on the positing of a limit.

The shift from the female to the male side is a subtraction. The thesis and antithesis of the mathematical failure, according to Kant, said too much. On the dynamical side, this surplus is subtracted, and it is this subtraction that instalts the limit. It means that on this side it will always be a matter of saying too little. Incompleteness on the dynamic side, and inconsistency on the mathematical side.
Furthermore, according to Copjec, the question of existence that caused the conflict on the female side is silenced on the male side because it is, precisely, existence - or being - that is subtracted from the universe that is formed here. Kant taught us that if one were to say that a man existed, one would add absolutely nothing to this man, or to the concept of man. Thus we could argue that this concept lacks nothing. And yet, it does not include being, and is in this sense inadequate.

Again, the two failures or forms of sexuation according to Lacan consist of the following: the woman and the man are not to be treated symmetrically nor conceived as complements of each other. One category does not complete, or make up for what is lacking in, the other. While the universe of women is simply impossible, a universe of men is possible only on the condition that we except something from this universe. The universe of men is then an illusion based, according to Copjec, on a paradoxical prohibition: do not include everything in your all! The sexual relation fails for two reasons: it is impossible, and it is prohibited. And this is why we will never come up with a whole.

For an easy solution we could say that, like the Eastern European Monsters Matrix, the Western European Scum of Society Matrix does not exist. But there is no problem in locating it on the left side, homologous to the Lacanian sexuation table. Kant taught us that, if one were to say that the Western European Scum of Society Matrix existed, one would add absolutely nothing to the concept of the Western European Scum of Society Matrix. Rather than defining a universe of men that is complemented by a universe of women, we can define, relying on Lacan, the Western European Scum of Society Matrix (MALE SIDE) as the prohibition against constructing a universe, and the Eastern European Monsters Matrix (FEMALE SIDE) as the impossibility of doing so.

Because of this implicit impossibility of constructing a universe, we have constantly to re-locate ourselves.
This is why positioning and re-articulation means re-politicization.

2. A failure, an error and a virus

It is not really a question of going to distant geopolitical spaces such as Africa, Asia or even Eastern Europe, it is, rather, about the capitalization of ideas and concepts becoming territory in itself. Theory is such a territory, as is the Internet with the World Wide Web. These huge new territories, expanded and evolved on numerous servers, allow Capital, the most internal vehicle of Capitalism at its purest, an even faster triplication. Theory, art and culture are huge archives, and it is the same with our bodies. That everything can be transformed into a territory for the expansion of Capital is something that is fundamental to capitalism. In this way, the idea of territory itself changes radically.

The year 2000 brought with it a completely different idea of how we think about territory. Territory as a pure geopolitical space is gone. Territory has become a much broader concept. Our intellectual concepts, our books, our works and, last but not least, all our archives are the new territories. Contributing concepts is, therefore, a gesture of expanding and broadening the concept of territory itself.

The second crucial change that has an effect on EAST and WEST, SOUTH and NORTH is that in the eighties, it was enough to be VISIBLE; [at] @2000 it is a question of re-articulation, and moreover, re-location, much more than pure visibility.

In today’s world, photographic, electronic and digital images are at the point of effective disintegration. Even with a very small PC, we can manipulate any image. Photographic images especially are losing their credibility, as, for example in the process of judging world events. Images, and especially photography, have reached the point where their internal reality is questioned. This is not simply a question of truth or falsity.
Questions of plausibility and implausibility override those concerning whether an image is simply true or false. The problem, therefore, no longer has to do with mental images and consciousness only, but with the paradoxical facticity of new media images, especially computer-generated photographic images. If art poses, according to Scott Bukatman, the enigma of the body, then technique poses the enigma of art.

In such a context it is possible to establish an important connection between the image and the power structures that form and surround it and to approach the video or film image, etc., as part of a larger system of visual and representational communication. This approach is fundamentally politics of representation in terms of the video and media image is not something that is directly connected with everyday politics but it is connected in so far as the aesthetics of the image is always inscribed in a field of power. Power takes different forms; therefore, electronic and media images as a form of representation have different connections with different types of power.

Cyberspace treats material as a toxic agent. Materiality is extracted from cyberspace and reduced from object to abject - to a senseless, obscene intervention (Julia Kristeva, Critical Art Ensemble and Pell). Something similar is happening with the body. It is possible to identify a process of estrangement: the body is a malfunctioning machine (Katarzyna Kozyra, Poland), or bodies are having love affairs between servers (Olia Lialina, Russia) waiting for a possible re-articulation. From an acrobat to an experimental engine, the body may take up any position, as exemplified by, in this order, Marina Abramovic (Yugoslavia/Netherlands), Vlasta Delimar (Croatia), Egle Rakauskaite (Lithuania) Sanja Ivekovic (Croatia). In the case of Marina Abramovic the body is a screen used for all sorts of changes including the complete masquerading of identity; Vlasta Delimar is the living work herself: she presents herself as the reservoir of the virus, reminding us of her potentiality waiting to become a
The introduction of errors, failures, potential bodies and viruses in perfect, simulated environments and the cyberworld can be viewed, therefore, as a means to developing new aesthetic and conceptual strategies, since the error as abject - an object of horror and disgust - cannot be integrated into the matrix. We can actually think about the error, in the words of Jacques Derrida, as a way of developing the logic of re-marking (re-marque). The logic of re-marking is similar to the function of the error or of the symptom, where what at first seemed an informative, general view of an event - a shot, so to speak, from a neutral, objective distance - suddenly turns out to be both threatening and embodied. The error is actually ‘the thing’ itself; it is the subject that is speaking, and tells more than the subject itself.

What characterizes the replacement of the depth of space by the depth of time is a splitting of viewpoint, the sharing of perception of the environment between the animate (the living subject), the inanimate (the object, the seeing machine) and, from now on, the abject (the error, mistake, failure). The vision(s) of this viewpoint, its visualizations, are what is already there in the eye of the camera(s), remaining in a state of latent immediacy in the huge junk heap of the stuff of memory, wanting to reappear, inexorably, when the time comes (Paul Virilio). To reappropriate the place of this memory, of virtual memory, in the modern way means, therefore, not to leave any more traces - as virtual memory is no longer a function of the past, but of the future - but instead to leave mistakes, errors, and failures! The speed at which TV and radio information circulates (in terms of one way distribution) has already been overtaken by the static speed of computer calculations; this means the speed of Internet
connections becomes more and more important. A failure, an error, a mistake is, therefore, the route leading to a transformation from the subject to the abject, which with its senseless, obscene intervention, can be perceived as the new (failed!) subject position.8

NOTES

1 Quotation from the essay by Yvonne Volkart "Stubborn Practices in the Age of Information and Biotechnology", written as a part of her curatorial project Tenacity: Cultural Practices in the Age of Information and Biotechnology, presented at the Swiss Institute, New York, 2000 and at the Stedhale, Zurich, 2000.


3 Ibid., p. 217.

4 Ibid., p. 218.

5 Ibid., p. 225.

6 Ibid., p. 226.

7 Ibid., p. 221.

8 I would like to express my gratitude for the English language editing of the present paper to Tina Horne and as well to Verena Kuni and Claudia Reiche for their engagement in the production, distribution and future publishing of this essay. I would like to acknowledge the support in preparation of this essay (discussion and invitation to Skopje to share, present and partly publish the essay) by dr. Nebojsa Vilic, Suzana Milevska and dr. Elizabeta Seleva.

REFERENCE


identities
Уrging judges to "use the tools of law as women, for all women" alarms universalist philosophers. These are the philosophers who think that moral theory should come up with principles which mention no group smaller than "persons" or "human beings" or "rational agents". Such philosophers would be happier if MacKinnon talked less about accountability to women as women and more about an ideal Minnesota, or an ideal America, one in which all human beings would be treated impartially. Univeralists would prefer to think of feminism as Mary
Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges did, as a matter of rights which are already recognizable and describable, although not yet granted. This describability, they feel, makes MacKinnon's hope for a voice saying something never heard before unnecessary, overly dramatic, hyperbolic.

Universalist philosophers assume, with Kant, that all the logical space necessary for moral deliberation is now available - that all important truths about right and wrong can not only be stated, but be made plausible, in language already to hand. I take MacKinnon to be siding with historicists like Hegel and Dewey, and to be saying that moral progress depends upon expanding this space. She illustrates the need for such expansion when she notes that present sex-discrimination law assumes that women "have to meet either the male standard for males or the male standard for females...For purposes of sex discrimination law, to be a woman means either to be like a man or to be like a lady."² In my terms, MacKinnon is saying that unless women fit into the logical space prepared for them by current linguistic and other practices, the law does not know how to deal with them. MacKinnon cites the example of a judicial decision that permitted women to be excluded from employment as prison guards, because they are so susceptible to rape. The court, she continues, "took the viewpoint of the reasonable rapist on women's employment opportunities".³ "The conditions that create women's rapeability as the definition of womanhood were not even seen as susceptible to change."⁴

McKinnon thinks that such assumptions of unchangeability will only be overcome once we can hear "what women
Pointing to the logical space that may need to be expanded before justice can be envisaged, much less done, McKinnon's point that logical space may need to be expanded before justice can be envisaged, much less done, can be restated in terms of John Rawls' claim that moral theorizing is a matter of attaining reflective equilibrium between general principles and particular intuitions-particular reactions of revulsion, horror, satisfaction, or delight to real or imagined situations or actions. McKinnon sees moral and legal principles, particularly those phrased in terms of equal rights, as impotent to change those reactions. So she sees feminists as needing to alter the data of moral theory rather than needing to formulate principles which fit pre-existent data better. Feminists are trying to get people to feel indifference or satisfaction where they once recoiled, and revulsion and rage where they once felt indifference or resignation.
misuses of language-familiar words used in ways which initially sound crazy. Something traditionally regarded as a moral abomination can become an object of general satisfaction, or conversely, as a result of the increased popularity of an alternative description of what is happening. Such popularity extends logical space by making descriptions of situations which used to seem crazy seem sane. Once, for example, it would have sounded crazy to describe homosexual sodomy as a touching expression of devotion, or to describe a woman manipulating the elements of the Eucharist as a figuration of the relation of the Virgin to her Son. But such descriptions are now acquiring popularity. At most times, it sounds crazy to describe the degradation and extirpation of helpless minorities as a purification of the moral and spiritual life of Europe. But at certain periods and places—under the Inquisition, during the Wars of Religion, under the Nazis—it did not.

Universalistic moral philosophers think that the notion of "violation of human rights" provides sufficient conceptual resources to explain why some traditional occasions of revulsion really are moral abominations and others only appear to be. They think of moral progress as an increasing ability to see the reality behind the illusions created by superstition, prejudice, and unreflective custom. The typical universalist is a moral realist, someone who thinks that true moral judgments are made true by something out there in the world. Universalists typically take this truth-maker to be the intrinsic features of human beings qua human. They think you can sort out the real from the illusory abominations by figuring out which those intrinsic features are, and that all that is required to figure this out is hard, clear, thought.

Historicists, by contrast, think that if "intrinsic" means "ahistorical, untouched by historical change", then the only in-
trinsic features of human beings are those they share with the brutes—for example, the ability to suffer and inflict pain. Every other feature is up for grabs. Historicists say, with Susan Hurley, that "the existence of certain shared practices, any of which might not have existed, is all that our having determinate reasons...to do anything rests on." So they think that we are not yet in a position to know what human beings are, since we do not yet know what practices human beings may start sharing. Univeralists talk as if any rational agent, at any epoch, could somehow have envisaged all the possible morally relevant differences, all the possible moral identities, brought into existence by such shared practices. But for MacKinnon, as for Hegel and Dewey, we know, at most, only those possibilities which history has actualized so far. MacKinnon's central point, as I read her, is that "a woman" is not yet the name of a way of being human—not yet the name of a moral identity, but, at most, the name of a disability.

Taking seriously the idea of as yet unrealized possibilities, and of as yet unrecognized moral abominations resulting from failure to envisage those possibilities, requires one to take seriously the suggestion that we do not presently have the logical space necessary for adequate moral deliberation. Only if such suggestions are taken seriously can passages like the one I quoted from MacKinnon be read as prophesy rather than empty hyperbole. But this means revising our conception of moral progress. We have to stop talking about the need to go from distorted to undistorted perception of moral reality, and instead talk about the need to modify our practices so as to take account of new descriptions of what has been going on.

Here is where pragmatist philosophy might be useful to feminist politics. For pragmatism redescribes both intellectual and moral progress by substituting metaphors of evolutionary development for metaphors of progressively less distorted perception. By dropping a representationalist account of knowl-
Токму тука прагматистичката философия може да биде полезна за феминистичката политика. Имено, прагматизмот ги преопишува како интелектуалниот, така и моралниот напредок, заменувајќи ги метафорите на се помалку изобличена перцепција со метафорите на еволутивниот развој. Отфрлајќи го репрезентационалистичкото објаснување на знаењето, ние прагматистите ја отфрламе дистинкцијата појава-реалност во полза на дистинкцијата помеѓу верувањата кои им служат на некои цели и верувањата кои им служат на други цели - на пример, целите на една и оние на некоја друга група. Нија ја отфрламе замислата дека реалноста е она што ги прави верувањата вистинити, како и дистинкцијата помеѓу интринсичните и акциденталните одлики на нештата. Така, ние ги отфрламе пракањата за (според фразата на Нелсон Гудмен (Nelson Goodman)) Начинот на кој Светот Е. Оттаму, ги отфрламе и идејата за Природата на Човештвото и за Моралниот Закон, сфатени како објекти кои истражувањето настојува точно да ги претстави, или како објекти кои вистинитите морални судови ги прават вистинити. Така, треба да се откажеме од удобното верување дека ривалските групи секогаш ќе бидат способни да расудуваат заедно врз основа на плаза,ќ и неутрални премиси.

Од прагматистички агол, ниту христијанството, ниту просветителството, ниту современиот феминизам, не се случаи на когнитивна јаснота која го надраснува когнитивното изобличување. Наместо тоа, секој од нив е пример на еволутивна борба - борба којашто не е раководена од никаква иманентна телеологија. Историјата на човечките социјални практики е во континуитет со историјата на биолошката еволуција, а единствената разлика е во тоа што она коешто Ричард Докинс (Richard Dawkins) и Даниел Денет (Daniel Dennett) го нарекуваат „меми“ постепено ја презема улогата на Менделовите (Mendel) гени. Мемите се нешта како јазични обрти, изрази на естетична или морална пофалба, политички слогани, пословици, музички фрази, стереотипски икони и слично. Мемите не само што се натпреваруваат за расположливот културен простор како што гените се натпреваруваат за располож-
No gene or meme is closer to the purpose of evolution or to the nature of humanity than any other—for evolution has no purpose and humanity no nature. So the moral world does not divide into the intrinsically decent and the intrinsically abominable, but rather into the goods of different groups and different epochs. As Dewey put it, "The worse or evil is a rejected good. In deliberation and before choice no evil presents itself as evil. Until it is rejected, it is a competing good. After rejection, it figures not as a lesser good, but as the bad of that situation." On a Deweyan view, the replacement of one species by another in a given ecological niche, or the enslavement of one human tribe or race by another, or of the human females by the human males, is not an intrinsic evil. The latter is a rejected good, rejected on the basis of the greater good which feminism is presently making imaginable. The claim that this good is greater is like the claim that mammals are preferable to reptiles, or Aryans to Jews; it is an ethnocentric claim made from the point of view of a given cluster of genes or memes. There is no larger entity which stands behind that cluster and makes its claim true (or makes some contradictory claim true).

Pragmatists like myself think that this Deweyan account of moral truth and moral progress comports better with the prophetic tone in contemporary feminism than do universalism and realism. Prophecy, as we see it, is all that non-violent political movements can fall back on when argument fails. Argument for the rights of the oppressed will fail just insofar as the only language in which to state relevant premises is one in which the relevant emancipatory premises sound crazy.

We pragmatists see universalism and realism as committed to the idea of a reality-tracking faculty called "reason" and an unchanging moral reality to be tracked, and thus unable to make sense of the claim that a new voice is needed. So we
commend ourselves to feminists on the ground that we can fit that claim into our view of moral progress with relative ease.

We see it as unfortunate that many feminists intermingle pragmatist and realist rhetoric. For example, MacKinnon at one point defines feminism as the belief "that women are human beings in truth but not in social reality."12 The phrase "in truth" here can only mean "in a reality which is distinct from social reality", one which is as it is whether or not women ever succeed in saying what has never been heard. Such invocations of an ahistoricist realism leave it unclear whether MacKinnon sees women as appealing from a bad social practice to something which transcends social practice, appealing from appearance to reality, or instead sees them as doing the same sort of thing as the early Christians, the early socialists, the Albigensians, and the Nazis did: trying to actualize hitherto undreamt-of possibilities by putting new linguistic and other practices into play, and erecting new social constructs.13

Some contemporary feminist philosophers are sympathetic to the latter alternative, because they explicitly reject universalism and realism. They do so because they see both as symptoms of what Derrida has called "phallogocentrism"—what MacKinnon calls "the epistemological stance...of which male dominance is the politics."14 Other such philosophers, however, warn against accepting the criticisms of universalism and realism common to Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida—against finding an ally in what is sometimes called "postmodernism". Sabina Lovibond, for example, cautions against throwing Enlightenment universalism and realism overboard. "How can any one ask me to say goodbye to 'emancipatory metanarratives'?, she asks, "when my own emancipation is still such a patchy, hit-or-miss affair?"15 Lovibond's universalism comes out when
I share Lovibond's doubts about the apocalyptic tone, and the rhetoric of unmasking, prevalent among people who believe that we are living in a "postmodern" period. But, on all the crucial philosophical issues, I am on the side of Lovibond's postmodernist opponents. I hope that feminists will continue to consider the possibility of dropping realism and universalism, dropping the notion that the subordination of women is intrinsically abominable, dropping the claim that there is something called "right" or "justice" or "humanity" which has always been on their side, making their claims true. I agree with those whom Lovibond paraphrases as saying "the Enlightenment rhetoric of 'emancipation', 'autonomy' and the like is complicit in a fantasy of escape from the embodied condition". In particular, it is complicit in the fantasy of escape from an historical situation into an ahistoricist empyrean--one in which moral theory can be pursued, like Euclidean geometry, within an unalterable, unextendable, logical space. Although practical politics will doubtless often require feminists to speak with the universalist vulgar, I think that they might profit from thinking with the pragmatists.

One of the best things about contemporary feminism, it seems to me, is its ability to eschew such Enlightenment fantasies of escape. My favorite passages in MacKinnon are ones in which she says things like "we are not attempting to be objective
Richard Rorty  FEMINISM AND PRAGMATISM

Feminists(к)ите се многу помалку од марксистите наклонети кон запагање во удобната доктрина на иманентна телеологија. Голем дел од феминистичките списи можат да бидат читани како да велат: Није не повикаување од фаличкиот привид кон нефаличката реалност. Није не велиме дека гласот со кој еден ден ќе зборуваат жените подобро ќе ја претставува реалноста одколку денешниот маскулнистички дискурс. Није не целиме кон невозможната задача на развивање на еден нехегемонистички дискурс, таков во кој вистината повеке не е поврзана со моќта. Не се обидуваме да ги укинеме социјалните конструкти со цел да изнајдеме нешто кошто не е социјален конструкт. Само се обидуваме да им помогнеме на жените да излезат од стапиците кои за нив ги конструирале мажите, да им помогнеме да ја здобијат моќта која сега ја немаат, и да им помогнеме да создадат морален идентитет како жени.

Pорано докажував дека дјуиевскиот прагматизам, лингвистификуван во насоката сугерирана од Хилари Путнам (Hilary Putnam) и Доналд Дејвидсон (Donald Davidson), го обезбедува сето она коешто е политички полезно во традицијата Ните-Хайдегер-Деррида-Фуко. Јас тврдам дека прагматизмот ги нуди сите дијалектички предности на постмодернизмот, а ја одбенува самопротивречната постмодернистичка реторика на демаскирањето. Прифаќам дека во онаа мерка во која феминистите ја усвојуваат дјуиевската реторика од тукушто опишаниот вид, тие се обидуваат да ги навлекуваат на себеси социјалните обвинувања за релативизам, ирационализам и обожување на моќта. Но, сметам дека предностите претежно се над овие недостатоци. Опишуваните се обвинувања за социјалните конструкти на дјуиевски начин, феминист(к)ите би се грижеле за себе од барањето на Ловиборд за една општа теорија на угнетувањето - начин на согледување на угнетувањето врз основа на расата, класата, сексуалните преференции и родот, како примери на генерален неуспех во третирањето на еднаквите како еднакви. Со тоа, тие би се одбачале неволите на универсалистичкиот

about it, we're attempting to represent the point of view of women.20 Feminists are much less inclined that Marxists were to fall back on a comfortable doctrine of immanent teleology. There is a lot of feminist writing which can be read as saying: we are not appealing from phallist appearance to non-phallist reality. We are not saying that the voice in which women will some day speak will be better at representing reality than present-day masculist discourse. We are not attempting the impossible task of developing a non-hegemonic discourse, one in which truth is no longer connected with power. We are not trying to do away with social constructs in order to find something that is not a social construct. We are just trying to help women out of the traps men have constructed for them, help them get the power they do not presently have, and help them create a moral identity as women.

I have argued in the past that Deweyan pragmatism, when linguistified along the lines suggested by Hilary Putnam and Donald Davidson, gives you all that is politically useful in the Nietzsche-Heidegger-Derrida-Foucault tradition. Pragmatism, I claim, offers all the dialectical advantages of postmodernism while avoiding the self-contradictory postmodernist rhetoric of unmasking. I admit that insofar as feminists adopt a Deweyan rhetoric of the sort I have just described, they commit themselves to a lot of apparent paradoxes, and incur the usual charges of relativism, irrationalism and power-worship. But these disadvantages are, I think, outweighed by the advantages. By describing themselves in Deweyan terms, feminists would free themselves from Lovibond's demand for a general theory of oppression—a way of seeing oppression on the basis of race, class, sexual preference, and gender as so many instances of a general failure to treat equals equally. They would thereby avoid the embarrassments of the universalist claim that the term "human being"—or even the term "woman"—names an unchanging essence, an ahistorical natural kind with a permanent set of intrinsic features. Further, they would no longer need to raise what seem to me unanswerable questions about the accuracy
of their representations of "woman's experience". They would instead see themselves as creating such an experience by creating a language, a tradition, and an identity.

So much for an overview of my reasons for trying to bring feminism and pragmatism together. I want now to enlarge on my claim that a pragmatist feminist will see herself as helping to create women rather than attempting to describe them more accurately. I shall do so by taking up two objections which might be made to what I have been saying. The first is the famil-
major charge that pragmatism is inherently conservative, biased in favor of the status quo. The second objection arises from the fact that if you say that women need to be created rather than simply freed, you seem to be saying that in some sense women do not now fully exist. But then there seems no basis for saying that men have done women wrong, since you cannot wrong the non-existent.

Hilary Putnam, the most important contemporary philosopher to call himself a pragmatist, has said that "a statement is true of a situation just in case it would be correct to use the words of which the statement consists in that way in describing the situation". Putting the matter this way immediately suggests the question: correct by whose standards? Putnam's position that "truth and rational acceptability are interdependent notions" makes it hard to see how we might ever appeal from the oppressive conventions of our community to something non-conventional, and thus hard to see how we could ever engage in anything like "radical critique." So it may seem that we pragmatists, in our frenzied efforts to undercut epistemological skepticism by doing away with what Davidson calls "the scheme-content distinction," have also undercut political radicalism.

Pragmatists should reply to this charge by saying that they cannot make sense of an appeal from our community's practices to anything except the practice of a real or imagined alternative community. So when prophetic feminists say that it is not enough to make the practices of our community coherent, that the very language of our community must be subjected to radical critique, pragmatists add that such critique can only take the form of imagining a community whose linguistic and other practices are different from our own. Once one grants McKinnon's point that one can only get so far with an appeal to make present beliefs more coherent by treating women on a par...
This means that one will praise movements of liberation not for the accuracy of their diagnoses but for the imagination and courage of their proposals. The difference between pragmatism and positions such as Marxism, which retain the rhetoric of scientism and realism, can be thought of as the difference between utopianism and radicalism. Radicals think that there is a basic mistake being made, a mistake deep down at the roots. They think that deep thinking is required to get down to this deep level, and that only there, when all the superstructural appearances have been undercut, can things be seen as they really are. Utopians, however, do not think in terms of mistakes or of depth. They abandon the contrast between superficial appearance and deep reality in favor of the contrast between a painful present and a possibly less painful, dimly-seen, future. Pragmatists cannot be radicals, in this sense, but they can be utopians. They do not see philosophy as providing instruments for radical surgery, or microscopes which make precise diagnosis possible.25 Philosophy's function is rather to clear the road for prophets and poets, to make intellectual life a bit simpler and safer for those who have visions of new communities.26

So far I have taken MacKinnon as my example of a feminist with such a vision. But of course she is only one of many. Another is Marilyn Frye, who says, in her powerful book The Politics of Reality, that "there probably is really no distinction, in the end, between imagination and courage". For, she
continues, it takes courage to overcome "a mortal dread of being outside the field of vision of the arrogant eye." This is the eye of a person who prides himself on spotting the rational unacceptability of what is being said—that is, its incoherence with the rest of the beliefs of those who currently control life-chances and logical space. So feminists must, Frye goes on to say, "dare to rely on ourselves to make meaning and we have to imagine ourselves capable of...weaving the web of meaning which will hold us in some kind of intelligibility."27 Such courage is indistinguishable from the imagination it takes to hear oneself as the spokesperson of a merely possible community, rather than as a lonely, and perhaps crazed, outcast from an actual one.

MacKinnon and many other feminists use "liberalism" as a name for an inability to have this sort of courage and imagination. "In the liberal mind," MacKinnon says, "the worse and more systematic one's mistreatment it, the more it seems justified. Liberalism...never sees power as power, yet can see as significant only that which power does."28 The phenomenon she is pointing to certainly exists, but "liberalism" seems to me the wrong name for it. So, of course, does "pragmatism". I think the main reason—apart from some reflexes left over from early Marxist conditioning—why pejorative uses of the terms "liberal" and "pragmatist" are still common among political radicals is that if you say, with Putnam, that "truth does not transcend use", you may easily be taken as referring to actual, present use. Again, if you deny that truth is a matter of correspondence to reality, you may easily be taken as holding that a true belief is one that coheres with what most people currently believe. If you think that emancipatory moral or social thought requires penetrating to a presently unglimpsed reality beneath the current appearances, and find pragmatists telling you that there is no such reality, you may easily conclude that a pragmatist cannot help the cause of emancipation.
When, however, we remember that John Dewey--a paradigmatic liberal as well as a paradigmatic pragmatist--spent a great deal of time celebrating the sort of courage and imagination Frye describes, we may be willing to grant that the relation between pragmatism and emancipation is more complex. Dewey said remarkably little about the situation of women, but one of the few things he did say is worth quoting:

Women have as yet made little contribution to philosophy, but when women who are not mere students of other persons' philosophy set out to write it, we cannot conceive that it will be the same in viewpoint or tenor as that composed from the standpoint of the different masculine experience of things. Institutions, customs of life, breed certain systematized predilections and aversions. The wise man reads historic philosophies to detect in them intellectual formulations of men's habitual purposes and cultivated wants, not to gain insight into the ultimate nature of things or information about the make-up of reality. As far as what is loosely called reality figures in philosophies, we may be sure that it signifies those selected aspects of the world which are chosen because they lend themselves to the support of men's judgment of the worth-while life, and hence are most highly prized. In philosophy, "reality" is a term of value or choice.29

Suppose we think, as feminists often do, of "men's habitual purposes and cultivated wants" as "the habitual purposes and cultivated wants of the males, the half of the species which long ago enslaved the other half". This permits us to read Dewey as saying: if you find yourself a slave, do not accept your masters' descriptions of the real; do not work within the boundaries of their moral universe; instead, try to invent a reality of your own by selecting aspects of the world which
ците на нивниот морален универзум. Наместо тоа, обидете се да изумите ваша сопствена реалност, избирајќи ги аспекти од светот кои се нудат себеси како поткрепа на вашиот суд за достојниот живот.30

Дјуевата доктрина за континуумот на средствата и целите би можела да го наведе да каже: не очекувајте непосредно да узнаете кој вид живот е достоен, бидејќи тоа е едно од нештата за кои постојано ќе го менувате мислењето во процесот на избиране на реалноста. Не можете ниту да ги поставите своите цели врз основа на јасен и експлицитен став за природата на моралната реалност, ниту да го изведете таквиот став од јасн и експлицитни цели. Не постои метод или процедура која треба да се следи, освен храброто и имагинативно експериментирање. Сметам дека Дјуи брзо би ја увидел поентата на описот на Фрај на нејзините сопствени списи како „вид флертување со бесмисленоста - танцување околу регионот на когнитивните јазови и негативните семантички простори, одржувано во воздух единствено преку ритамот и забрзувањето на моето сопствено движење, во обид да ги долови злоупотребите кои, според општата согласност, не постојат.”31 Имено, бесмисленоста е токму она со кое треба да флертувате кога се наоѓате среде социјалните, особено јазичките практики - не сакајќи да учествувате во старата, но се уште не успевајќи да создадете нова практика.

Значењето на Дјуевиот прагматизам за движењата како feminismот, може да се согледа на следниов начин: не обвинувајте ја тековната социјална практика или тековниот јазик дека не е верен на реалноста, дека погрешно ги сфаќа нештата. Не критикувајте го дека е резултат на идеологија или предрасуди, наспроти вашето сопствено ползување на спосоштва за откривање на реалноста, наречена „разум”, или на неутрален метод наречен „непристрасно набљудување”. Не критикувајте го нито како „неправеден”, доколку „неправеден” треба да значи нешто повеќе отколку „напати некохерентен, дури и во сопствените изрази”. Наместо од минливите тековни појавности да повикувате кон трај-

lend themselves to the support of your judgment of the worthwhile life.30

Dewey's doctrine of the means-end continuum might have led him to add: do not expect to know what sort of life is worthwhile right off the bat, for that is one of the things you will constantly change your mind about in the process of selecting a reality. You can neither pick your goals on the basis of a clear and explicit claim about the nature of moral reality, nor derive such a claim from clear and explicit goals. There is no method or procedure to be followed except courageous and imaginative experimentation. Dewey would, I think, have been quick to see the point of Frye's description of her own writing as "a sort of flirtation with meaninglessness-dancing about a region of cognitive gaps and negative semantic spaces, kept aloft only the rhythm and momentum of my own motion, trying to plumb abysses which are generally agreed not to exist."31 For meaninglessness is exactly what you have to flirt with when you are in between social, and in particular linguistic, practices—unwilling to take part in an old one but not yet having succeeded in creating a new one.

The import of Dewey's pragmatism for movements such as feminism can be seen if we paraphrase Dewey as follows: do not charge a current social practice or a currently spoken language with being unfaithful to reality, with getting things wrong. Do not criticize it as a result of ideology or prejudice, where these are tacitly contrasted with your own employment of a truth-tracking faculty called "reason" or a neutral method called "disinterested observation". Do not even criticize it as "unjust" if "unjust" is supposed to mean more than "sometimes incoherent even on its own terms." Instead of appealing from the transitory current appearances to the permanent reality, appeal to a still only dimly imagined future practice. Drop the appeal to neutral criteria, and the claim that something large like Nature or Rea-
nata realnost, povikuvaite kon edna se uste maglovito zamislevana idna prakтика. Otfrletete go povikuvaeneto na neutralni kriteriumi, i twrdeneto deka neesho golemo kako Prirodata ili Razumot, ili Istoriijata, ili Moralniot Zakon e na stranata na ungeteniot. Namente toa, jednostavno pravete konjeglivii sporedbi pomegu aktualnata seganishina i edna moguena, makar i vo zarodish, idnina.32

Толку за релацијата помеѓу прагматизмот и политичкиот утопизам. Јас доказувајќи дека обата се компатибилни и дека заемно се поткрепуваат. Ова се должи на фактот дека прагматизмот ја допушта можности за проширивање на логичкиот простор, и оттаму, за еден повик понтерство и измислување посокоро од што кон навидум неутралните критериуми. Она што прагматизмот го губи кога се откажува од претензията дека исправноста или реалноста е на негова страна, го добива со способноста да го претпознае присуството на тоа што Фрај го нарекува „злоупотреби кои, според општата согласност, не постојат“ Тоа се ситуациите кои им задаваат маки на универсалистите и реалистите - оние во кои се достапни мноштво описи што наложуваат согласност, но ниеден од овие описи не го исполнува бараното.

Сега се свртувам кон парадоксот којшто го бев набележал претходно: сугестијата дека жените дури сега запостојуваат, а не дека биле лишени од способноста да го изразат она што цело време било длабоко во нив. Сметам оти привikuвањето од страна на МекКинон на „улогата коja жените допра требa да ja одиграat“ е един начин да се сугерира дека жените дури сега започнуваат да обликуваат еден морален идентитет како жени. Да се пронајде нециj морален идентитет во бидувањето X значи да се биде какаден да се направи следново: да го истакнете вашето бидување X како пресудно во вашето оправдување на значајните, непринудни избори, да го направите вашето бидување X важен дел од приказата коjашто си ja раскажувате себеси кога имате потреба да си ja возобновите самодовербата, да ги направите вашите релации со другите X-ови клучни за вашиот став дека сте одговорна ли-

So much for the relations between pragmatism and political radicalism. I have been arguing that the two are compatible and mutually supporting. This is because pragmatism allows for the possibility of expanding logical space, and thereby for an appeal to courage and imagination rather than to putatively neutral criteria. What pragmatism loses when it gives up the claim to have right or reality on its side it gains in ability to acknowledge the presence of what Frye calls “abysses which are generally agreed not to exist”. These are situations which give the universalist and the realist trouble-ones in which plenty of assent-commanding descriptions are available, but such that none of these descriptions do what is needed.

I turn now to the paradox I noted earlier: the suggestion that women are only now coming into existence, rather than having been deprived of the ability to express what was deep within them all the time. I take MacKinnon’s evocation of a “role that women have yet to make” as a way of suggesting that women are only now beginning to put together a moral identity as women. To find one’s moral identity in being an X means being able to do the following sort of thing: make your Xness salient in your justification of important uncoerced choices, make your Xness an important part of the story you tell yourself when you need to recover your self-confidence, make your relations with other X’s central to your claim to be a responsible person. These are all things men have usually been able to do by reminding themselves that they are, come what may, men. They are things which men have made it hard for women to do by reminding themselves that they are women. As Frye puts it, men have
nast. Ova se sите нешта коишто мажите обично се способни да ги сторат потсетувајќи се себеси дека тие, без оглед на се, се мажи. Тоа се нештата кои жените, поради мажите, тешко можат да ги сторат потсетувајќи се себеси дека се жени. Како што тоа го формулира Фрај, мажите себеси си го имаат припишан статусот на „комплетни личности” - луѓе кои го уживаат она што таа го нарекува „неограничено учество во радикалната „супериорност" на видот“ и им го ускратуваат тој статус на жените. Резултатот од фактот што мажите постојано, ревносно и јавно му заблагодаруваат на Бога што не се жени, е тоа што жените тешко би му заблагодарили на Бога што се жени. Именно, се до неодамна, кога некоја жена би кажала дека таа го пронаоѓа својот морален идентитет во тоа што е жена, ова би прозвучело исто така настрано како кога некој роб би рекол дека го пронаоѓа својот морален идентитет во тоа што е роб.

Повеќето феминист(к)и би се согласиле дека дури со почетоците на феминистичкото движење жените започнаа да го пронаоѓаат својот морален идентитет во тоа што се жени. Но повеќето феминист(к)и веројатно се се уште довольно реалисти и универзалисти за да инсистират дека постои разлика помеѓу тврдењето дека не може да го пронајдете својот морален идентитет во би­двувањето X и тврдењето дека еден X се уште не е полно­крвна личност, личност на која ѝ е нанесена неправда со забраната да го пронаи­де својот морален идентитет во своето бидување X. Именно, големата предност на реализмот и универзализмот над прагматизмот е во тоа што тие овозможуваат да се каже дека жените биле се­то она што тие се сега, и следствено, имале право на се­то она кое сега се обидуваат да го здоби­јат - дури и кога не знаеле, па и експлицитно порекнува­ле дека имаат право на тоа.

Сепак, за нас прагматистите не е така лесно да се каже ова. Имено, бидувањето личност ние го согледу­ваме како проблем на степенот, а не како прашање на „сè или ништо”, нешто рамномерно распределено низ видот. Ние го согледува­ваме тоа како нешто што рабовитеобично го имаат помалку отколку нивните господари. Ова не се

Most feminists might agree that it was only with the beginnings of the feminist movement that it began to become possible for women to find their moral identities in being women. But most feminists are probably still realist and universalist enough to insist that there is a difference between the claim that one cannot find one's moral identity in being an X and the claim that an X is not yet full-fledged person, a person to whom injustice has been done by forbidding her to find her moral identity in her X-hood. For the great advantage of realism and universalism over pragmatism is that it permits one to say that women were everything they are now, and therefore were entitled to everything they are now trying to get—even when they did not know, and might even have explicitly denied, that they were entitled to it.

For us pragmatists, however, it is not so easy to say that. For we see personhood as a matter of degree, not as an all-or-nothing affair, something evenly distributed around the species. We see it as something that slaves typically have less of than their masters. This is not because there are such things as "natural slaves" but because of the masters' control over the
I have in mind the need to name, and thus to begin to bridge, what Frye calls "abysses generally agreed not to exist"—consider Adrienne Rich's description of her situation when young. She was, she says, "split between the girl who
wrote poems, who defined herself as writing poems, and the girl who was to define herself by her relationships with men.\textsuperscript{35} I want to interpret Rich’s individual situation as an allegory of the more general situation in which women found themselves before feminism achieved lift-off-of their inability to stop defining themselves in terms of their relationships with men. To envisage this inability, consider how Rich’s situation differed from that of a young man in a similar situation.

Since Byron and Goethe men have thought of writing poems as one of the best ways to create an autonomous self, to avoid having to define oneself in the terms used by one’s parents, teachers, employers and rulers. Since 1820 or thereabouts, a young man has had the option of defining himself as a poet, of finding his moral identity in writing verse. But, Rich tells us, this is not easy for a young woman.

What is the difficulty? It is not that there is any dearth of true descriptions which Rich might have applied to herself. There were no well-formed-that is, generally intelligible-questions to which Rich could not have given true, well-formed answers. But nevertheless there was, she tells us, a split. The various true descriptions which she applied did not fit together into a whole. But, she is implicitly suggesting, a young male poet’s descriptions would have fitted together easily. Rich was, in her youth, unable to attain the kind of coherence, the kind of integrity, which we think of as characteristic of full persons. For persons who capable of the full glory of humanity are capable of seeing themselves steadily and whole. Rather than feel that splits are tearing them apart, they can see tensions between their alternative self-descriptions as, at worst, necessary elements in a harmonious variety-in-unity.
Rich’s account of herself as split rings true for, as she shows in her essay on Emily Dickinson and elsewhere, the language-games men have arranged that young women should play forces them to treat the men in their lives (or, the absence of men in their lives) as the independent variable and everything else-even their poems-as dependent variables. So insofar as Rich could not tie her poems in with her relationships with men, she had a problem. She was split. She could not be, so to speak, a full-time poet, because a language she could not forget did not let one be both a full-time poet and a full-time female. By contrast, since Byron, the language has let one be a full-time poet and a full-time hero (just as, since Socrates, it has been possible to be a full-time intellectual and a full-time hero).

What might solve Rich’s problem? Well, perhaps nowadays it is a little easier for a young woman to define herself by and in her poems than when Rich was young—simply because she may have read books by Rich, Frye and others. But only a little easier. What would make it really easy? Only, I would suggest, the sort of circumstance which made it easy for a young man in the generation after Byron to make his poetic activity the independent variable in the story he told himself about himself. In the previous generation there had been what now looks to us like a band of brothers—Hölderlin and Keats, Byron and Goethe, Shelley and Chamisso. Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, and to be a young male with poetic gifts was to be able to describe oneself in heroic terms, terms which one could not have used earlier without sounding crazy. That band of brothers founded an invisible club, a very good club, one which is still giving new members a warm welcome. So young male poets do not face abysses when they attempt self-definition. But, as Rich points out, Emily Dickinson was not allowed into that club. So, to make things really easy for
Future Dicksons and Riches, there would have to be a good, well-established club which they could join.

Here, I take it, is where feminist separatism comes in. Rich asks that we understand lesbian/feminism in the deepest, most radical sense: as that love for ourselves and other women, that commitment to the freedom of all of us, which transcends the category of "sexual preference" and the issue of civil rights, to become a politics of asking women's questions, demanding a world in which the integrity of all women—not a chosen few—shall be honored and validated in every aspect of culture.38

Someone who tries to fit what Rich is saying into a map drawn on a universalist and realist grid will have trouble locating any space separate from that covered by "the category of 'sexual preference'" or by "the issue of civil rights". For justice, on this universalist view, is a matter of our providing each other with equal advantages. Nothing, in this vision, could transcend civil rights and the realization of those rights by institutional change. So, for example, lesbian separatism is likely to be seen simply as an arrangement by which those with a certain sexual preference can escape stigma until such time as the laws have been extended to protect lesbians' rights and the mores have caught up with the laws.

Frye offers a contrasting view of the function of separatism when she writes
Re the new being and meaning which are being created now by lesbian-feminists, we do have semantic authority, and, collectively, can and do define with effect. I think it is only by maintaining our boundaries through controlling concrete access to us that we can enforce on those who are not-us our definitions of ourselves, hence force on them the fact of our existence and thence open up the possibility of our having semantic authority with them.39

I take Frye's point to be, in part, that individuals—even individuals of great courage and imagination—cannot achieve semantic authority, even semantic authority over themselves, on their own. To get such authority you have to hear your own statements as part of a shared practice. Otherwise you yourself will never know whether they are more than ravings, never know whether you are a heroine or a maniac. People in search of such authority need to band together and form clubs, exclusive clubs. For if you want to work out a story about who you are—put together a moral identity—which decreases the importance of your relationships to one set of people and increases the importance of your relationships to another set, the physical absence of the first set of people may be just what you need. So feminist separatism may indeed, as Rich says, have little to do with sexual preference or with civil rights, and a lot to do with making things easier for women of the future to define themselves in terms not presently available. These would be terms which made it easy for "women as women" to have what Dewey calls "habitual purposes and cultivated wants"—purposes and wants which, as Rich says, only a chosen few women presently have.

To sum up: I am suggesting that we see the contemporary feminist movement as playing the same role in intellectual and moral progress as was played by, for example, Plato's Acad-
When a group forms itself in conscious opposition to those who control the life-chances of its members, and succeeds in achieving semantic authority over its members, the result may be its ruthless suppression—the sort of thing that happened to the Albigensians, and which Margaret Atwood has imagined happening to the feminists. But it may also happen that, as the generations succeed one another, the masters, those in control, gradually find their conceptions of the possibilities open to human beings changing. For example, they may gradually begin to think of the options open to their own children as including membership in the group in question. The new language spoken by the separatist group may gradually get woven into the language taught in the schools.

Insofar as this sort of thing happens, eyes become less arrogant and the members of the group cease to be treated as wayward children, or as a bit crazy (the ways in which Emily Dickinson was treated). Instead, they gradually achieve what Frye calls "full personhood" in the eyes of everybody, having first achieved it only in the eyes of fellow-members of their own club. They begin to be treated as full-fledged human beings, rather than being seen, like children or the insane, as degenerate cases—as beings entitled to love and protection, but not to participation in deliberation on serious matters. For to be a full-fledged person in a given society is a matter of double negation:

emy, the early Christians meeting in the catacombs, the invisible Copernican colleges of the seventeenth century, groups of workingmen gathering to discuss Tom Paine's pamphlets, and lots of other clubs which were formed to try out new ways of speaking, and to gather the moral strength to go out and change the world. For groups build their moral strength by achieving increasing semantic authority over their members, thereby increasing the ability of those members to find their moral identities in their membership of such groups.

When a group forms itself in conscious opposition to those who control the life-chances of its members, and succeeds in achieving semantic authority over its members, the result may be its ruthless suppression—the sort of thing that happened to the Albigensians, and which Margaret Atwood has imagined happening to the feminists. But it may also happen that, as the generations succeed one another, the masters, those in control, gradually find their conceptions of the possibilities open to human beings changing. For example, they may gradually begin to think of the options open to their own children as including membership in the group in question. The new language spoken by the separatist group may gradually get woven into the language taught in the schools.

Insofar as this sort of thing happens, eyes become less arrogant and the members of the group cease to be treated as wayward children, or as a bit crazy (the ways in which Emily Dickinson was treated). Instead, they gradually achieve what Frye calls "full personhood" in the eyes of everybody, having first achieved it only in the eyes of fellow-members of their own club. They begin to be treated as full-fledged human beings, rather than being seen, like children or the insane, as degenerate cases—as beings entitled to love and protection, but not to participation in deliberation on serious matters. For to be a full-fledged person in a given society is a matter of double negation:
it is not to think of oneself as belonging to a group which powerful people in that society thank God they do not belong to.

In our society, straight white males of my generation-even earnestly egalitarian straight white males—cannot easily stop themselves from feeling guilty relief that they were not born women or gay or black, any more than they can stop themselves from being glad that they were not born mentally retarded or schizophrenic. This is in part because of a calculation of the obvious socio-economic disadvantages of being so born, but not entirely. It is also the sort of instinctive and ineffable horror which noble children used to feel at the thought of having been born to non-noble parents, even very rich non-noble parents.40

At some future point in the development of our society, guilty relief over not having been born a woman may not cross the minds of males, any more than the question "noble or base-born?" now crosses their minds.41 That would be the point at which both males and females had forgotten the traditional androcentric language, just as we have all forgotten about the distinction between base and noble ancestry. But if this future comes to pass, we pragmatists think, it will not be because the females have been revealed to possess something—namely, full human dignity—which everybody, even they themselves, once mistakenly thought they lacked. It will be because the linguistic and other practices of the common culture have come to incorporate some of the practices characteristic of imaginative and courageous outcasts.
The new language which, with luck, will get woven into the language taught to children will not, however, be the language which the outcasts spoke in the old days, before the formation of separatist groups. For that was infected by the language of the masters. It will be, instead, a language gradually put together in separatist groups in the course of a long series of flirtations with meaninglessness. Had there been no stage of separation, there would have been no subsequent stage of assimilation. No prior antithesis, no new synthesis. No carefully nurtured pride in membership in a group which might not have attained self-consciousness were it not for its oppression, no expansion of the range of possible moral identities, and so no evolution of the species. This is what Hegel called the cunning of reason, and what Dewey thought of as the irony of evolution.
This means taking Frye's phrase "new being" literally, and saying that there were very few female full persons around before feminism got started, in the same sense in which there were very few full-fledged Galilean scientists before the seventeenth century. It was of course true in earlier times that women should not have been oppressed, just as it was true before Newton said so that gravitational attraction accounted for the movements of the planets. But, despite what Scripture says, truth will not necessarily prevail. "Truth" is not the name of a power which eventually wins through, it is just the nominalization of an approbative adjective. So just as a pragmatist in the philosophy of science cannot use the truth of Galileo's views as an explanation either of his success at prediction or of his gradually increasing fame, so a pragmatist in moral philosophy cannot use the rightness of the feminist cause as an explanation either of its attraction for contemporary women or of its possible future triumph. For such explanations require the notion of a truth-tracking faculty, one which latches on to antecedently existing truth-makers. Truth is ahistorical, but that is not because truths are made true by ahistorical entities.

Frye's term "new being" may seem even more unnecessarily hyperbolic than McKinnon's "new voice", but we pragmatists can take it at face value and realists cannot. As I read Frye, the point is that before feminism began to gather women together into a kind of club, there were female eccentrics like Wollstonecraft and de Gouges, but these were not women who existed as women, in MacKinnon's sense of "as". They were eccentric because they failed to fit into roles which men had contrived for them to fill, and because they were as yet no other roles. For roles require a community—a web of social expectations and habits which define the role in question. The community may be small, but, like a club as opposed to a convocation, or a new species as opposed to a few atypical mutant members of an old species, it only exists insofar as it is self-sustaining and self-reproducing.
To sum up for the last time: prophetic feminists like MacKinnon and Frye foresee a new being not only for women but for society. They foresee a society in which the male-female distinction is no longer of much interest. Feminists who are also pragmatists will not see the formation of such a society as the removal of social constructs and the restoration of the way things were always meant to be. They will see it as the production of a better set of social constructs than the ones presently available, and thus as the creation of a new and better sort of human being.

NOTES:


3 Ibid., p. 38

4 Ibid., p. 73

5 At p. 33, Frye remarks that “For subordination to be permanent and cost effective, it is necessary to create conditions such that the
potchinetata grupa do nekoja merka se pomiruva so potchinestota" (Politics of Reality, 33). Vo idealen slucaj, toa bi bile uslovi takvi
sha onoj chlen na grupata koj ne se pomiruva so toa bi zvuchen nal-
udnichev. Fraj sugeriira deka toa sha nekoja lichnost zvuchi na-
ludnichev e dobbar indikator deka ja gruntuvate taas lichnost (112).
Videte isto takva MacKinnon, "On Exceptionality": "Osebeno koga ste
del od jedna potchineta grupa, vashata sospstvena definicija na
vashite povredi moko e oblikuvana od vashata procentka dali mo-
je da priдобite neko da stoi neko mater stolto toa, inkluzhitelno
neko ofisialno (105). Na primer, ne naludnichevato tveđe
deka imalo siliuvane e ona priflativo za lugeeto (voobicenha za
maschite) koji se vo pozicija da ponudat podrshka ili odmaza.
Istinstveno koga postoi sozialno priftaten lek, moke da postoi
realna (namesto naludnichev zamislena) povre da.

6 Koga Olimpp de Gush, vo imeoto na xenite, se povika na
Deklaracijsata na pravata na chovekot i grafiinot, duri i
najrevolucionerno nastronite nezini mashi sovremenci ja
smetaa za luda. Koga vo 1920-te godini kanadske femistik(e)j
dokazuvau deka zborot "lichnosti" vo eden akt koj gi specifikova
uslovite za da se byde senator, gi vkluchuna i xenite isto kako i
mashite. Vrohaqot sud na Kanada odlochi deka zborot vo toj
kontekst ne treba da bide takta konstruirean, bidajki vashestu
nikogash i ne bil takov. (Treba da se napomenie deka Sudskiot
komitet na Kralskiot sovet pod odna presudi vo korist na femi-
histik(e)te.)

7 Ovoj pasus e od Shefleroviot (Samuel Sheffler) navor
na Harli vo negoziat prikaz na neziniot delo Natural Reasons
(September 19, 1990), 9-10. Ne moikes da ja lociraam stranicata od
koj Shefler citira. Glidisheteto koesho Harli go sumira ne
nezino, tuku na filosofite pod vlijanie na Viteneshal.

8 Vo edna statia za Rolps ("Reason and Feeling in Thinking
about Justice", Ethics 99 [1989], 248), Suzan Moler Okin (Suzan Moler
Okin) ukazuva deka misleneieto spored izvornata Rolpsova
pozicija ne e worka na mislene kako "obstedelen nikho" tuku
poskoro na mislene kako povike razlichni ljute posledovatelnno
-mislene od glindata tocka na "sekoj "konkretan drug" koj toj
nekoh moze da bide". Harli (Natural Reasons, 381) ja izlzbuva
istata poenta. Istorichnost na pravdata - historichnost kojesho
Rolp ja priznava vo negovite eesi od osumdesetotini godini - se
sveduva na faktot deka historijata prodoluva da produrira
novi vidovi na "konkretni drugi", koj nekoj moze da bide.

9 Videte ja temata na "hentata kako delumen majh", vo
"Theories of Sex Difference" na Kerolajn Vajtbeek (Carolyn Whitbeck),
in Women and Values, ed. Marilyn Pearsall (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth,

10. Michael Gross (Michael Gross) and Mary Beth Averill (Mary Beth Averill), in their "Evolution and Patriarchal Myths" (in Discovering Reality, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka [Boston: D. Reidel, 1983]), suggest that the term "struggle" is a specifically masculist way of describing evolution and ask "Why not see nature as bounteous, rather than parsimonious, and admit that opportunity and cooperation are more likely to abet novelty, innovation and creation than are struggle and competition?" (p. 85). The question gives me pause, and I have no clear answer to it. All I have is the hunch that, with memes as with genes, tolerant pluralism will sooner or later, in the absence of interstellar travel, have to come to terms with shortage of space for self-expression.

There is a more general point involved here, the one raised by Jo-Ann Pilardi's claim that Hegel, Freud and others "were burdened with a notion of identity which defines it as oppositional, one which was derived from the psychosocial development of male children." ("On the War Path and Beyond" in Hypatia Reborn [cited above], p. 12.) Just such a notion of identity is central to my claims in this paper—and particularly to the claims about the possible benefits of feminist separatism in the paper's later pages. So I am employing what many feminist writers would consider specifically male assumptions. All I can say in reply is that the notion of identity as oppositional seems to me hard to eliminate from such books as Frye's—and especially from her discussion of feminist anger. Anger and opposition seem to me the root of most moral prophecy, and it is the prophetic aspect of feminism that I am emphasizing in this paper.

social structure" and our feeling of "shock". To work simultaneously for weaving and expanding a fabric that expresses this, "categories of our cosmology and our social structure" (Ethics after Babel [Boston: Beacon Press, 1988], 159). This choice between the poème of realism and the pragmatic rhetoric of the editor and the iskazat of deka moral progress gradually aligns these seams with the real seams, and saying that it is a matter of simultaneously rewaving and enlarging a fabric which is not intended to be congruent with an antecedent reality. Giving an example of such a seam, Stout says (p. 153) "The sharper the line between masculine and feminine roles and the greater the importance of that line in determining matters such as the division of labor and the rules of inheritance, the more likely it is that sodomy will be abominated."

Later he says (p. 158) "The question is not whether homosexuality is intrinsically abominable but rather what, all things considered, we should do with the relevant categories of our cosmology and social structure."

As with the abominableness of homosexual sodomy, so, we pragmatists think, with the abominableness of the absence or presence of patriarchy. In all such cases, up to and including the abominableness of torturing people for the sheer pleasure of watching them writhe, pragmatists think that the question is not about intrinsic properties but about what we should do with the relevant categories—a question which boils down to what descriptions we should use of what is going on.

"Feminism and Postmodernism," New Left Review, Winter 1989, p. 12. For a somewhat more tempered account of the relation of postmodernism to feminism see Kate Soper, "Feminism, Humanism and Postmodernism", Radical Philosophy 55 (Summer 1990), pp. 11-17. In their "Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and Postmodernism" (in Universal Abandon?, ed. Andrew Ross [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988]), Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson argue that "a robust postmodern-feminist paradigm of social criticism without philosophy is possible" (p. 100). I of course agree, but I am less sure about the need for, and utility of, "social-theoretical analysis of large-scale inequalities" (p. 90) than are Fraser and Nicholson. This is because I am less sure than Fraser about the possibility that "the basic institutional framework of [our society] could be unjust" (Fraser, "Solidarity or Singularity?") in Reading Rorty, ed. Alan Malachowski (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 318), and hence about "the utility of a theory that could specify links among apparently discrete social problems via the basic institutional structure" (p. 319). I suspect my
differences with Fraser are concrete and political rather than abstract and philosophical. She sees, and I do not see, attractive alternatives (more or less Marxist in shape) to such institutions as private ownership of the means of production and constitutional democracy, attractive alternatives to the traditional social-democratic project of constructing an egalitarian welfare state within the context of these two basic institutions. I am not sure whether our differences are due to Fraser's anti-foundationalist theory hope (see fn. 17 below) or to my own lack of imagination.

16 Ibid., p. 28. See Lovibond's reference at p. 12 to "remaking society along rational, egalitarian lines". The idea that egalitarianism is more rational than elitism, rational in a sense which provides reasons for action not based on contingent shared practices, is central to the thinking of most liberals who are also moral realists.

17 A rhetoric of "unmasking hegemony" presupposes the reality-appearance distinction which opponents of phallogocentrism claim to have set aside. Many self-consciously "postmodern" writers seem to me trying to have it both ways--to view masks as going all the way down while still making invidious comparisons between other people's masks and the way things will look when all the masks have been stripped off. These postmodernists continue to indulge the bad habits characteristic of those Marxists who insist that morality is a matter of class interest, and then add that everybody has a moral obligation to identify with the interests of a particular class. Just as "ideology" came to mean little more than "other people's ideas", so "product of hegemonic discourse" has come to mean little more than "product of other people's way of talking." I agree with Stanley Fish that much of what goes under the heading of "post-modernism" exemplifies internally inconsistent "anti-foundationalist theory hope". (See Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies [Durham: Duke University Press, 1989], pp. 346, 437-8.)
He sum ljubitel on termo in “postmodernizam” and malku se cispjav (verojatno, isto kako i MekIntaaj (MacIntyre)) koga go otkriv teriine nel Lavioid indeka Lyotar (Lyotard), MekIntaaj i jas se otrovjavame “vo najpolnite zastrapnioci na argumentite i vrednostite kon konstituiaraat postmodernizmot vo rankite na akademskata filosofija” (“Feminism”, 5). Sepak, jas gi prepoznam sличностите помеѓu našite pozicij i ja navale Laviibond trojca da ne grupira zajeno. Yekoi od ovie sличности se prikazhaj od Frejzer i Nikolson, “Social Criticism”, 85-7.

Lovibond, “Feminism”, 12.


18 I am not fond of the term "postmodernism" and was a bit startled (as presumably was MacIntyre) to find Lovibond saying that Lyotard, MacIntyre and I are "among the most forceful exponents of the arguments and values which constitute postmodernism within academic philosophy." (p. 5). Still, I recognize the similarities between our positions which lead Lovibond to group the three of us together. Some of these similarities are outlined by Fraser and Nicholson at pp. 85ff. of the article cited in fn. 15.

19 Ibid., p. 12.

20 MacKinnon, p. 86. See also pp. 50, 54, for the "postmodernist" suggestion that the quest for objectivity is a specifically masculist one.

21 We pragmatists are often told that we reduce moral disagreement to a mere struggle for power by denying the existence of reason, or human nature, conceived as something which provides a neutral court of appeal. We often rejoin that the need for such a court, the need for something ahistorical which will ratify one’s claims, is itself a symptom of power-worship of the conviction that unless something large and powerful is on one’s side, one shouldn’t bother trying.

22 Developing this point would take too long. Were more time and space available, I should argue that trying to integrate feminism into a general theory of oppression—a frequent reaction to the charge that feminists are oblivious to racial and economic injustice—is like trying to integrate Galilean physics into a general theory of scientific error. The latter attempt is as familiar as it is fruitless. The conviction that there is an interesting general theory about human beings or their oppression seems to me like the conviction that there is an interesting general theory about truth and our failure to achieve it. For the same reasons that transcendental terms like “true” and “good” are not susceptible of definition, neither error nor oppression has a single neck which a single critical slash might sever.

Maria Lugones is an example of a feminist theorist who sees a need for a general philosophical theory of oppression and liberation. She says, for example, that "the ontological or metaphysical possibility of liberation remains to be argued, explained, uncovered" (“Structure/Antistructure and Agency under Oppression”, Journal of Philosophy 87 (October 1990), p. 502). I should prefer to stick to merely empirical possibilities of liberation. Although I entirely agree with Lugones about the need to "give up the unified self" P. 503), I do not see this as a matter of ontology, but merely as a way of putting the familiar point that the same human being can contain different coherent sets of belief and desire-different roles, different personalities, etc.--correlated with the different
FEMINISM AND PRAGMATISM

Richard Rorty

Culler is right in saying that we pragmatists hold the latter view, but wrong in suggesting that we think that logical changes in belief are the only respectable ones. What I have called "creative misuses" of lan-
дури и ако не се разлози за тоа. Видете ја дискусијата за Дејвидсоновите гледишта за метафората во различни есеи од моето дело Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge University Press, 1991) за поопстоно изложување на дистинкцијата причина-разлог, и за тврдењето дека поголемиот дел од морапниот и интелектуалниот сонови гледишта за метафората во различни есеи од моето дело "zloупотреба" на јазикот се за поопстоно изложување на дистинкцијата причина-разлог, и за ните кои се респектабилни. Она што jaq го нареков "креативни
луѓето кои сакаат да се придржуваат кон приматот на логиката
da се прави.

други автори, на пример Joseph Singer, "Should Lawyers Care about Philosophy?", Duke Law Journal (1989): "...Рорти... го маргинализирале потфатот на философската, лишувајќи го со тоа прагматизмот од каков и како да биде критички зафат (1752)". Според моето гледиште, прагматизмот ги зафаќа другите философии, но не социјалните проблеми како такви - и така е подеднакво корисен за фашистите како Мусолини и конзервативците како Оукшот (Oakeshott), како што е и за либералите како Дуи. Сингер смета дека jaq го имам "идентификувано разумот со status quo" и дека jaq дефинирал "вистината како коекстензивна со преовладува-вачките вредности во едно општество" (1763). Сметам дека овие тврдења се резултат од истиот заклучок кој Калер го изведува во горенаведениот пасус. И Сингер и Калер сакаат философската да биде способна за поставување цели и да не биде ограничена единствено на помошната улога која jaq опишувам во забелешката 26 подолу.

Калеровото обвинување може да се најде и кај многумина други автори, на пример Joseph Singer, "Should Lawyers Care about Philosophy?", Duke Law Journal (1989), pp. 1752: "...Rorty...has marginalized the enterprise of philosophy, thereby depriving pragmatism of any critical bite." On my view, pragmatism bites other philosophies, but not social problems as such-and so is as useful to fascists like Mussolini and conservatives like Oakeshott as it is to liberals like Dewey. Singer thinks that I have "identified reason with the status quo" and defined "truth as coextensive with the prevailing values in a society." (p. 1763) These claims are, I think, the result of the same inference as Culler draws in the passage quoted above. Both Singer and Culler want philosophy to be capable of setting goals, and to not be confined to the merely ancillary role I describe in n. 26 below.

Culler's charge can be found in many other authors, e.g., Joseph Singer, "Should Lawyers Care About Philosophy?", Duke Law Journal 1989, pp. 1752: ". . .Rorty...has marginalized the enterprise of philosophy, thereby depriving pragmatism of any critical bite." On my view, pragmatism bites other philosophies, but not social problems as such-and-so is as useful to fascists like Mussolini and conservatives like Oakeshott as it is to liberals like Dewey. Singer thinks that I have "identified reason with the status quo" and defined "truth as coextensive with the prevailing values in a society." (p. 1763) These claims are, I think, the result of the same inference as Culler draws in the passage quoted above. Both Singer and Culler want philosophy to be capable of setting goals, and not to be confined to the merely ancillary role I describe in n. 26 below.

24 Видете го Патнамовото дело Representation and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 1988), pp. 114-15. Видете jaq исто така формулирањата на Роберт Брендон (Robert Brandom) за "феноменализмот во врска со вистината" како гледиштето дека "нешто да биде вистинито значи да биде разбрано како наполнено земено за вистинито" (како нешто во кое се верува). Брендон дека она што е најинтересно во врска со класичните прагматистички приказни (Ч. С. Пирс, Вилијам Џејмс) е "двојната приврзаност кон едно нормативно објаснување на тврдењето или верувањето (објаснувањето на верувањето како правило на дејствување, дадено од Александар Бејн (Alexander Bain) и Пирс) којшто не се потпира врз еден претпоставен објаснувачки, претходен повеќе за вистината, и сугестијата дека вистината може да биде разбрана феноменалистички, низ одликите на овие независно карактеризирани земања-за-вистинито" ("Pragmatism, Phenomenalism, Truth Talk", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1988): 80). Брендон, Davidson and I would agree with Putnam that "truth does not transcend use" but I think all three of us might be puzzled by Putnam's further claim that "whether an epistemic situation is any good or not depends on whether
WEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 12 [1988], 80). Брендон, Девидсон и яс
би се согласише со Патнам дека "вистината не ја трансцендира
употребата", но сметам дека сите тројца би биле збунети од ната-
мощното тврдење на Патнам дека "даден една епистемичка ситу-
ација е добра или не зависи од тоа дали повеќе различни искази
се вистинити" (Representation and Reality, 115). Мене ова ми изгледа
како да се каже дека даденичност е богата или не, зависи
од тоа колку пари пари има таа.

25 Bo "Should Lawyers Care?" Џозеф Сингер (Joseph Singer)
ја фали Елизабет Спелман (Elizabet Spelman) за тоа што "ги ко-
рсти орудијата на философијата за да ја промовира праведноста"
и сугерира дека една таква употреба треба да покаже дека "ката-
гориите и формите на дискурсот коишто не ги употребуваме...
имаат значителни консеквенции при канализирањето на нашето
внимание во определени насоки" (1771). Секако, инсистирањето
dека не се потребни никакви специјални орудија, никаква специ-
jална философска експертиза, да се воочи и развие последната
поента, не претставува непочитување на достигањата на Спел-
ман, или на философијата. Употребувањето на поимите како "мо-
ники методи" и "прецизни аналитички инструменти" во реториката
на аналитичката философија и на марксизмот, за мене претста-
вува заведувањо рекламирање. Еден неповолен произход од вак-
vата мистификација е тоа што коишто се нарекуваат философи е да припомогнат
во ослободувањето од бесполезната граѓа која ги блокира нашите
патишта на мислата, и да се стремат да ги исправат и отворат
патеките кои водат кон иднината". Кај Дуй често се среќава оваа
реторика на расчистување на патишта, реторика коишто се на-
dоврузува во Локовиот опис на самиот себеси како прост работник
на оние кои му се чинеле како пророци духови на неговото време-
корпускуларните науки како Нютон и Бојл. Обете метафори
сугерираат дека работата на философите е да ја отстранат зас-
tарената философија од патот на оние кои покажуваат невооби-
чаена храброст и имандија.

Во „Should Lawyers Care?“ Сингер вели дека "Дуй, за разлика од Рорти, ги согледува проблемите на философијата како
many different statements are true" (Representation and Reality, p. 115).
This seems to me like saying that whether a person is wealthy or not
depends on how much money she has.

26 See Dewey's "From Absolutism to Experimentalism" in Later
Works of John Dewey, vol. 5 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1984), p. 160: "Meantime a chief task of those who call them-
selves philosophers is to help get rid of the useless lumber that blocks
our highways of thought, and strive to make straight and open the paths
that lead to the future." There is a lot of this road-clearing rhetoric in
Dewey, rhetoric which is continuous with Locke's description of himself
as an underlaborer to those who seemed to him the prophetic spirits of
his time-corpuscularian scientists like Newton and Boyle. Both meta-
phors suggest that the philosophers' job is to drag out-dated philosophy
out of the way of those who are displaying unusual courage and imagi-
nation.

Singer, in the article cited in n. 24, says that "Dewey, unlike
Rorty, saw the problems of philosophy as inseperable from the prob-
Jerry’s justification of Rorty’s view reinforces existing power relations..." (p. 1759). It is true that Dewey often speaks as if social problems and philosophical problems were interlocked, but I should argue that all these passages can best be interpreted in the road-clearing sense I have just suggested. Dewey never, I think, saw pragmatism in the way in which Marxists saw dialectical materialism—as a philosophical key which unlocks the secrets of history or of society.

27 This and the previous quote are from Frye, p. 80.
28 McKinnon, p. 221. Cf. 137.
30 To use an analogy suggested by Charlotte Perkins Gilman's poem "Similar Cases", it is as if one said to the creatures which were eventually to become the mammals: "Do not try to imitate the ways in which those larger and more powerful fish cope with their environment. Rather, find ways of doing things which will help you find a new environment." (Similar Cases" is perhaps most easily available at pp. 363-4 of Ann Lane, To Herland and Beyond: The Life and Works of Charlotte Perkins Gilman (New York, Pantheon, 1990). The point of the poem is that if it were true that, as feminists were often told, that "you can't change your nature" we should have had neither biological nor cultural evolution).

32 As I suggested earlier, it is easy to bring together Dewey's claim that, in philosophy, "real" is as evaluative a term as "good" with "postmodernist" views for example, those found in Chris Weedon's book Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory. Pretty much the only difference between Weedon's criticism of the philosophical tradition and Dewey's is one which also separates contemporary pragmatists like Putnam and Davidson from Dewey—the use of "language" instead of Dewey's word "experience" as the name of what it is important for the oppressed to reshape. Weedon, like Putnam and Davidson and unlike Dewey, is what Wilfrid Sellars called a "psychological nominalist"—someone who believes that all awareness is a linguistic affair. At p. 32 she says "Like Althusserian Marxism, feminist poststructuralism makes the primary assumption that it is language which enables us to think, speak and give meaning to the world around us. Meaning and consciousness do not exist outside language." The difference with Dewey has few consequences, however, since Dewey would have heartily agreed with Weedon (p. 131) that one should not view language "as a transparent

The only real advantage to psychological nominalism for feminists, perhaps, is that it replaces hard-to-discuss (I am tempted to say "metaphysical") questions about whether women have a different experience than men, or Africans a different experience than Europeans, or about whether the experience of upper-class African women is more like that of lower-class European men than that of upper-class European women, with easier-to-discuss (more evidently empirical) questions about what language these various groups of people use to justify their actions, exhibit their deepest hopes and fears, etc. Answers to the latter questions are jumping-off places for practical suggestions about different languages which they might use, or might have used. I share MacKinnon's skepticism about the idea that "viewpoints have genitals" and Sandra Harding's skepticism about the utility of notions like "woman's morality", "woman's experience", and "woman's standpoint". See Harding's "The Curious Coincidence of Feminine and African Moralities: Challenges for Feminist Theory" in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Kittay and Diana Meyers (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), 296-315.

Although most of the doctrines (e.g., essentialism, Cartesian individualism, moral universalism) which Weedon attributes to "liberal humanism" are doctrines Dewey (a notorious liberal humanist) also targeted, Weedon does not seem able to eschew a longing for what Mary Hawkesworth calls "a successor science which can refute once and for all the distortions of androcentrism". (Hawkesworth, "Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and the Claims of Truth" in Feminist Theory in Practice and Process, ed. Micheline R. Malson et al. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 331.) But once you put aside universalism, you should neither hope for knock-down refutations nor talk about "distortion". Hawkesworth goes on to criticize Harding for saying that "Feminist analytical categories should be unstable at this moment in history" (Harding, "The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory", in the same collection, at p. 19.) But prophecy and unstable categories go together, and Harding's claim chimes with many of the passages I have been quoting from Frye. Harding's further claim that "we [feminists] should learn how to regard the instabilities themselves as valuable resources" is one that Dewey would have cheered.
od Fraj kojto go navedov. Dopолнительното тврдение на Хардинг дека "ниве [феминист(к)ите] треба да научиме да ги гледаме самите нестабилност како вредни ресурси" Дуи сигурно би го поддржал.

33 Frye, Politics of Reality, 48-9.

34 Премалку знам за историјата на феминизмот - за тоа колку долга и континуирана била феминистичката традиција - за да спекулирам за тоа кога нештата започнале да се менуваат.


36 Продолжената привленост на овој клуб во нашево ци­
нично столетие е посведочена од фактот што, иако Бернард Шо
ya имаше Кандида да се подбива со Марчбанс, Џојс го имаше Сти­
вен Дедалус кој напиша дека "во ковачницата на својата души би
ja исковал несоздадената свест на мојата раса". Џојс не се подби­
ваше со Стивен, а дури и Шо призна дека Кандида "не ја знае тај­
ната во поетовото срце".

37 "Она што може, кај машкиот писател - еден Торо, да
речеме, или Кристофер Смарт или Вилијам Блејк - да изгледа како
легитимна необичност, уникатна интенција, кај една од нашите две
најголеми поети (Дикинсон) беше девалвирано во вид наивност,
моминско незнаење, женски недостиг од професионализам, исто
како што самата поетеса беше престорена во сентиментален об­
јект. ("Повеќето од нас беа напола вљубени во оваа мртва девојка",
признава Арчибалд МакЛиш. Дикинсон имаше педесет и пет години
кога почина.)" (Rich, p. 167).

38 Ibid.,

39 Frye, Politics of Reality, 106n.

40 Ова е оној вид неискажлив ужас кој го создава чувст­
вото на морална одвратност (на пример, при межукастинскиот
брак), и така ги обезбедува интуициите кои се обидуваме да ги
dоведеме во рефлексивна рамнотежа со нашите принципи. Да се
смета моралната одбојност за нешто што ние можеме да го про­
изведеме или избришеме преку менувањето на јазикот на кој се
почувуват младите е првот чекор кон една универсалистичка
концепција на моралниот напредок.

41 Со цел да сформирам колку е далечна оваа иднина, да ја
земеме предвид поемата на Ева Клосовски Седвик (Eve Klodoski
Sedwick) дека ќе бидеме праведни кон гиодовано кога ќе ни биде
исто колку сеедно. Џојс не се подбиваше со Стивен, а дури и Шо
адмитирал дека "не знае тајната во поетовото срце."
42 Pragmatists need not deny that true sentences are always true (as I have, unhappily, suggested in the past that they might—notably in my "Waren die Gesetze Newtons schon vor Newton wahr? (Jahrbuch des Wissenschaftskollegs zu Berlin, 1987). Stout (Ethics After Babel, chapter 11) rightly rebukes me for these suggestions, and says that pragmatists should agree with everybody else that "Slavery is absolutely wrong" has always been true—even in periods when this sentence would have sounded crazy to everybody concerned, even the slaves (who hoped that their fellow-tribespeople would return in force and enslave their present masters). All that pragmatists need is the claim that this sentence is not made true by something other than the beliefs which we would use to support it—and, in particular, not by something like The Nature of Human Beings.

43 I have criticized realists' claims to explain predictive success by truth in Part I of my forthcoming Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). A related point—that the success of a true theory needs just as much historico-sociological explanation as the success of a false one—is made by Barry Barnes and other members of the so-called "Edinburgh school" of sociology of science.

44 It may seem that the view I am offering is the one which Frye rejects under the name of "the institutional theory of personhood"—the theory that, as she puts it, "person denotes a social and institutional role and that one may be allowed or forbidden to adopt that role." (p. 49) She says that this view "must be attractive to the phallist, who would fancy the power to create persons". But I do not want to say that men have the power to make full persons out of women by an act of grace, in the way in which sovereigns have the power to make nobles out of commoners. On the contrary, I would insist that men could not do this if they tried, for they are as much caught as are women in the linguistic practices which make it hard for women to be full persons. The utopia I foresee, in which these practices are simply forgotten, is not one which could be attained by an act of condescension on the part of men, any more than an absolute monarch could produce an egalitarian utopia by simultaneously ennobling all her subjects.
identities

리가지/осбр"и
reviews
리가지/осбр"и
reviews
Виктор Шиков

МРЕЖА ОД МАЛЕЧКИ ПРИКАЗНИ, ФЕМИНИСТИЧКИ ЛОВ ВО ПОСТБИОЛОШКИОТ ПЕЈЗАЖ

A NET OF LITTLE STORIES, FEMINIST HUNT IN THE POST-BIOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE

The unreserved, exact scientific visionary faith in the unfinished encyclopaedic abundance of the morphologic potential of natural matter – whose new, experimental laboratory life forms have yet to induce the orbit of their philosophic microcosm – is also determined by a meditation on the trespass outside the borders of biology, language and the cumulative empiricism of the pragmatic social polemic of the implemented political doctrines and adaptive political concepts. A polemic that - especially after the capitalistic leukaemia that swept over the USSR and caused rapid destruction of the, heretofore, bipolar world – takes on global dimensions, turning into a grandiose, for some even a paranoid, project called New World Order. The monumental, vertical drive of the modernistic spirit towards an exalted ontological solace had been disappointed for twenty centuries, until the teleology of its integrative urges was not interpreted as the final blindness in the one-way street of history, the last frontier of the new-millennial, auto-regulated, horizontal diversity of individual freedom. A global disintegration and fragmentation of the modern identity takes place. It is then, in a new global game, with a sort of postbabylonian potent theory of combinations using the pieces of the fragmented modernistic identity, from the ecumenical landfills of history’s memory, that the projective power of the saved culture capital, built within the mainstays of the referential points (race, class, gender, gene, education, family, nation, etc.) is activated. At that time the so called modern state occurs, which is the hyper-textually realised theme of
Viktor Shikov | A NET OF LITTLE STORIES, FEMINIST HUNT IN THE POST-BIOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE

Polifonichniot gлас на д-р Харавеј низ поглавата илустрирани со сликите на Лин Рандолф (кои се своевиден вовед, но едновремено и визуелна синтеза за медитациите на Харавеј), се обидува да ја освети да раширената мрежа на малечките приказни, изнедрени и испреплеткани внатре во тој, со прогресот на експерименталното поместување на езистенцијалните граници, од темел прекомбиниран хаосмос на постоенето. Дона Харавеј гази по лилипутската сигурност на Деридијанските траги, веќе разгазени по маргините на длабокиот лански снег од Лиотарова постмодерна состојба. Сама среде завеаниот, стерилен постбиолошки пејзаж, Харавеј со себе ги носи инструментите на биотехнологијата, генетскиот инженеринг и технонауката, кои ѝ овозможуваат да ги напише новите, киберантрополошки митови - не веќе имагинарна кохезија, туку реални виртуелности на имплодираните, индиго хоризонти на виртуелната реалност. Во длабокиот мраз на социјалната емпатија, под нејзините женскомашки нозе, д-р Харавеј тreads on the Lilliputian soundness of Derrida's footsteps, already impressed on the margins of last year's deep snow from Lyotard's postmodern state. Alone, in the midst of the snow-bound, sterile postbiological landscape, Harraway carries the instruments of biotechnology, genetic engineering and technoscience, which she would like to write the new, cyberanthropological myths - no longer an imaginary cohesive force but a real virtualities of the imploded, indigo horizons of virtual reality. In the deep ice of the social empathy beneath her femalemale feet, she decides to make a hole, where she would throw the emptied fishhook with an eclectic multitude of hooks on her own feminist question mark. She waits with a post-modernist appetite of a discursive cannibal. Then, she makes one more hole; and another, and another...until the holes encircle her, creating a round telephone dial in the middle of which she stands alone. Harraway inserts her index finger in one of those Eskimo holes and, with self-conscious, monadic-interactive drive, begins to dial the number of some of her uncountable identities, multiplied after the conquering of the selfregulating cyberfreedom. This is how she starts the knitting of the hypertextual communicative web of little narratives, recounted by the modest witnesses of the existence in the imploded chronotope of the cyberspace. "My cyborg characters populate the mutated time-space regime I call technobiopower (...) The modest witness is the sender of messages to my e-mail address (...) The modest witness is a figure in the narrative net of this book, working to reconfigure the subjects, the objects
and the communication exchange of technoscience in various types of languages", says Harraway.

One thing is certain: you either love or loathe Donna Harraway's books. She writes on the self-chosen blade of the experimental scientific scalpel. Her philosophic irony and freedom of metaphors can either annoy or amaze you. There is no middle and no compromise – except if you remain utterly indifferent towards the baroque of her dominantly feminist rhetoric, which writes new pages in the history of science.
Aleksandra Bubevska

**IS BEING A WOMEN ENOUGH?**

**Towards “Deep Breathing” by Sonja Abazieva,**


“...the metaphor of the picture and the frame, where the history of art is described as the place of identity, is also applicable in understanding the problems which take part in this particular topic, even today. As far as the, so called Worlds Art is concerned, this frame, which was created for a certain culture, but not for all cultures, is no longer suitable ...”

The new book of Sonja Abadzieva, which is the first antological review dedicated to the female visual art in Macedonia in the 20th century, could be observed in relation with the previously mentioned metaphor of the narrow frame of the History of the art and the need for it to be revised, so that the female artists could read their identity within its frames. This book appears several decades after the feminist polemics had ended, not only worldwide, but in the Balkan’s cultural space as well. It is also coming little behind of the artistic production that is directly or indirectly involved in working with the specific topics of the female artistic expression. Although this division to female and male art is a problematical one, and the unitary concept of what is female is even more problematical, Abadzieva decides to apply this chronological approach, with the tendency to “fill in certain voids that exist in to the educational, informatical and historical domain”. This ambition probably comes from the basic position of the author that the feminist movement haven’t reached the “front door” of Macedonian society yet. According to Abadzieva, the sphere of the History of the visual arts in 20th century in...
историјата на ликовното творештво во 20-от век, пак, таа недопреност од каков било радикализам, според Абаџиева, се огледа и во фактот дека основната творечка матрица на авторките во периодот на модернизмот во Македонија - е машката матрица.

Аналогијата на ситуацијата во Македонија со онаа во повеќето земји, каде се до 80-те години на миннатиот век за уметноста на жените важеле различни стандарди, за Абаџиева е појдова точка за констатацијата дека „како резултат на тоа, женското творештво е маргинализирано, потценно, несоодветно елаборирано и делумно валоризирано“. Но, со оглед на тоа што станува збор за прва студија од ваков вид кај нас, авторката не презентира аргументи за ваквата состојба конкретно во Македонија, ниту пак нуди свој критичко или теориско читање на општо прифатениот термин “женско писмо“ (во поднасловот на англиски јазик преведено како “женски дискурс”) или базем на некои негови елементи како што се субјективноста или наративноста. Контекстуализирајќи ја ситуацијата во ликовната критика, Абаџиева попатно констатира недоверност на критичарско-историчарскиот тим во Македонија. Не навлегувајќи во полемика оценува дека изложбите “Плодова вода”, 1997 г. и особено „Нарцизми“, 1999 г. добиле крајно негативни критички осврти од машките колеги, како резултат на патријахалното мислење, фалоцентричната доминација и отсуството на волја и желба да се навлезе во исказноста на женските уметници. Иако токму оваа студија би била вистинското место за теориски одговор и обмислување на македонскиот контекст. Тргнувајќи од квантитативната премиса (и покрај деклариранит метод на феноменолошка анализа) дека во Македонија, во 20-от век, бројката на жени уметници изнесува - 200, Абаџиева, во една тотална перспектива ги разгледува тематските и содржинските преокупации на македонските авторки, специфичките на ликовните медиуми и другите одредници на македонското женско писмо. Во вториот дел на книгата, самите наслови на поглавјата: „Белиот пајак“, „Мојата колиба - среќен простор“, „Сонди во телото“, „Автоскопија“, „Допир на кристалот“, „Спомени во це­лофан“, „Совршенство на јајцето“, „Припитомување на Та­

Macedonia, is pure, untouched. This “virginity” or “purity” of any radicalism, is also visible and can be proven by the fact that the basic creative matrix of the female artists in Macedonia during the period of the modernism — was in fact a masculine one.

The analogy of this situation in Macedonian female art with the similar situation in other countries, where till the 80es, the female art was treated differently than the masculine art; is base for Abadzieva’s opinion that “as a result of this circumstances, female art is marginalized, underestimated, unsuitably elaborated and is valorized only partly”. However, having in mind that this is the first study of this kind in Macedonia, we can say that the author is not presenting any kind of argumentation for this situation in Macedonian art, nor she offers her own critical or theoretical readings of the widely excepted term of women writing (in the subtitle this term is translated as female discourse). Also the author had missed to analyze some of its most typical elements such as the subjectivity or the narration. Conceptualizing the situation with the Critique of the visual arts, Abadzieva comes to the general vague opinion that the Critique and History team in Macedonia is inadequate, and without entering in any kind of polemics with them, she only mentions that the exhibitions “Plod ova Voda”1997 and especially “Narcizmi” 1999 were given negative reviews from the mail colleagues as a result of their patriarchal way of thinking, falocentric domination and the lack of their will and desire to enter into the specific way of expression of the female artists. By doing this the author missed the opportunity to focus on something that this study could be ideally suitable for; she missed the opportunity to focus on the theoretical answer to this kind of criticism and on the chance of setting the Macedonian context within. Abadzieva starts with the quantitative premise (although the method of the phenomenological analysis is declared as the method which is applied in the study) that in Macedonia, in the 20th century, the number of female artists equals 200, and from there in a certain wide, total perspective, she observes the thematic preoccupations of Macedonian female authors, the specifics of the visual medias and other characteristics of womens writing. In the second part of the book, the titles of the chapters such as “The white spider”, “My cottage – happy space”, “Probes
in the body”, “Autoscopy”, “Touch of the Crystal”, “Memories in Cellophane”, “Perfection of the Egg”, “Taming of Thanatos”, “Achtung! Cries and Whispers” and “Women and Machine”, are representing metaphors for this specific significators of the women writing. Each chapter consists from a short theoretical introductions that can be seen as signs for understanding the further described artistic peaces. A number of authors names are mentioned in several chapters, according to the themes of their artistic works... For example, Iskra Dimitrova is mentioned in all of the thematically devided chapters. The book is equipped with over 90 professional or amateur photography's of the artifacts (some of them published even before they could have been seen in the catalogues for their own projects), and in the subtext of the photography on page 138, there is an information that can lead the reader to believe that Dimitrova actually took part in the official programs of the Biennale di Venezia in 1999, where as she was only exhibiting in Venice in the time of the duration of the Biennale, but out of the official concurrences.

Sonja Abadzieva, with this catalogical review, only makes a diagnosis of the reality of the existence of female artistic expression in Macedonian visual arts. But due to the extremely wide aria of interpretations and the lack of basal method that measures the real values of the artistic works or of the individual opuses of the authors, this book, although an important step towards mentioned direction of evaluation of the artifacts, still fails to answer many of the questions about the aspects of the women writing in the Macedonian visual art of 20th century. Observed in a wider theoretical context, this book also rises one old in somewhat déclassé question regarding the symmetrical differences between the female and the mail, especially in to the sphere of their creativity.

The constant need for reevaluation and the new reading of the History of the Macedonian Visual arts that will include in it self an objective evaluation of the works of Macedonian female artist is undisputable. This new reading and reevaluating could also include the implementation of the writings of the difference, the writings of the Other vis a vis the dominant mail writing. But we can not do it if we are not avaire of the effect, that Judith
Bathler is warning us of, that a simple categorization of all women in one group which is separated from the man, is in it’s essence a dangerous and harmful one for the feministic cry for equality.

Translation: Tamara Bustrevska

NOTES

Irena Stefoska

THE CHALLENGES OF THE POLYLOGUE


In a context like this, Nikolchina’s study is a great move by the publisher, due to, above all, her theoretical and critical position. Nikolchina’s book, as we can see from its “double structure”, wants to discuss, first and foremost, one of the central figures in feminist theory and theory of literature in the 20th century, Julia Kristeva. In doing that, Nikolchina’s “gaze” on the work is determined by the very concepts of Kristeva’s theoretical “polylogue”. In a word, Nikolchina “reads Kristeva through Kristeva”, herself entering the whirlpool – not the one of dialogue, but of polylogue. This indicates a critical and lucid, not apologetic, perspective, in the course of which the problematic points of an old story about the antinomies of “the female production of thought” are re-opened.

Irena Stefoska

THE CHALLENGES OF THE POLYLOGUE


In a context like this, Nikolchina’s study is a great move by the publisher, due to, above all, her theoretical and critical position. Nikolchina’s book, as we can see from its “double structure”, wants to discuss, first and foremost, one of the central figures in feminist theory and theory of literature in the 20th century, Julia Kristeva. In doing that, Nikolchina’s “gaze” on the work is determined by the very concepts of Kristeva’s theoretical “polylogue”. In a word, Nikolchina “reads Kristeva through Kristeva”, herself entering the whirlpool – not the one of dialogue, but of polylogue. This indicates a critical and lucid, not apologetic, perspective, in the course of which the problematic points of an old story about the antinomies of “the female production of thought” are re-opened.
Вториот дел на книгата претставува обид, повторно поаѓајќи од теориските концепти на Крстева, да се чита Вирџинија Вулф, онаа Вулф која стои на почетоците на долгото, заводливо и понекогаш опасно проблематизирање на женскиот субјект. Читањето на Вулф што го предлага Николчина е дотолку поинтересно, бидејќи отворено и храбро ја демаскира вечната приказна за „убиството на мајката” како неделив идиом на формулирањето на женскиот субјект. Преку познатите метафори на „макубиството” и „немата сестра”, Николчина, меѓу другото, зборува и за еден двоен екстремизам во феминистичката литература: од една страна, тоа е екстремизам насочен кон „машкиот свет”, а од друга, (и токму тук е местото на критичката недоумица на Николчина), екстремизам кон творештвото на жените, токму она исто творештво кое „гинокритиката” вслушот сака да го откопа од целоснот заборав. Екстремизмот за кој зборува Николчина, анализирајќи го случајот на Вулф, чиј живот и дело се уште се предмет околу кој феминистките ги кршат копјата, во крајна линија, доживува пораз на една многу суптилна територија на самото уметничко и животно „писмо”, територија на која и Николчина го пронаоѓа своето место.

Текстот на Николчина претставува вистинска новост на македонскиот читателски простор, не само поради овие тук и поради многу други луцидни и критички согледувања на отворените прашања во феминистичката теорија и критика. Посебниот шарм на оваа книга лежи во фактот што нејзината авторка истовремено е и теоретичар и поет, така што, читателот и самоит нужно ќе биде вовечен во еден нов и автентичен „полилог”.

Starting once again from Krsteva’s theoretical concepts, the second part of the book is an attempt to read Virginia Woolf, the selfsame Woolf standing at the beginnings of the long, seductive and sometimes dangerous problematization of the female subjectivity. The reading of Woolf that Nikolchina suggests is all the more interesting since it unmasks, openly and bravely, the eternal “murder of the mother” story. She sees this as the indivisible idiom of formulation of the female subject. Using the well-known metaphors of “matricide” and “the silent sister”, Nikolchina speaks, among other things, of a certain dual extremism directed, on one side, towards the “male world”, and on the other, (and here lies Nikolchina’s critical quandary) towards the oeuvre of women, towards the very oeuvre that “gynecocriticism” is in fact trying to rescue from utter oblivion. The extremism Nikolchina discusses here, analyzing Woolf’s case – whose life and work is still something feminists cross verbal swords about – is defeated on the extremely subtle territory of the “letter” of art and life, a territory where Nikolchina herself finds a place under the sun.

Nikolchina’s text is a true novelty for the Macedonian reader, due to many other lucid and critical remarks on contemporary issues in feminist theory and critique. The special charm of this book lies in the fact her author is simultaneously a theorist and poetess, and as a result of this the reader too will be drawn in a new and authentic “polylogue” of a sort.

Translation: Sase Tasev
A story exists of the primeval human's understanding of reality, not as a reality of separated points, sections and splits, but as an organism. It is truly toilsome to look at that self as fragmented. Creating an awareness of the existence of a mysterious unity is to say that they are One, fruit of one root and only one beginning - unius principii.

The "dream" of the primordial Whole is actually a dream of the unity of the primordial epicene One, a dream contained in the myth of the androgynous, as a myth which deeply implies the sole beginning, generator, creator, the man and the woman in their zero level of sexuality.

The mystery of the totality is academically founded in the myth-critical essay The Androgynous - utopia of the perfect sex (Sigmapres, 1999, Skopje) of the author Maja Bojadzievska who, embracing the comparative research option, establishes numerous (ritual, mythological, esoteric, philosophical, literary) descriptions of the androgynous being and traverses them through the complex and imaginary symbolic theory of Gilbert Durand. This suggests a deep and polyphonic approach which rounds up the chanting on the same topic - the androgynous being. But what is that which in this project on the utopia of the perfect sex is being structured as a next runway, as a possibility of a dialogue journey through this androgynous imaginative image? What is that which the author...
Maja Bojadzievska opens as a possibility for a postsinging of this myth critical essay?

One such possible postsinging can frame gender, ideological, sociological, cultural, feminist, critical (...) spaces and relations that essentially provoke the proclamation of the dialogue as an important and deeply founded component. Namely, the openness to an encounter with separated androgynous collocutors and to all these highlighted spaces, also suggests a contemporary phenomenon like the dialogue. It yields a possibility to operate with the principle of dynamics through space and time, to merge past and future, to rediscover the incompleteness, thus rediscovering the imperfection of things as well (hence their challenging power). This revelation would be a new possibility to proceed, search, contemplate, merge and separate new truths and utopias. It is the dialogue with the numerous spaces that this writing on the utopia of the perfect sex opens, the permanent existence of two sides, the course of One towards the Other, discerning into that other identity and the true understanding of it. It means opening the longing for the lost oneness, the ontologically unified view on harmony - the Whole. That is, the Other as a complementary, positive and positing constituent and not as a disparate, overruling, superior and oppositional. Androgyny as a utopia of the positing and not the oppositional.

This mythocritical essay The Androgynous - utopia of the perfect sex by Maja Bojadzievska is a clear proclamation of such a dialogue credo, which, going beyond the theoretical and critical contours, launches itself in the broader existential space where the One, the Other and the Third exist. These, if they do not contain the myth of the androgynous origin, contain at least the androgynous thought about things. Such a communicational function, through the concept of a dialogue, foretells a superstructure of the primordial in the myth of the androgynous, built of other texts of a broader anthropological, social and existential context, thus pointing at the complex conditions for that which means mythical, heavenly primordial state of the One as a whole, as the beginning and the end of the history of the world.
на Едното како цело, како почеток и крај на историјата на светот.

Расплетувањето и плетењето на двојните моќи на нештата е еден од оние гласови кои се вклучуваат во нашето постпеење за враќање кон андрогинот во единственоста на текстот, како во приказната дека древниот човек ја гледал стварноста, не како стварност на раздвоени точки, пресеци, расцепи, туку како целовит организм. Или како во приказната дека некогаш постоело Едното, а потоа се раздвоило и оттогаш секој тежнее да го пронајде својот дел. Дијалогот со Другиот, различниот, инаквиот, се покажува како дијалог на вечното враќање, но и како принцип на активирачко и надградувачко егзистенцијално патување за стигнување до себе си, Едниот како дел од Другиот, и Другиот како дел од Едниот, кон Целината. Андрогинот.

Преводот е на авторката

In the unraveling and the entwining of the twofold forces of things is one of those voices which take part in our post singing of the return to the androgynous being within the unity of the text, like in the story of the primeval human who saw reality not as one of separated poles, sections or ruptures but as an integral organism. Or like in the story that in ilо tempore only the One existed which later divided itself and that since then each strives to find his or her severed part. The dialogue with the Other, the different and the otherwise, reveals itself as a dialogue of the perpetual return, but it also reveals itself as a principle of an activating and superstructuring existential journey towards oneself, the One as an unavoidable part of the Other, and the Other as an infallible of the One, a journey towards the Totality. The Androgyny.
Despina Angelovska


Why does the future (not to mention the present) seem to offer no hope or escape from capitalism? Ironically, the author argues, it is not the economic discourse of the right but primarily the socialist and Marxist traditions that have constituted capitalism as large, powerful, active, expansive, penetrating, systematic, self-reproducing, dynamic, victorious, and capable of conferring identity and meaning. What this has meant for left politics is the continued deferral of anticapitalist projects of social transformation and noncapitalist initiatives of economic innovation, since these presumably would have little chance of success in the face of a predominantly or exclusively capitalist economy.

In this book J.K. Gibson-Graham explores the possibility of more enlivening modes of economic thought and action, outside and beyond the theory and practice of capitalist reproduction. She draws on feminist and poststructuralist theorising, of subjectivity and the body, and on anti-essentialist developments within Marxism. Challenging the usual vision of capitalism as necessarily and naturally hegemonic, J. K. Gibson-Graham liberates a space of economic difference, one in which a noncapitalist politics of economic invention might take root and flourish.
When capitalism takes up the entire available social place, there's no possibility of anything else. If capitalism functions as a unity, it cannot be partially or locally displaced. The intent of J. K. Gibson-Graham with this book is first of all to help create the discursive conditions under which socialist or other noncapitalist constructions become "realistic" present activities. For this purpose, the hegemony of capitalism has to be deconstructed, its unity must be made a fantasy, visible as a denial of diversity and change.

Rather than constituting a diverse realm of heterogeneity and difference, representations of noncapitalism frequently become subsumed to the discourse of capitalist hegemony. To the extent that capitalism exists as monolith and noncapitalism as an insufficiency or absence, the economy is not a plural space, a place of difference and struggle. When capitalism exists as sameness, noncapitalism can only be subordinated or rendered invisible. In encountering the subordination of noncapitalism, we confront a similar problem to that encountered by feminists attempting to reconceptualise binary gender, argues J. K. Gibson-Graham. Noncapitalism is then to capitalism as woman to man: an insufficiency until and unless it is released from the binary metaphysics of identity. Rethinking capitalist morphology in order to liberate economic development from the hegemonic grasp of capitalist identity is a radical project. Yet resources, says J. K. Gibson-Graham, for such a project are already available in the domain of social theory, especially within queer theory, where a rethinking of sexual morphology is taking place. For queer theorists sexual identity is not automatically derived from certain organs or practices but is instead a "state of transitivity": one of the things that "queer" can refer to (is) the open mesh of possibilities, gaps overlaps, dissonance and resonance, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone's gender, of anyone's sexuality are not made (or cannot be made) to signify monolithically. Queer theory has encouraged critical feminist's attempts to rupture monolithic representations of capitalism and capitalist formation, and to understand it not as a unity but as heterogeneity, not as sameness but as a difference.
можат да бидат направени да означават монолитност.
Квир теоријата ги охрабри критичните феминистички
обиди за раскршување на монолитичката репрезентација
на капитализмот и капиталистичката формација, и тоа да
се сфаши не како единственост, туку како разнообраз-
ност, не како истост, туку како разлика.

Превод: Саше Тасев

*Џ.К Гибсон-Грeam е авторска амалгамира на Џули Гре-
am и Катерина Гибсон, феминистички економски географичарки
кои истражуваат нови начини на размислување за социјалното,
позиционирање на економското и издеjствување на политичкото.
Џули Греам е при Универзитетот на Масачусетс во Амхерст, а
Катерина Гибсон е во Универзитетот Монаш во Мелбурн.

*J.K.Gibson-Graham is the authorial amalgamation of Julie
Graham and Katherine Gibson, feminist economic geographers who are
exploring new ways of thinking the social, positioning the economic, and
enacting the political. Julie Graham is at the University of Massachusetts
in Amherst and Katherine Gibson is at Monash University in Melbourne.
The concept of ethics able to incorporate the plurality of moral values existent in the relations between people of diverse socio-cultural groups is the project of contemporary ethics theories. The ethical approach faces a problem that has two aspects: what are the boundaries of moral values, their origin and significance, and the aspect of moral values emerging from the interaction between various moral systems.

Hinman's theoretical views of the contemporary ethical challenges presented in his book portray him as an ethicist who forces himself into the very center of contemporary moral conflicts, identifying their origin forthwith. The themes he presents, whose solution he seeks, refer to our reaction to moral diversity, typified by certain dilemmas and issues, but with the diversity of moral theories as well.

As he himself admits, ethical pluralism allows for a much better answer to or attitude towards moral diversity, than ethical relativism or ethical absolutism. It is clear he is not hiding the background of his position when stating his view on the relation ethical pluralism would have with multiculturalism: our surrounding is multicultural, so pluralism is fundamental for sound multiculturalism.
Hinman does not pose multiculturalism only as a matter of interethnical relations, but as a medium where the relations of the moral agent's identities meet. For Hinman the transcendentual moral subject is an illusion of modernism and cannot be a starting point for ethical investigation. On the other hand, ethical relativism recognizes the socio-cultural identity as a subject of moral life but it does not exclude the possibility of an intercultural moral judgment, which reduces it to ethical isolationism.

The basic assumptions of Hinman's ethical position are that we live in an age of diversity and a shared world; a world where the problems are global and interdependence is becoming greater and greater. Nevertheless, he develops a thesis that the identity is central for the moral agent. The "argument for identity" substantiates this thesis. The argument's structure is:

"The Argument For Identity"

1. Premise "What is morally correct depends on the identity of a moral agent"
2. Premise "Gender, ethnicity, race or any other attribute is central to the identity of the moral agent"
3. Conclusion "Therefore, what is morally correct depends on the race, ethnicity, gender, etc. of the person"

This argument is very controversial, not only in the content of its premises but in its implications as well. Stated like this, the argument seems to undermine the very idea of ethics as a philosophic discipline transcendenting the limits of exclusivity, and presents it as a discourse drawn into the policy of power. The summoning of the fact of diversity and the determinants of moral life do not seem to justify our intuition when it comes to the nature of morality.
After all, it seems that the key concept that will jolt this dilemma is borrowed from Carol Gilligan’s female ethics. The concept of a “moral voice” is more of a metaphor, which we will use to bridge the great difference between the “moral identities.” Although the various moral voices are traits of the various cultural identities, they do not have to be incompatible. The moral voice is what transcends the separateness of the moral interest in the multicultural world.

Ethical pluralism presupposes certain principles, which, beside the moral identity of the moral agent, are its moral voice:

1. The principle of understanding: The danger of forming a moral attitude before understanding the meaning of conduct and moral practice of a culture, call us to understand the moral meaning of said practice.

2. The principle of tolerance: The ability to live with Otherness is a sign of multicultural ethics. Leaving room for development of the morality of the Other, regardless how different from ours.

3. The principle of standing against evil: Understanding and tolerance have their limits. There can be no understanding for killing, atrocities, and humiliation in the name of anything or with any justification.

4. The principle of error: We must bear in mind the possibility of misunderstanding other cultures, even if we approach them in the spirit of humanity. Constant reevaluation of our moral position in the context of both our and the Other’s moral values.

Hinman’s ethical position is a challenge to the moral issues in a world where the processes of globalization call for a
reevaluation of our identities, their nature and groundwork. Simultaneously, however, it reminds us of the moral aggressiveness we harbor towards those who are not we.

Translation: Sase Tasev

This collection of texts rounds off the annual conference bearing the same name organized by the English Institute in the USA. The authors find the motives for the choice of the conference subject in the debate going on in the past few years, on the politics of theory in terms of Literature Studies. However, the authors feel that basic terms, theory and politics have not been cleared yet. According to them, the theory oftentimes boils down to poststructuralism, which is too narrow a frame, and this is not a single phenomenon. On the other hand, there are opinions that theory is a plain formalistic guidebook, with which the text reveals its lore, usually autoreferentially. These opinions exclude the political nature of theory, for if there is no initiation into the context, there is no politics. Today authors like Ernesto Laclau, Homi Bhabha, Spivak, Drucilla Cornell, Theresa de Lauretis, are recontextualising the norms of the French poststructuralism with their research into the issues of race, colonialism, sexuality and gender. This situates them in the framework of the left academic discourse, although this is far from the roots of the Marxist tradition. According to the authors, the goal of this collection is to see how the issue of the political nature of (poststructuralistic) theory is posed and to present the ways in which literature studies continue to blend with left political thinking. They reject the contrary, pure viewpoints: one, that every text is autonomous and cannot be transposed in a different type of texts, and two, that referential and thematic criticism is all that theory should deal with. They use the ambivalence of the word “left” in posing the questions: does
Critique the main perspectives on the theory. By considering the multifaceted nature of the concept "left" (left, remainder), they re-examine two questions: whether politically imbued literary analysis leaves theory behind, and, if so, does literature remain what it is? However, it is not the ambition of the collection to give definite answers. They focus much more on presenting texts, many of them even with contrary positions, but always ones that use the terms "theory", "left" and "literature" in an unusual manner.

When editing the collection, the authors decided on a different strategy from the one at the symposium: Jonathan Caller's introductory test "The Literary in Theory" is at the end of the collection. The readers may still want to start with that text because the indispensable historical dimensions of this issue are given there, which will make it easier to understand the positions of the other participants, since their texts are more explicative and less metatheoretical. Caller starts his review in the sixties when he was initiated into the area and governed by structuralism. At the time, compared to other scientific disciplines, literature was privileged. This is because it is the essence of language, and language, according to structuralists, is vital for expression, but also for the investigation of various aspects of life. Theory was the key to all other disciplines and was preoccupied with establishing literature, that pure, eternal amalgam, in every simple text, or with what Jakobson calls the poetic function. Caller then shows the opposite tendency, the antitheory of Knapp and Benn Michaels who believed that theoretical arguments have no consequences in terms of literature and that theory should thus be abolished. Next is post-theory, which perceives the aporia nature of antitheory, being a theory itself — and yet it strives to abandon the teleology and totalitarianism of all Great theories. He further elaborates the value of literature for today's identity theories (race, gender, class) since it is full of implicit models how to form and identify. He sees literature's position today not only as a source of themes for theoretical contemplation but also as a theory in and of itself. Finally, Caller ends his essay agreeing with David Simpson's opinion that although today literature is not central to sciences, its specifics, narration above all, anecdotes, subjectivization — are basic models in which sciences organize their scientific material.
дотноста, субјективацијата, денес се основни модели според кои науките го организираат својот научен материјал.

Во текстот „Од станот на Хејверсток Хил до американската училишна“ Гајатри Чакраворти Сливак дава своє видување на современи текови на финансискиот капитал. Таа ги пронаоѓа апориите, заблудите и неодржливите позиции на теориските промислувања и практични дејствувања на одредени леви движења. Таа мошне детално укажува на појавата на т.н. западен марксизам, заради погрешната интерпретација на англискиот превод на Енгелс на Марк-совиот „Капиталот“, при што се изедначиле трудот и моќта на трудот, и во поимот на вредноста не се синтезирале употребната и разменската вредност. Елaborирале ги карактеристиките на глобализацијата, создавадени финансискиот капитал и од несоодветноста на некои негови практики, таа објаснува како доаѓа до создавање површи промени во редистрибуцијата на добрата и заштитата на животната средина. Сливак смета дека на денешниот марксизам му треба многу повеќе од мешање на човекови права и економија, му треба етичка практика олицетворена во грижата за другиот како грижа за себе. Приоритет треба да имаат они што загубиле во капиталистичката битка, а капиталот на поефикасен и посуштински начин треба да се сврти кон социјалното. Тоа подразбира напуштање на телеволошкото и урбаното и свртување кон руралното, кон неделивоста на човекот и земјата, на субјектот и објектот.

Џенет Хејли во својот текст „Исто како расните аргументи“ го разгледува судирот мегу расните и сексуалните движења за човекови права. Обидот на геј активистите да ги остварат своите права повикувајќи се на расните права во Америка, кои во голема мерка се остварени, е во контраст со отпорот на црнечките водачи да се идентификуваат со хомосексуалците. Иако смета дека прашањата на расата и сексуалноста се испреплетени, и дека треба да се биде претпазлив кон сите поистоветувања, таа се обидува да ги деконструира кохерентностите теории според кои, групата и идентитетот се компактни и униформни. Давајќи многуброjni примери кога

In her text “From Haverstock Hill Flat to Classroom”, Gayatri Chakrayorty Spivak gives her view on the contemporary flow of financial capital, finding the aporias, the misconceptions and the fallacies in theoretical contemplation and practical actions of certain left movements as well. At first, she points out in great detail to the wrong interpretation of Marx’s Capital in Engels’ English translation, which lead to the emergence of the so-called Western Marxism. It is characterized by equaling labour with power of labour and the failure to incorporate the terms use value and exchange value in the term value. Then, she further elaborates on the characteristics of globalization, caused by financial capital and the ineptitude of some of its practices. She said it created only superficial, not essential, changes in terms of the redistribution of goods or the protection of the environment. She feels that Marxism today needs more than a mix of human rights and economy – it needs ethical practices, embodied in caring for the other like for oneself. Priority should be given to those who have lost the capitalistic battle. Also, capital should focus on the social, but in a way that is more effective and fundamental – this will be the abandonment of the urban teleological and turning towards the rural, towards not making a division between man and earth, the subject and the object.

In “Like Race Arguments”, Janet Halley looks into the clash between racial and sexual human rights movements – the attempt of the gay activists to exercise their rights calling back the analogy with the largely exercised racial rights in America – and the resistance of the African-American leaders who refuse to be identified with the homosexuals. She supports the view that racial and sexual issues are interlaced, complex and that, for those reasons, one should beware of uniformity. Simultaneously she deconstructs theories of coherency that see the group and the identity as compact and uniform. She gives numerous examples when an individual, due to his specificity, gives up the loyalty to the group, touching upon the issue of talking in somebody else’s name.
Michael Warner, in his “Zones of Privacy”, critically analyzes New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s decision to close strip-tease bars, porno video stores, gay bookstores etc. in the name of protection of privacy. Warner thoroughly expounds that this policy is dictated by the market capital wishing to create uniformed buyers with standardizes norms. Those are the reasons to destroy the public sexual culture of the gay/lesbian movements, and force monogamous private life. Warner points out the importance public sexual culture has on any private sexual forming, and notes the many contradictions in the private/public relation. Although public, some sexual practices take place in strictly closed circles. He refutes the view that public sexual culture is at a great risk from HIV, since some of its forms (peep shows, cinemas, masturbation, striptease) involve no partner contact.

John Brenkman explores the relations between literary studies and politics in his “Extreme criticism”. He thinks those relations have been fruitful in the past two centuries, but now are disconnected. He notes the unreasonable division in formalist and nonformalist criticism, claiming form is important for the material expression of the work, while the aesthetic experience of the form is important for the sociopolitical practices, which form the public sphere. Brenkman feels that current gender, race and class research neglects form.

In his “The Return to Realism and the Future of Contingency”, Michael Bérubé elaborates that today antifundamentalist theory does not support the progressive political movements and that, for those reasons, more and more intellectuals are going back to the values of the Enlightenment.
William Connolly's "Refashioning of the Secular" seeks a renewed animation of secularism, which has lost its Christian values in the face of the new religious, ethical, gender or sexual differences. With that in mind, he presents a review of the philosophical ideas that can serve the purpose.

In the text "The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Anorexia", Jeff Nunokawa elaborates that Oscar Wilde's homosexuality was not a result of his intimate preference but his rejection of the canons of Protestant ethics. He discusses Wilde's attitudes in his utopian text "The Soul of Man Under Socialism", convergent to the de-essentialist attitudes present in the novel "The Picture of Dorian Gray."

Translation: Sase Tasev

This impressive study by professor Lefkowitz is an attempt to describe how the Greek treated female experience in myths and to present some of the aspects of this experience that were regularly interpreted differently. Using a comparative method, Lefkowitz matches the myths with other Greek and Roman texts in order to approach the authentic language of the original text as close as possible. In addition, she avoids starting from a position of structural anthropology and discussing a complex issue using binary oppositions. The author no longer has the ambition to set this book aside for specialized readers – she can woo the reader with a simple, though analytical style, without pretensions for theoretical systematization.

In this study, Lefkowitz presents the female characters in myths, literature and historical documentation. She concentrates on those aspects of female experience that are most often misunderstood – life of wives separated from their husbands, marriage, women's role in politics, self-sacrifice and martyrdom and the nature of misogyny.

Attempting to discern the gender positioning in the story of Greek civilization, she polemizes with some modern critics' views. These critics oftentimes interpret Greek literature according to their standards and preoccupation, mostly read recounted
Towards Women in Greek Myth

Vesna Krstevska

The story of Greek mythology is not about the unhappiness of women or their repression by men, but the hard time of mortals in general. On the contrary, women in Greek myths are educated (everybody in Greece, including free people went to theatre and knew the dramatic poetry) and as opposed to the concept of women in the Bible, where chastity is the primary ideal, the Greek woman has a great potential for admittance into the public sphere.

Visibility and mention of female existence appear in the period of her initiation in marital life and she is remembered mostly for her role in the family. This is the most favorable model of her participation in society and most of the time those with a different vision of their primary role in life are evil and destructive. Women who have achieved something have aristocratic background and are most often associated with an important husband. Greek writers wrote that women talked publicly about the problems that concerned them but did not participate in decision making. They were brave but not truly independent. Although the unconventional behavior of certain women in ancient times is often emphasized, this complies with what was expected from them in the frames of the laws of family. Thus, Antigone defends the laws of the family, Ifigeny deceives the king in order to save her brother, Helen lies to save Menelaus –
All these women show a sort of passive resistance and defend their male kin with nonviolent methods. Lystrate in Aristophanes' play with the same title is considered the first liberal woman to create a peace agreement, but she does that in order to save the family and return to it. Again, this speaks of the fact that women maintained political views and had intellect but did not have independence. Intelligence in women is emphasized but it was not becoming for them to adopt a different lifestyle, separated from the husband. Woman's ability to sacrifice speaks volumes about her courage and responsibility in the face of society laws and this equals her to men. Finally, the woman constantly cosmoizes and harmonizes the space around her in her rituals.

Lefkowitz analyzes everything from epitaphs, historical texts, catalogues to nuptial agreements because it has been proven that they say much more about the status of women and give a much more tangible view than myths and literary texts. She portrays some very ordinary women like the woman - philosopher Hyparchy who traveled with her husband and disseminated her philosophy, Menophila who received honors from the town for her wit and leadership abilities and Hypathia, the woman - philosopher who gathered the most influential men around herself.

The Greek woman lived her own femininity. Gender was not the principal reason for criticism directed towards the visible, unconventional and influential women - the reasons were primarily of a political nature.

Although the author leaves the question open on why the idea of true independence for women seems foreign to Greek thought, she renders women's ability to think (something publicly recognized by men) clearly visible. Lefkowitz lucidly concludes that in Orestia and Odyssey Agamemnon is not discussing Clytemnestra's adultery, but indicates her need for justice and ability to plan and think. After all, what
правда и способност да планира и размислува. Најпосле, она што ги плаше грчките мажи кај жената не е женската сексуалност, туку нивната интелигенција.

men feared in women was not their sexuality, but their intelligence.

Translation: Sase Tasev
In the critiques of the '80 we can notice a glorification of this book, from the perspective of publishing something that was served to the female intellectual energy as impossible and unnatural. Misogyny was the very air they breathed at the time. Here we are talking about the time when the American woman was unquestioningly belittled, taken away from the path of success, aggressively ignored or ignorantly aggressed, taken for a helper, and when the case was not so, she was called a bitch or a witch.

Recently this book has already been accepted not as an instrument in the fight against the men, but more as an analysis of the differences of which both genders are unaware but still continue to build the stonewall that buries the foundations. The book offers a full anatomy of the men who, despite running the world, still behave like frightened children. Such men, Dinnerstein argues, infinitely continue to separate from the ruler of their infantilism, the Mother. Women, too, are complicit in the daily injustices they suffer since they, too, distrust the mother in themselves. The author offers a subtle, revealing account of the accusations men and women have traditionally been throwing at each other, including the women's acquiescence to male power. It is a woman who introduces us to the world before we can recognize her as a limited, mortal being like ourselves. Struggling out from under the control of this first alluring, seemingly omnipotent person, we actually fight the biggest battle we ever
Ida Nikolovska
Towards The Mermaid and The Minotaur

Exhausted, we fling ourselves out of the sea full of mermaids onto the dry land of minotaurs who roar and strut, but who nonetheless seem much more rational and tamer in contrast to the Mother still stalking in the infantile layers of our personality.

Dinnerstein's evocation of the age-old arrangements between men and women often approaches poetry. In her lyricism, she recreates the familiar pull of culturally rich versions of the heterosexual past, the dance in the villages, the men kicking and shouting and twirling women whose job is to admire and honor male strength.

This book is not a defense of female existence; it is a loom with years of related observations about the strengths and weaknesses of human thought. Clearly, this work is only a part of a great project: To create in us a mature recognition of the fact that we are not alone here, that we are the makers of future and the caretakers of a wild nature that now depends on our mental growth, on our knowledge of ourselves and to learn self-restraint if that nature is to survive. Therefore, Ann Snitow in the Preface of the book says:

This is the point of The Mermaid and The Minotaur - forbearance and responsibility, an amalgam always changing, the very stuff of life.

We can understand this point only by comparing Dorothy Dinnerstein to Ariadne, who, knowing that we must move through complex and frightening pathways of the labyrinth, believes that in the end we will come out of it gaining the genuine freedom as a personal value. Ariadne freeing Theseus from the Minotaur's maze opens a new way for men and women. Those are the pathways for overcoming the differences that had often been abused in order to dishonor the character of the Mother,
кои много често биле злоупотребувани на штета на ликот на Мајката, во која авторката ја гледа симбиозата на сите живи сущности и затоа посебно ја подвлекува важноста на примарното искуство во мајчиното тело. Едно е сепак евидентно, а тоа се забележливи разлики кои се јавуваат по неонаталниот период и кои се предмет на многуте обликувања произлезени од самата средина во која субјектот се развива. Тоа што е опасно во овој случај е прераснувањето на овие разлики во јаз сличен на оној меѓу расите, кој многу лесно преоѓа во социопатолошко и агресивно однесување.

Преводот е на авторката

in which the author sees the symbiosis of all living creatures and that is why she stresses the importance of the primary experience with the maternal body. What we can be sure of is that the average gender differences that are observable after the neonatal period have been subject to heavy environmental shaping. The danger in this case is in the growth of these differences up to a point where they will create a gap, like the racial one, which could easily get transformed into a sociopathological and aggressive behavior.
Идентитети: Списание за политика, род и култура (ISSN 1409-9268)
Издавач: Истражувачки центар за родови студии,
Институт Евро-Балкан,
„Партизански одреди” 63, Скопје, Македонија
tел.: ++ 389 02 390 731

Дизајн и техничко уредување:
студио - add ART

Институт Евро-Балкан, 262 страни, 21 см.
Тираж 800 примероци